Hsinchu City Mayor Ann Kao (高虹安) announced her departure from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) immediately after she was sentenced to seven years and four months in prison by the Taipei District Court for embezzling public funds during her time as a legislator. It was the first trial of her case.
The question is, why did she quit the TPP? What was her intention?
From the TPP’s perspective, Kao was the party’s only head of local government — a high-ranking party member, an important asset and a rising star.
If the TPP had evidence that Kao was innocent of the charges against her, had been wronged, and that her sentencing could be considered “political persecution,” the ruling would not in any way damage the party.
In fact, it would have had the opposite effect: It would spark public empathy for the TPP’s tragic star. Kao could leverage her “victimhood” in subsequent election campaigns, either by running for re-election in Hsinchu City or seeking higher-ranking roles. Her case would become an asset for the TPP’s election campaigns.
A similar phenomenon happened during the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) party-state period, when dangwai (黨外, “outside the party”) figures and their family members, who were politically persecuted in the Kaohsiung Incident, were handily elected because they were seen as being victimized for their political beliefs.
It could be expected that Kao’s case would be of great value to the TPP.
The party should not accept her decision to leave, but should rather employ all their resources and mobilize supporters to back her up. One could argue that TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) would be duty-bound to give her a lifetime achievement award for her contribution to the party.
If we look at the situation from Kao’s perspective we see that:
First, it is unreasonable to say that she must leave the party to be able to appeal.
Second, it is nonsense to say that only an opt-out can prove that her case is “political persecution.”
Third, it is illogical to say that leaving the party is the only way to prove her innocence.
Finally, while it might sound reasonable for her to say that she does not want her party to bear the consequences of the ruling, it is hardly a valid argument. The reason is simple enough. If Kao insists that she is being wronged, then why would her party be compromised?
If Kao was politically persecuted, she and the TPP would benefit from it, as told from the above, then how could the party be hurt?
If Kao was being subject to political victimization, why did she not mobilize the TPP’s resources to seek redress through the justice system? Instead, she left the party, which she seemingly tried to avoid compromising. None of this is fathomable.
Chang Kuo-tsai is a retired National Hsinchu University of Education associate professor.
Translated by Fion Khan
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