The foreign ministers of members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — consisting of Australia, Japan, India and the US — met last weekend in Tokyo following meetings at the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting convened in Vientiane, Laos. After their discussions in Tokyo, they achieved greater clarity on how the Quad could be more focused. Except for Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong Penny Wong (黃英賢), who had met Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) in Canberra in March, they all met Wang in Vientiane.
The Quad has consciously turned toward a “doing good for the region” approach. This requires greater implementation efforts and follow-ups. Working groups are increasing and the foreign ministers have discussed serious ideas for the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) region, the Pacific Island nations and to increase the inclusion of ASEAN.
These initiatives include a space-based climate warning system in Mauritius, support for Open Radio Access Networks, joint projects on disaster relief in Palau and Papua New Guinea, ASEAN countries in the Quad fellowships and greater involvement of India’s International Finance Corp in the national marine domain awareness plan.
Following the ministers meeting, the Quad announced the establishment of a Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting which would discuss capacity-building projects and responsible state behavior in cyberspace.
They also announced the establishment of a Quad Cyber Bootcamp in India. This is significant progress.
These are important initiatives for potential partners in the IORA, among which are ASEAN countries and the Pacific Island nations who collaborate with the Quad in areas which do not conflict with China.
The Quad versus China framing makes these nations anxious. This Quad functional approach allows engagement with reduced anxiety.
The Quad must seek better physical connectivity. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor announced in September last year is an example and a warning of difficulties. Cooperative projects within the Indo-Pacific region itself are necessary to counter China.
However, a few cogent ideas need to be determined and feasibility studies need to be conducted to deliver on these projects.
First, Quad countries need to divide their responsibilities and work toward fulfilling these initiatives with other partners. This has not been an easy task, even in arrangements among Quad members.
Second, strategic issues invariably dominate Quad meetings. “Unwritten, but evident” is the Quad challenge to China’s domination of the region. By seeking a level playing field and adherence to international rules by all, the Quad hopes to make breakthroughs. China’s response to the Quad meeting is to label it an effort to curtail China’s influence. It has also increased its military exercises in the region and brought the first Russian ships in a long time back into the South China Sea.
The Quad fully backs ASEAN’s centrality and encourages its conclusion of a code of conduct with China in the hope that China would abide by the rules it sets for itself.
China’s bullying of the Philippines is discouraging. Although the standoff between the Philippines and China has diffused, China Coast Guard vessels continue to surround Filipino vessels at the Second Thomas Shoal (Renai Shoal, 仁愛暗沙) and tensions could escalate at any time.
Japan and the US have already enhanced their military engagement with the Philippines. Japanese fighter jets now undertake rotational roles in the Philippines and Australian forces are also likely to see rotational deployment soon.
India has provided it with BrahMos missiles, the most potent in the Filipino armament.
Although these are not all of the Quad activities, they arise from a common outlook.
India has shed its reticence in calling for Beijing to uphold the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration ruling in favor of the Philippines. Previously, India had only spoke about the need for all sides to uphold the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Beginning on a bilateral basis last year with the Philippines, and now in a Quad communique, India has asked for China to abide by this ruling.
The South China Sea and China’s actions were a dominant feature of this Quad meeting and a carryover of the meetings in Vientiane.
The Quad would be happier if ASEAN could negotiate a worthy code of conduct with China. In reality, whatever they agree to is likely to be an effort to circumscribe the role of non-Chinese powers in the South China Sea, rather than an agreement on keeping a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Third, like Russia’s war on Ukraine, Israel’s war in Gaza has also attracted the Quad’s attention.
All four members are in favor of peace, a two-state solution and Israel’s right to defend itself. On Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is less commonality, but a general agreement that the war should end.
India’s possible engagement with Ukraine would be viewed with interest because, among the Quad members, India is the only one that has not publicly criticized Russia, and maintains stable relations with Russia and Ukraine.
Finally, the dichotomy of the Quad formally working for the public good in the region while continuing to coordinate military responses to problems would continue. The Quad is here to stay, and it is evolving.
Although on some issues the US, Japan and Australia work separately and India does not join them, in the overarching scheme of things, India is a participant.
There have been several maritime and multi-role exercises happening in the Indo-Pacific region over the past month. While some have been between Japan and its European partners, in the larger exercises, India has been an important and integral partner.
This is the nuance that India is showing in the Quad. It is strategic congruence, but not alignment. India remains committed to dealing with “shared challenges, and present our respective visions for stability and prosperity together with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, and our plans for the Quad to provide tangible benefits for the region.”
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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