For a long time, the air force’s battle plan has been to use segments of the nation’s freeways as contingency runways for its military aircraft in the event of an invasion and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) destroy or damage the nation’s runways.
Currently, the distribution of Taiwan’s runways is mainly concentrated in the western part of the country — including the freeway sections in Changhua County’s Huatan (花壇), Chiayi County’s Minsyong (民雄), Tainan’s Madou (麻豆) and Rende (仁德), and Pingtung County’s Jiadong (佳冬). The first four are all on freeways, while the Jiadong section is on Provincial Highway 1.
However, in recent years, the PLA Navy and Air Force have increased their range and capabilities with the addition of fighters that can fly longer distances, and the commissioning of air refueling tankers and aircraft carriers. As a result, the frequency of various types of PLA aircraft flying around southeastern and eastern Taiwan has increased.
In the past, Hualien County’s Jiashan (佳山) airbase and Taitung County’s Chihang (志航) airbase in eastern Taiwan were regarded as the air force’s final resort from which to counterattack, because of their underground caves and underpass networks.
Today, the security of the Jiashan and Chihang airbases is threatened by the frequent PLA flights near Taiwan. A practical policy response to meet these threats is for the air force to establish an additional runway in eastern Taiwan, so as to diversify the risk fighters would face in taking off and landing there.
From the perspective of national security and air defense, I support the air force building an additional runway in eastern Taiwan. Perhaps those against it would argue that Taiwan is already within the range of PLA rockets and cruise missiles, would another runway not also be subject to the PLA’s firepower?
This argument is not entirely wrong. However, from the perspective of defense, the more new runways and arms storage the nation builds, the more it would increase the PLA’s cost of attacking Taiwan. In other words, from the perspective of the defense, in order to disperse the PLA’s ballistic missile attacks, it is necessary for the air force to build an additional runway in eastern Taiwan.
As for the highly urbanized western part of Taiwan, there is almost no room to add another runway. Since the eastern part of Taiwan is less developed than the western part, and the former is relatively sparsely populated, the addition of a runway in eastern Taiwan is not only a necessity, but also a much better option for the “Taiwan-Pescadores defense operation.”
Residents of eastern Taiwan, rather than opposing the construction of an additional runway, should consider how a new runway in the region would help the air force’s fighter jets evacuate to stay in the fight, which would strengthen the nation’s defense.
Ray Song is a doctoral student at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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