Last month, US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo in an interview with the Washington Post said: “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities … so that I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”
The “Drone Hellscape” is a strategy devised by the US to deploy thousands of uncrewed aerial, surface and underwater drones in the Taiwan Strait as soon as the Chinese invasion fleet and airplanes take off from China. This hailstorm of drones would create a formidable defense network. The goal is to buy time for the US, Taiwan and their allies to mount a coordinated response to a Chinese attack.
Much of the discussion following the Washington Post article has revolved around the feasibility of the plan, specifically in mechanical terms: how many drones, launched from where, how would they be controlled and would they be effective in stopping an invasion?
While those discussions are necessary, it is important to focus on the primary purpose of the drone hellscape, which is to buy time, and how that fits into the larger defense strategy.
The primary goal of the US defense strategy for Taiwan is to deter an invasion. As former US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Philip Davidson, said: “Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing, unequivocally, that the costs of achieving their objective by the use of military force are simply too high.”
To this end, critical defense data, official military strategies, agreements and arms purchases are being made public. The intent is to communicate clearly to China that the US is steadfast in its commitment to defend Taiwan, and that there are ample weapons, ships, planes and other military assets patrolling the Taiwan Strait to make an invasion prohibitively costly.
The official US stance on Taiwan, encompassing its “one China” policy and strategic ambiguity, is publicly known and complicates Beijing’s planning. This ambiguity makes it unclear whether the US would engage in kinetic conflict over Taiwan. Additionally, the US’ many bilateral defense agreements in the region, public activities and the intentions of groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS and the Five Eyes further complicate Beijing’s calculations.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) not only faces uncertainty regarding US military engagement, but also does not know which US allies would become involved and to what extent. This uncertainty creates a multilateral strategic ambiguity forcing him to consider whether to spread Chinese forces thin by preparing for potential involvement from countries such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, the UK and Australia. Furthermore, countries as distant as the UK and France, both NATO members, have direct interests in the Indo-Pacific, adding additional layers of complexity to Beijing’s strategic planning.
In the same interview with the Washington Post, Paparo said that Xi most likely aims to launch a lightning-fast offensive without prior notification, intending to conclude the attack swiftly. Paparo specifically referenced Russia’s war in Ukraine, and how Xi would seek to avoid repeating Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mistake of turning what should have been a quick victory against a smaller opponent into a protracted conflict that drags in major powers and supporters from around the world, particularly the US.
If deterrence fails, the next goal of the defense strategy is to prolong the conflict. China aims for a quick victory, and once it takes physical possession of Taiwan, it would become a lengthy process of unenforceable international law and powerless UN negotiations to try and extricate the Chinese People’s Liberation Army from the nation. Therefore, the longer and more costly the invasion, the further it would diverge from the quick fait accompli that Xi would be hoping for.
Buying time is crucial for the US and its allies to effectively mobilize and reinforce Taiwan’s defenses. Deploying a large number of drones could disrupt an invasion, allowing allied forces to arrive and provide support. This delay would help Taiwan’s military regroup and strategize, ensuring a unified and effective defense. Time would also allow for the deployment and integration of advanced defense systems, such as additional drones, missile defenses and electronic warfare capabilities.
Drones can gather and transmit intelligence, as well as disrupt enemy communications and command structures, which is essential in modern warfare.
Prolonging the conflict could garner international support and increase diplomatic pressure on China. Extended hostilities might prompt other nations to intervene diplomatically or militarily due to the economic instability and disruptions to global supply chains that war would bring, particularly in the technology sector where Taiwan is a key player. The Taiwan Strait is a critical maritime route, and a prolonged conflict could significantly affect global trade, compelling countries such as Japan and South Korea to intervene to protect their economic interests.
Prolonged military actions increase the likelihood of infringing upon other neighboring countries’ territorial waters, airspace or land, potentially invoking defense treaties such as those between the US and Japan, the US and the Philippines or the US and South Korea, drawing the US and its allies into the conflict.
This multilateral strategic ambiguity complicates Beijing’s planning and ensures that any invasion attempt would be costly and uncertain, militarily and diplomatically, thereby enhancing overall deterrence.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
In their recent op-ed “Trump Should Rein In Taiwan” in Foreign Policy magazine, Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim argued that the US should pressure President William Lai (賴清德) to “tone it down” to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait — as if Taiwan’s words are more of a threat to peace than Beijing’s actions. It is an old argument dressed up in new concern: that Washington must rein in Taipei to avoid war. However, this narrative gets it backward. Taiwan is not the problem; China is. Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions
The term “assassin’s mace” originates from Chinese folklore, describing a concealed weapon used by a weaker hero to defeat a stronger adversary with an unexpected strike. In more general military parlance, the concept refers to an asymmetric capability that targets a critical vulnerability of an adversary. China has found its modern equivalent of the assassin’s mace with its high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons, which are nuclear warheads detonated at a high altitude, emitting intense electromagnetic radiation capable of disabling and destroying electronics. An assassin’s mace weapon possesses two essential characteristics: strategic surprise and the ability to neutralize a core dependency.
Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) said in a politburo speech late last month that his party must protect the “bottom line” to prevent systemic threats. The tone of his address was grave, revealing deep anxieties about China’s current state of affairs. Essentially, what he worries most about is systemic threats to China’s normal development as a country. The US-China trade war has turned white hot: China’s export orders have plummeted, Chinese firms and enterprises are shutting up shop, and local debt risks are mounting daily, causing China’s economy to flag externally and hemorrhage internally. China’s
During the “426 rally” organized by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party under the slogan “fight green communism, resist dictatorship,” leaders from the two opposition parties framed it as a battle against an allegedly authoritarian administration led by President William Lai (賴清德). While criticism of the government can be a healthy expression of a vibrant, pluralistic society, and protests are quite common in Taiwan, the discourse of the 426 rally nonetheless betrayed troubling signs of collective amnesia. Specifically, the KMT, which imposed 38 years of martial law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, has never fully faced its
RSS