The big question regarding Israel’s war in Gaza has always been whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had any intention of allowing a political settlement to end the fighting — the kind the US administration has been pushing for and the UN Security Council has now demanded. We might soon have more clarity.
That is in some measure because Netanyahu on Sunday dissolved his war cabinet, a move unlikely to have much substantive impact. Yet the disappearance of a body created specifically to rope his main political rival, former Israeli minister without portfolio Benny Gantz, into the operation’s conduct ensures that from now on responsibility would rest, squarely and transparently, with the prime minister and his government.
Gantz resigned from the war cabinet last week precisely because he had lost patience with Netanyahu’s refusal to engage with “day after” planning for Gaza, meaning that his departure was more a symptom of impasse than a herald of change. In terms of what happens next, the events on the ground — where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are pressing Hamas hard in Rafah — would be more important.
In recent days, IDF generals and spokespeople have made seemingly contradictory statements on the war’s progress.
On Monday last week, they said two of Hamas’ remaining four battalions in Rafah had been effectively destroyed since the offensive began on May 6, with at least 550 of their fighters killed, some 200 tunnels and shafts destroyed, and up to 70 percent of the Rafah governorate now under Israeli control. Defeating the other two battalions could take just weeks, they said.
At the same time, Israeli generals have warned the war in Gaza would require until at least the end of the year, if not longer, to end. So, which is it?
Both, former Israeli intelligence officer Avi Melamed said. The Rafah operation is really the last part of the war’s first “hot” phase. The second would consist of what the IDF has long described as “mowing the lawn” — specific incursions aimed at mopping up Hamas capabilities whenever that becomes necessary.
This all makes military sense, given the IDF knows full well that the government’s stated goal — to destroy Hamas as a fighting and governing force — is unachievable on the battlefield.
Much like a lawn, Hamas would continue to regrow. Without a broader strategy for marginalizing the group, this is also a recipe for perpetual war and occupation.
As former US officials with a focus on the Middle East Aaron David Miller and Steven Simon wrote recently in Foreign Policy, it is likely that neither Netanyahu nor Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has a problem with that.
For Sinwar, Israel’s perpetual semi-occupation of Gaza would ensure that Hamas becomes the primary representative of the Palestinian cause, burying their more moderate rival, Fatah. It would also undermine Israel’s economy and international support, while increasing the likelihood of wider regional war aimed at the destruction of the Jewish state.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s critics believe he never had the slightest intention of making the kind of deal now on the table, because his government would collapse as its ultra-nationalist member parties walked out. He would then be left to face not just a public reckoning for the security lapses on Oct. 7 that allowed Hamas to carry out the worst attack on Jews since the Holocaust, but also trials on fraud charges and potential jail time. So, prolonging the conflict works for him, too.
The prime minister says he is doing what is best for Israel, and make no mistake, he has strong public support insisting on Hamas’ destruction. At the same time, he has kept a door ajar for US-led mediation of a ceasefire agreement, endorsing the latest proposal while saying Israel reserves the right to return to war. Hamas, too, appears to have balked at some of the terms.
This ambiguity should not hold for much longer. Protests within Israel demanding Netanyahu secure the release of all remaining hostages and call early elections have been getting bigger. Outside Israel, blowback for the high levels of civilian Palestinian deaths and suffering is growing, too.
Meanwhile, an end to the “hot” phase of the war would inevitably raise questions as to Gaza’s future rule and reconstruction that, in the absence of a substantive day-after plan, Netanyahu would struggle to answer.
This is not an enviable decision for any Israeli leader to have to make, but the reality is that the choice is not between destroying Hamas and feeble compromise.
Very few terrorist organizations are eliminated by military force alone, Carnegie Mellon University professor of security and technology Audrey Kurth Cronin wrote in a recent article. Far more in her database of 457 cases faded away, as better options or their own excesses caused support bases to reject them.
Achieving that in the case of Hamas would take time, international help and a much broader strategy. It also would be extremely difficult, but it would have a better chance of success than the current policy vacuum.
If Israel really wants to get rid of Hamas, Netanyahu needs to come clean about his intentions for Gaza’s future. He should also abandon a war-only strategy that has degraded the terrorist organization’s military strength at the risk of a far greater strategic loss for Israel.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.
Would China attack Taiwan during the American lame duck period? For months, there have been worries that Beijing would seek to take advantage of an American president slowed by age and a potentially chaotic transition to make a move on Taiwan. In the wake of an American election that ended without drama, that far-fetched scenario will likely prove purely hypothetical. But there is a crisis brewing elsewhere in Asia — one with which US president-elect Donald Trump may have to deal during his first days in office. Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have been at
A nation has several pillars of national defense, among them are military strength, energy and food security, and national unity. Military strength is very much on the forefront of the debate, while several recent editorials have dealt with energy security. National unity and a sense of shared purpose — especially while a powerful, hostile state is becoming increasingly menacing — are problematic, and would continue to be until the nation’s schizophrenia is properly managed. The controversy over the past few days over former navy lieutenant commander Lu Li-shih’s (呂禮詩) usage of the term “our China” during an interview about his attendance
Bo Guagua (薄瓜瓜), the son of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Politburo member and former Chongqing Municipal Communist Party secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙來), used his British passport to make a low-key entry into Taiwan on a flight originating in Canada. He is set to marry the granddaughter of former political heavyweight Hsu Wen-cheng (許文政), the founder of Luodong Poh-Ai Hospital in Yilan County’s Luodong Township (羅東). Bo Xilai is a former high-ranking CCP official who was once a challenger to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) for the chairmanship of the CCP. That makes Bo Guagua a bona fide “third-generation red”
Historically, in Taiwan, and in present-day China, many people advocate the idea of a “great Chinese nation.” It is not worth arguing with extremists to say that the so-called “great Chinese nation” is a fabricated political myth rather than an academic term. Rather, they should read the following excerpt from Chinese writer Lin Yutang’s (林語堂) book My Country and My People: “It is also inevitable that I should offend many writers about China, especially my own countrymen and great patriots. These great patriots — I have nothing to do with them, for their god is not my god, and their patriotism is
RSS