Submarine cables form the backbone of international communication, responsible for 99 percent of international data traffic and playing a pivotal role in facilitating seamless communication, commerce and collaboration on a global scale.
Despite the importance of submarine cables in an era in which digital connectivity is the lifeblood of economies and societies, this critical infrastructure is vulnerable to attack and damage. The majority of that damage is caused by unintentional human activities at sea, with fishing accounting for almost half of the cable faults.
In February last year, two submarine cables in waters off Lienchiang County (Matsu) were damaged by a Chinese fishing boat and a Chinese cargo ship in separate incidents, leaving 13,000 residents with limited Internet access for 50 days. Although there was no evidence indicating that the incidents were deliberate actions, some analysts have said that the cables were targeted as part of “gray zone” tactics by China, which could have been planning to disrupt Taiwan’s Internet access.
An Internet outage in Taiwan could severely disrupt global supply chains, as the nation produces more than 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors. The chips are essential components in the production of nearly all electronic devices, such as laptops and mobile phones. Taiwan is also responsible for manufacturing more than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors.
To safeguard connectivity, the Taiwan Space Agency is investigating the development of its own satellite network.
Submarine cables are also at risk of cyberattack or espionage by state or non-state actors as “gray zone” tactics.
In the past few years, competition between the US and China to lay submarine cables has intensified. Having control over the vast amount of data flowing through submarine cables allows the world’s major powers to exert greater influence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, and concerns about mass surveillance by foreign states through tapping into fiber optic cables have grown.
The security of shore-based cable landing stations and the companies operating the submarine cables is also critical.
In April 2022, an unidentified international hacking group attempted to hack the server of a company that operates a submarine cable that links Hawaii and the Pacific region, but it was foiled by US authorities.
There are gaps in international law concerning the governance of submarine cables. States cannot legally board and penalize foreign nationals on a foreign-flagged vessel engaging in intentional theft or damage of submarine cables in waters beyond their territorial seas, under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. That makes it more difficult to protect submarine cables from terrorist attacks or “gray zone” warfare.
Moreover, many states have not enacted laws that would make damaging submarine cables an offense in their jurisdictional waters.
The regulatory situation in some countries is also complex, often involving many ministries and agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and weak interagency coordination, which complicates the licensing process for submarine cable installation and repair. If it is not clear which agency is in charge, there could be a significant security problem when submarine cables are at risk during emergencies such as natural disasters.
Additionally, many countries mandate permits for the installation and repair of cables within their waters, even where there is no legal or practical justification for such requirements.
In the South China Sea, overlapping maritime claims could delay the process as permits from multiple countries are required. For example, Google and Meta’s Apricot, Echo and Bifrost are laying cables in the Java Sea rather than the South China Sea.
Surveillance and monitoring of submarine cables should be enhanced. Drones and uncrewed surface vehicles could be utilized to increase maritime domain awareness so that regional maritime law enforcement agencies can react faster to sabotage.
Public-private partnerships are increasingly important. Submarine cable companies could help governments pass appropriate legislation and regulations, especially in relation to penalties for sabotage of submarine cables in their jurisdictional waters. Submarine cable companies should also invest in educating personnel about potential cyberthreats and best practices to mitigate risks.
The International Maritime Bureau, alongside the Information Fusion Centre, could report maritime cybersecurity crimes, including submarine cable damage. This would enhance industry awareness and underscore the importance of maintaining cable resilience. Private cable companies could contribute by notifying these organizations of any damage.
Increasing the number of cable ships in the region is also necessary. National governments could play an important role by providing subsidies to submarine cable owners for cable repair ships.
Shortening repair time could significantly reduce the impact of cable faults. Some states, such as the US and India, have started their own government-led or government-subsidized cable ships program to ensure that vessels are always available for installation and repair.
Finally, regional cooperation among Indo-Pacific states is critical. The ASEAN Guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables is important to streamline and simplify regulations and policies of ASEAN members to expedite the permit application process for cable repairs. Additionally, table-top exercises that re-enact scenarios of intentional or unintentional damage to submarine cables and dialogues could be held during meetings and workshops of ASEAN-led mechanisms. This could improve the cooperation between regional maritime law enforcement agencies.
Jeslyn Tan is a researcher at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia’s Centre of Maritime Security and Diplomacy. The full version of this article was published in the online journal Melbourne Asia Review.
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