Mon, Jun 03, 2024 page8

• The perils of a China-centric world

  • By Kamlesh K. Agnihotri
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  When the presidential inauguration on May 20 passed by quite peacefully amid the ongoing tenuous security situation across the Taiwan Strait, an anxious global community in general, and the administrative establishment of Taiwan in particular, heaved a veritable sigh of relief.

  This was quite short-lived, with China engaging in an overtly threatening display of brinkmanship on May 23, by conducting naval and coast guard exercises at an unprecedented scale in waters around Taiwan. A large number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft also crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.

  This show of force, which has heightened the sense of alarm in Taiwan, was not wholly unanticipated, particularly in light of China having adopted an overtly proactive stance over the past two years, since the visit of then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022.

  However, such a hardline posture has not come about all of a sudden. Various official pronouncements, media articulations and white papers have progressively ratcheted up the issue of “national unification,” in tandem with the increasing diplomatic, informational, military and economic heft of the country.

  China’s White Paper of 1993, The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, sought to emotionally link the origin of the Taiwan question to the country being subjected to aggression, dismemberment and humiliation by the foreign powers over the past century.

  The paper went to great lengths to convince the world that “peaceful reunification was a set policy of the Chinese Government,” although with addition of a caveat that “any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

  The tone, tenor and language was almost entreating, seeking the understanding of the world towards its interpretation of the vexed issue. China, under then-leader Jiang Zemin (江澤民), had a GDP of less than US$450 billion.

  When Pelosi in 2022 announced her visit to Taiwan, China, in addition to cajoling, threatening and militarily posturing to somehow convince the US to put off that visit, released another white paper on Aug. 10, 2022, titled The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.

  The very title of this paper connoted that the “rejuvenated” China of the “new era,” “driven by an unstoppable force,” considered this time as “a new starting point for reunification.”

  The stridency of the tone and the underlying aggression was quite evident from the blunt statement “Taiwan is part of China — This is an indisputable fact,” and that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would engage in “resolute effort to realise China’s complete reunification.”

  The comparison of these two white papers alone provides a broad insight into a much more aggressive stance adopted by Beijing.

  It is quite clear that the contemporary China, under Chinese President and CCP Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平), with a GDP exceeding US$17.5 trillion, and having reduced the international diplomatic support for Taiwan to just 11 countries, believes that this is perhaps the right moment to attempt unification.

  Notwithstanding the ambiguity about China’s plans, the long-cherished wish of the country which sees unification as its unfinished agenda, the increasing conviction of its leadership about the appropriateness of the timing, and confidence in China’s capability to pull this off does set the stage for ominous portends across the Taiwan Strait.

  In the event that such a cataclysmic eventuality was to actually come about, how would the global security order be impacted?

  Since the Taiwan Strait and the adjoining East and South China seas are critical sea lanes for global trade and energy flow, the emergent situation would have dangerous ramifications for the whole Indo-Pacific region.

  Most countries whose economies are tightly linked to China’s “panda hug” — particularly the ASEAN nations — would face a Hobson’s choice. The existing “balance of power” model, wherein they sought a national security guarantee from the US, while still maintaining huge economic dependency on China, would no longer be viable.

  The US, for its part, would be hard-pressed to provide a security umbrella to all its widely dispersed allies and partners.

  While the middle order countries might, somehow, manage to steer through the resultant geostrategic quagmire, the nations comprising the Global South would be severely impacted. Most of these countries, inextricably weighed down with China’s debt diplomacy and lacking the wherewithal to act independently in their national interest, would be left with no alternative, but to fall into China’s orbit.

  The mere thought of the consequent global order tilting irretrievably in favor of China is quite discomfiting.

  It is no wonder that the affected stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region have been vehemently advocating for keeping the region free, open and secure under the rubric of existing rules-based order.

  These very sentiments were publicly expressed by US President Joe Biden in June last year while welcoming Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, when he emphasized the need for an “open, secure and transparent” Indo-Pacific.

  India is also cognizant of this possible shift in the global order and is thus equally concerned with its adverse ramifications.

  Modi, during his address to the US Congress on June 22 last year said that “dark clouds of coercion and confrontation are casting their shadow in the Indo-Pacific.”

  It would not be entirely wrong to presume that such dark clouds are ominously rising from the Taiwan Strait, on account of China’s quest for an ill-advised reunification.

  India enjoys reasonably genuine respect amongst the Global South, cutting across political systems and ideological divides, due to its historical nonalignment stance through the Cold War, and nuanced assertion of strategic autonomy amid the contemporary geostrategic upheavals with their attendant pulls and pressures.

  New Delhi can leverage this widespread goodwill to embark on the onerous task of spreading awareness amongst the Global South about the pitfalls of the changed world order to their general detriment.

  Modi, during the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, outlined India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region, being premised on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, adherence to international rules and freedom of navigation and overflight in the international seas.

  However, this vision can only come to fruition if the countries of the Global South can first appreciate the perils of living in a China-centric world order, and then unitedly sally forth to prevent such a contingency from taking shape — with the selfless guidance of India and due support from the good offices of countries such as the US and “Global North,” wherever forthcoming.

  Kamlesh K. Agnihotri is a senior fellow at India’s National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi. He is a MOFA Taiwan fellow and is pursuing his research project in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University.
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