Tue, May 28, 2024 page8

• Analyzing the PLA’s ‘Joint Sword’ exercises

  • By Lin Ying-yu 林穎佑
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  The Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started its “Joint Sword (聯合利劍)-2024A” military exercises around Taiwan on Thursday last week, the purpose of which was to respond to President William Lai’s (賴清德) inaugural address on Monday last week.

  Since Lai’s election in January, China has initiated a series of actions. Some of the preparations for these exercises were made before the speech, ranging from small-scale training to joint military drills, which were to be conducted depending on the content of Lai’s speech. Unfortunately, the end of the speech was the beginning of the Chinese military threat.

  These exercises were a continuation of last year’s “Joint Sword 2023,” and it is worth paying attention to whether “Joint Sword” operations would become a regular event targeting Taiwan. Whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launches Dongfeng (東風) ballistic missiles across Taiwan’s airspace again — just like it did after then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 — is another operation to look out for. If Beijing had raised the scale of these exercises to the level of test-firing a Dongfeng missile, it might lead to a loss of flexibility with its future actions toward Taiwan.

  The scale of this year’s exercises was similar to last year’s, which was to use naval and air forces to try to create form of blockade against Taiwan. Its military operations were limited to around the Taiwan Strait, so as to avoid causing a reaction from other countries, and to tell the international community that this was an internal affair of China while rejecting foreign intervention.

  For this exercise, the most important thing to observe is the PLA’s newly reorganized military command and control capabilities. After its Strategic Support Force was replaced last month by three new units, the outside world is very interested in knowing whether its new Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force are experiencing any difficulties in mastering joint operations after the major reorganization. As changes in the PLA’s military power would inevitably affect Beijing’s trust in its strength.

  Moreover, the three new units’ hierarchical command and control structure, as well as the mobilization of the units in this exercise should be observed. The fact that the China Coast Guard also conducted joint operations around Taiwan’s outlying islands shows that the Chinese armed forces have been integrated and are now able to conduct coordinated joint operations.

  After the Joint Sword-2024A exercise, would a B, C or D exercise be launched this year, depending on the new triangular interactions between the US, China and Taiwan, or does the code refer to various types of scenarios in this exercise? Such issues also deserve our observation.

  Finally, this exercise is also a reaction to the US’ recent China policy and US-led joint military exercises in the Western Pacific region. Would new Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (董軍) attend this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, which is scheduled to run from Friday to Sunday? Would this exercise have an impact on upcoming events, such as the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercises in the summer and the US presidential election in November? These all need to be analyzed and countermeasures must be planned.

  Strategy is about prevention, not a cure. Past failures can be summed up in two words: too late.

  Lin Ying-yu is an assistant professor in Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.

  Translated by Eddy Chang
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