When four of the Indo-Pacific region’s leading democracies — Australia, India, Japan and the US — revived the long-dormant Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017, their objective was clear: To create a strategic bulwark against Chinese expansionism and reinforce a stable regional balance of power. However, the coalition is now adrift, and the security risks this poses should not be underestimated.
The Quad’s resurrection reflected a paradigm shift in US foreign policy. After decades of engagement with China, including aiding its economic rise, US policymakers — Democrats and Republicans alike — realized that the US’ biggest trade partner had become its biggest strategic adversary, bent on replacing it as a global hegemon.
China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective,” US President Joe Biden said in his 2022 National Security Strategy.
Biden, like his predecessor, Donald Trump, viewed the Quad as an essential instrument to uphold a “free and open Indo-Pacific” — a concept formulated by the late former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe. So, Biden elevated Quad discussions from the level of foreign ministers — who had been meeting annually since 2019 — to heads of state or government, initiating a flurry of leaders’ summits in 2021 to last year. However, it has been more than a year since the Quad leaders last met, and with the US focused on the upcoming presidential election, their next summit is unlikely to be held before next year.
The reason for this drop off is simple: The US’ priorities have changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine — together with the hybrid war the West is waging in response, not to mention renewed conflict in the Middle East — has stymied US efforts to position the Indo-Pacific region at the “heart” of its grand strategy. It is striking that the latest US foreign assistance package provides US$60.8 billion for Ukraine, but only US$8.1 billion for security in the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan, on which China has set its sights.
With limited resources to dedicate to the Indo-Pacific region, Biden seems to hope that he can prevent a war over Taiwan through personal diplomacy with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Last month, in a telephone call with his Chinese counterpart, he stressed the importance of maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.
Biden seems to believe that a more conciliatory approach toward China can also forestall the emergence of a comprehensive Sino-Russian alliance. The “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, reaffirmed during Russian President Vladmir Putin’s recent visit to Beijing, is problematic enough. China has already undercut Western sanctions by providing an economic lifeline to Russia, in exchange for cheap energy and some of Russia’s most advanced military technologies, including air defense and early warning systems. A full military alliance, with China supporting the Kremlin’s war machine directly, would be the US’ worst geopolitical nightmare.
The problem for Biden is that appeasing China and strengthening the Quad — which Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) has decried as the “Indo-Pacific version of NATO” — are fundamentally incompatible. It might not be a coincidence that the Quad leaders have not met since Biden sent a series of cabinet officials to Beijing and met with Xi in California in November last year.
Biden has lately shifted his focus to less provocative initiatives like the “Squad,” an emerging unofficial regional grouping involving Australia, Japan and the Philippines — countries that already have mutual defense treaties with the US. However, what good is an anti-China alliance without India? After all, it is the only power that has truly locked horns with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army this century: The tense military standoff along the disputed Himalayan border, triggered by China’s stealthy territorial encroachments, has just entered its fifth year. Moreover, as the leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean, India must play a central role in checking China’s westward naval march from its new citadel, the South China Sea.
The US has also been touting its AUKUS security partnership with Australia and the UK. However, this grouping would not be able to play a meaningful role in Indo-Pacific security until Australia is equipped with nuclear-powered submarines, and that would not happen for another decade.
Biden’s overtures to China have yielded few positive results. On the contrary, Xi has lately intensified coercive pressure on Taiwan, and Chinese provocations in the South China Sea have been increasing. Unless the US changes its approach, it might well fail to deter China from attacking Taiwan or cementing a strategic axis with Russia, just as it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine.
To maintain security in the Indo-Pacific region, there is no substitute for a strong Quad with a clear strategic mission. Rather than unraveling years of efforts to build a coherent and credible regional strategy, thereby enabling yet more Chinese expansionism, Biden and his fellow Quad leaders must get to work defining such a mission and then commit to pursuing it. Otherwise, the Quad risks becoming a kind of Potemkin grouping. The facade of an alliance would not fool China.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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