While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under the leadership of President William Lai (賴清德) has formed a government for a third succesive term, China has intensified its efforts to create a new world order with Beijing as its apex. In this context, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s two-day visit to Beijing on Thursday and Friday last week was significant. The visit, which marked 75 years of bilateral diplomatic ties, was used by China and Russia to show their strong ties under the heading of a joint statement of “deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era.”
More to the point, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) said that Beijing’s relations with Moscow “not only serve the fundamental interests of both countries and their peoples, but also contribute to regional and global peace, stability and prosperity.”
Putin, in a veiled reference to the West, said that the Russia-China partnership “is not directed against anyone,” adding that “it is aimed at one thing: Creating better conditions for the development of our countries and improving the well-being of the people of China and the Russian Federation.”
Undoubtedly, one of the major aspects of the bonhomie between Russia and China is in the security and military domain. Beijing and Moscow have expanded cooperation in the form of joint military exercises. The two sides have also begun to share sensitive data with each other. Cooperation in the field of missile defense systems would boost China’s surveillance capabilities. Russia’s expertise in aviation technologies helps modernize Beijing’s Soviet-era fighter jet engines.
Another dimension to the relationship is the economic factor. For Russia, China is the backbone of support after Putin invaded Ukraine. The Xi regime has not only extended moral support to Russia against the US-led Western bloc’s economic and other sanctions, but has also extended a economic lifeline to Moscow through its purchases of Russian oil. Chinese companies have effectively filled the economic space in the Russian market created by Western economic sanctions. This in turn has accelerated bilateral trade from US$190 billion in 2022 to US$240 billion last year.
The comprehensive China-Russia partnership also has a shared interest in limiting the US’ global hegemony. At the same time, by supporting Russia’s action against Ukraine, Beijing expects Moscow to toe its line on several issues, including in the South China Sea, Taiwan and elsewhere. There is a widespread view that China is exporting semiconductors and other dual-use items to Russia to help it continue fighting in Ukraine. These developments in turn have led a section of international security experts to term the ties between Russia and China as a new alliance system in world politics, but the reality is far from the truth. However the two countries characterize their relationship, the fact remains that the closeness is merely a marriage of convenience.
For example, the Ukraine war enabled China to isolate Russia from the EU market, and capture the Russian market. Russia’s increasing dependency on China has placed Moscow in a more subordinate position to Beijing.
What experts should be aware of is the inherent contradictions in the imaginations of the two countries about their vision for international order. While it is true that both want to replace the US-led liberal international order, they strongly differ in their view of their role in a new world order.
Xi wants to build a regional and global order dominated by China. Putin wants to regain for Russia the lost glory of the Soviet Union. After all, one of the aims of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was to show the prowess of the Kremlin to the rest of the world, especially the US-led West. Therefore, to say that China and Russia have built an alliance to create a new world order is not a convincing argument.
If there is still any doubt, a close reading of the China-Russia joint statement shows that it offers no concrete measures to strengthen their bilateral ties, and contribute to global peace and prosperity.
On the contrary, Putin and Xi used the occasion to project their global acceptability to boost their power at the domestic level.
From Taiwan’s perspective, the increasing military and other cooperation might be viewed as a security threat. However, what also works in Taipei’s favor is the fact that the more Russia takes China’s side on the Taiwan issue, the more global support increases for Taiwan, because the international community is faced with a resurgence of the ugliest form of authoritarianism in China and Russia.
In addition to hosting Putin, Xi’s decision to visit Europe was conditioned by the return of the DPP government to power, among other factors.
Through these foreign engagements, Xi unsuccessfully tried to change global opinion about Taiwan.
While Lai’s inauguration has received unprecedented international coverage, and Lai has shown the strength of democratic values by expressing the desire to have dialogue with China in resolving disputes, a better strategy is needed to effectively deal with the Chinese communist regime.
Sumit Kumar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi and a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University.
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