For decades, the US and Taiwan have focused on shoring up Taiwan’s military defenses against a potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion. However, a new report by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, From Coercion to Capitulation: How China Can Take Taiwan Without War, explores alternative Chinese strategies.
The report says that China could employ non-military methods such as threats, coercion and isolation to pressure Taiwan into submission. This highlights a potential gap in US strategy, suggesting a need to consider approaches beyond solely strengthening Taiwan’s military.
Former US president Donald Trump and US President Joe Biden have shown their commitment to protecting Taiwan, but what does that mean against economic coercion leading to gradual acceptance by Taiwanese?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used economic coercion for years. Experts say this strategy of economic pressure and isolation is more likely than an invasion and is already under way, with the CCP chipping away at Taiwan’s friends and allies. Now, Taiwan is only formally recognized by 11 countries, and nations that increase their engagement with Taiwan face significant pressure and retaliation from Beijing.
The increased PLA activity around Taiwan over the past few months is part of a broader strategy. It exerts military pressure and feeds a CCP narrative, amplified on social media, that Taiwan cannot defend itself. The Chinese 50 Cent Army of paid online commentators also pushes the idea that the US is an unreliable partner that would abandon Taiwan.
This narrative increases risk and causes foreign countries to hesitate before investing in or collaborating with Taiwan. If seeds of doubt are sown in the minds of Taiwanese, they might be quicker to surrender to Beijing’s pressure. The authors of the report refer to this comprehensive political-military campaign as the “short-of-war coercion course of action.”
Other components might include Beijing intensifying its economic warfare and enhancing its cyberwarfare capabilities to isolate Taiwan. A blockade could close the sea and airspace around the main island, with Beijing demanding the right to inspect all ships and planes. CCP saboteurs could infiltrate, or already be present, committing acts of espionage to damage Taiwan’s water, electricity, transportation or communication infrastructure. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns could then be used to turn the public against the central government for failing to protect them or resolve the issue quickly.
As 2027 approaches — a year many believe could coincide with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan — it is important to counter Chinese propaganda and disinformation.
US support for Taiwan is not purely altruistic. Beyond preserving an allied, democratic nation, the US has a strategic interest in Taiwan, as the nation is crucial to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy. Taiwan must remain independent of China to ensure freedom of navigation, which is vital for global shipping and commerce.
Conversely, control of Taiwan is crucial to Beijing’s Indo-Pacific ambitions. The US recognizes this and is unlikely to allow Beijing to succeed in taking Taiwan.
Regarding the Taiwan issue as a purely strategic interest of the US raises an awkward question: What if Taiwan decided it wanted to be part of China?
Beijing views the Taiwan problem as “the continued resistance to unification by ardent Taiwanese ‘separatists’ who maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence and are buoyed by support from foreign powers, namely the US and its regional allies,” the report says.
To take Taiwan without a shot, Beijing needs to remove these separatists and their foreign supporters. Through election interference and propaganda, the People’s Republic of China hopes to transfer power to politicians willing to sign a cross-strait peace agreement.
The report says that an intensified isolation campaign could begin now, in the wake of this year’s elections, aiming to bring Taiwan to heel by 2028. This campaign would include coordinated military actions in the air and sea around Taiwan, economic pressure and hybrid warfare across information, cyber and cognitive domains.
There is ample evidence of Beijing’s use of information and cyberwarfare against Taiwan. A lesser-known, but potentially more powerful weapon to be employed over the next four years is cognitive warfare, which focuses on affecting the adversary’s perception, beliefs and decisionmaking. Cognitive warfare includes psychological operations, perception management and influencing public opinion.
The different domains of hybrid warfare were previously under the PLA’s Strategic Support Force. However, last month, in a military shake-up, it was decommissioned, and its responsibilities were distributed across the Chinese Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and the new Information Support Force. This restructuring of the PLA is concerning in light of the report, as Beijing is better poised to launch a hybrid warfare campaign.
The report outlines a four-phase strategy for China to achieve unification with Taiwan, employing a mix of diplomatic, economic and informational warfare tactics. First, China aims to sever the US-Taiwan relationship, isolating Taiwan on the world stage. Second, it intends to cripple the Taiwanese government’s functionality, potentially through economic pressure or cyberattacks. Third, China plans to erode public morale in Taiwan through extensive psychological and informational campaigns, weakening the public’s will to resist. Finally, it intends to use similar information campaigns to decrease American public and political support for Taiwan.
The report urges US policymakers to take serious notice and prioritize building counter-capabilities. This includes significantly increasing efforts in the information domain to prevent the PRC from shaping public opinion among key stakeholders. These stakeholders include Taiwanese, the American public and the governments of allied states such as Australia, Japan and the UK, all of which are crucial to deterring China from seizing Taiwan and preventing the PRC from establishing regional dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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