The parliamentary system originated in England, where a bicameral system developed. Many countries also adopted the bicameral system when they copied the UK in setting up their parliaments.
There must be a good reason that the bicameral system has spread to many countries. If parliamentary members are unable to control their emotional impulses when debating motions, the nature of majority rule in parliamentary politics might lead to irrational resolutions. However, under a bicameral system, a bill can be enacted only if it is unanimously resolved by both assemblies, chambers or houses, which avoids rashness and carelessness.
A parliament is a lawmaking institution, and is often in a superior position given the nature of its authority — it can use its legislative power to restrain all matters, and its budgetary power can be used to interfere with the activities of the executive office. As a body representing the public, its abuse of power is inevitable.
A parliamentary autocracy is particularly dangerous, as it is a system in which the parliament is a collegial body and cannot be held accountable. This is especially true of a unicameral system. In contrast, the bicameral system aims to weaken the power of parliament to prevent parliamentary autocracy. This is why it has been adopted by many countries.
THREE-YEAR TERMS
Originally, the term of office for Legislative Yuan members was three years, with the ability to stand for re-election, but their election should be completed within three months before the expiration of their term of office, Article 65 of the Constitution states.
However, in the seventh Constitutional amendment in 2005, the length of their term was extended to four years, as seen in Article 4 of Additional Articles of the Constitution (中華民國憲法增修條文). Increasing the power of legislators makes the unicameral system more vulnerable to abuse of power.
As elected representatives, lawmakers are responsible for monitoring the government’s administration on the public’s behalf. They should be clean and self-respecting. Yet regrettably, cases of “lobbying for legislation” used to be frequent.
Commentators say that to prevent corruption among legislators, the most important thing is to shorten their term in office. If the legislators’ terms are extended and their powers are increased, their campaigns would have a high rate of return on investment, which would encourage election bribery. After being elected, they would inevitably seek to amend laws to fulfill the promises they made to their supporters.
The duty of these public representatives is only to supervise the administration of the government. Therefore, their terms do not need to be four years. Instead, legislators’ terms in office should be modeled on the two-year terms offered by the US House of Representatives.
US SYSTEM
In the US, voters have a clear idea of their representatives’ performance. Competent representatives do not need to spend lots of money to be re-elected — and there is no reason to do so, because they have limited powers and short terms, so there is no point in bribing them. This is the great insight of the founding fathers of the US.
To avoid election bribery and the improper exchange of interests in legislating, Taiwan should improve its system, starting with, most importantly, shortening the term length for legislators.
Tseng Chao-chang is a former chairman of the Taiwan Bar Association.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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