Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) has been the nation’s most prominent foreign-policy initiative since it was unveiled shortly after President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) assumed office in 2016. This endeavor is essentially a problem-solving strategy to help Taiwan amid geopolitical uncertainties.
At the nucleus of the Tsai administration’s concerns have been Beijing’s assertiveness and the impasse in cross-strait relations. Hence, the introduction of the NSP was to lessen Taiwan’s dependence on China through steady engagement with 18 targeted countries comprising ASEAN members, South Asian states, Australia and New Zealand.
Over the past eight years, Taiwan has worked hard to foster a cooperative economic community and has gradually lessened its economic and trade reliance on the Chinese market. There has been a recent dramatic increase in Taiwanese investment in NSP countries.
Taiwanese manufacturers have been steadily expanding their presence in these partners, especially in industrial clusters, with a focus on electronics in Vietnam, printed circuit boards in Thailand, and textiles and footwear manufacturing in Indonesia.
But how could this grand strategy advance in light of the impending swearing-in of president-elect William Lai (賴清德)? In his presidential campaign remarks, Lai underscored that Taiwan, by promoting the NSP, was playing the role of a force for good, and would persist in collaborating with like-minded partners to address challenges, and foster a robust and resilient Asia.
Last year, Lai — as vice president — underlined that the NSP was centered around people, suggesting that it would continue to serve as a blueprint for joint efforts to achieve the common prosperity and development of Taiwan and NSP countries.
The NSP’s success, however, hinges on more than merely Lai’s pledge. The rapidly changing geopolitical landscape necessitates a new thrust for this strategy to bring Lai’s vision into line. While China’s power is pernicious to Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, democratic Taiwan should be wary of other factors. Some of these are the fragility of the global supply chain, the tensions and continuation of the Sino-US tech rivalry, and the growing weight of Southeast Asia, coupled with the retreat of freedom and democratic values across Asia.
For the Lai government to come up with a good strategy, his foreign policy team must first have a crystal-clear picture of the goals and values of the existing NSP — and the precise issues that the revitalized NSP is supposed to address. A glimpse at Tsai’s foreign-policy discourse would provide some insight for the new administration.
In her address at the opening of the Yushan Forum in October last year, a platform utilized to facilitate dialogue and policy exchanges between Taiwan and partners, Tsai stated the importance of “fostering more inclusive and resilient growth” with Taiwan’s partners and like-minded countries. Here comes the two key words: “inclusive” and “resilient.”
While inclusiveness denotes the allocation of equal opportunities and resources encompassing all groups and people that might be excluded or marginalized, resilience refers to the persistence — the ability to stay strong in the face of challenges — and the adoption of patterned adjustments to recover, or “bouncing back.”
With these connotations in mind, Lai’s incoming administration should recalibrate the NSP toward a more forward-looking, inclusive and resilient framework.
The economic push has been the backbone of Taiwan’s integration with NSP countries up until this point. Although economic gains from the NSP deserve credit, interpersonal ties between Taiwan and NSP countries are falling behind.
As cultural and interpersonal awareness might direct interactions, it is critical that people-to-people ties be front and center in the reinvigorated NSP.
Taiwan and NSP nations cannot afford to have a mutual understanding based solely on artistic and cultural activities, with the help of overseas offices, arts and culture workers, and online participants. Language exchanges, Taiwanese staff fluent in the local language, and a nuanced grasp of the customs, beliefs, strengths and even shortcomings of NSP partners are all necessary for effective cultural engagement.
It is essential that the Lai administration bring in competent professionals who are conversant in the languages of countries in the NSP.
Taiwan has also nurtured educational ties with countries in the NSP through talent exchanges and scholarship programs, and they have been in place for quite some time.
However, this field of attraction should be renewed. For instance, a stipend of NT$20,000 per month is provided to postgraduate students in Taiwan through the Taiwan Scholarship program run by the Ministry of Education.
Last year, Taipei ranked as the 12th-most expensive city in Asia according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, so this monthly stipend is fairly modest for those studying in such a bustling metropolis.
Hence, Lai’s government should adjust the distribution of stipends on a par with the cost of living in the country.
The new government should also include Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, three of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, in the upgraded NSP.
Even more so in light of China’s use of financial resources to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the absence of these countries from the present NSP gives the impression that Taiwan has not made sufficient efforts to reinvigorate strategic interactions with these nations.
After Nauru switched diplomatic allegiance to China in January, Taiwan’s diplomatic circle shrank to 12, including the Vatican and several smaller nations in Latin America and the Pacific Ocean.
Hence, enhancing formal diplomatic relations with its remaining allies is crucial for Taiwan because they speak on Taiwan’s behalf in international bodies like the UN, which Taiwan is not permitted to join.
It is no secret that Taiwan lacks the financial and development incentives to go head-to-head with China in the fight to retain its allies.
So, the self-governed nation can only do the right thing by highlighting that it prioritizes democratic and transparent policies, values-based relations, and long-term commitments over short-term gains and economic allure.
While bold connections might take years of extensive diplomatic efforts to nurture, mutual benefits and commitments require fresh input to solidify. Including the three Pacific allies in the updated NSP could not only give them more confidence, but also affirm Taiwan’s unwavering support.
The NSP’s strategic weight is on full display as it helps Taiwan stand tall amid great-power rivalry, and China’s diplomatic and economic coercion. Lai’s tenure as premier (September 2017 to January 2019) provided valuable expertise in overseeing the NSP, which could prove useful in keeping it going.
As essential modifications could grease the wheel of the NSP, Lai should use his statecraft to gather a get-up-and-go team which could make tangible and meaningful contributions to the revised strategy.
Huynh Tam Sang is a lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum and a research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation. He is now serving as a visiting academic at National Taiwan University as part of the 2024 MOFA Taiwan Fellowship.
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
US President Donald Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have each given their thoughts on Russia’s war with Ukraine. There are a few proponents of US skepticism in Taiwan taking advantage of developments to write articles claiming that the US would arbitrarily abandon Ukraine. The reality is that when one understands Trump’s negotiating habits, one sees that he brings up all variables of a situation prior to discussion, using broad negotiations to take charge. As for his ultimate goals and the aces up his sleeve, he wants to keep things vague for