The trio of AUKUS defense chiefs — US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, British Secretary of State for Defence Grant Shapps and Australian Minister for Defence Richard Marles — have recently revealed the nations’ collaboration with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects.
This announcement surfaces amid growing concerns in London and Canberra regarding the inclusion of Tokyo in Pillar II. Both the UK and Australia have expressed apprehensions about the adequacy of Japanese security systems in safeguarding highly sensitive information — an issue warranting legitimate consideration.
There is a palpable fear in London and Canberra that expanding AUKUS to encompass additional countries might ultimately dilute the alliance’s primary strategic objective (known as “Pillar I”) of equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines — underscoring the balance between broadening the alliance’s scope and preserving its core mission.
While acknowledging the legitimacy of these concerns, it is critical that Washington and Tokyo address them comprehensively.
However, there exists a strategic imperative for incorporating Tokyo into AUKUS, or perhaps “JAUKUS,” not just within Pillar II, but also within Pillar I. This involves supporting Japan in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines similar to those planned for Australia.
There are three primary strategic reasons to justify Tokyo’s inclusion in AUKUS:
First, aligning Japan’s military capabilities with the objectives of AUKUS is critically important, particularly considering the deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and the potential for a broader conflict in the region.
Incorporating Tokyo into AUKUS could expedite Japan’s military evolution into a formidable bulwark in the Indo-Pacific, standing shoulder to shoulder with US forces amid a shaky security landscape around the Philippines, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, which would necessitate bringing more forces to bear.
Since the era of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, Tokyo has embarked on a path of rearmament. In its 2022 national security strategy, Japan pledged to double military spending, with expenditures set to reach an annual total of about US$80 billion by 2027 — positioning Japan as the world’s third-largest military spender behind the US and China.
Furthermore, Japan is actively building up its counterstrike capabilities, aimed at deterring missile attacks from China or North Korea by presenting a credible threat of retaliation.
Earlier this year, Japan finalized an agreement to procure 400 US-made Tomahawk missiles, expediting the process by one year compared with previous plans.
These acquisitions follow an announcement made in December 2022, revealing plans by Japan, the UK and Italy to jointly develop a new sixth-generation fighter jet. This initiative, known as the Global Combat Air Program, aims to produce a next-generation fighter by 2035, as announced in a joint leaders’ statement.
With its significant change in security and military posture and associated pursuit of enhanced defense capabilities, Tokyo, in tight coordination with Washington, is responding assertively to the adverse security conditions in the Indo-Pacific. Departing from its long-held pacifist principles, Japan is vigilantly preparing for potential great-power conflicts, positioning itself as “America’s Best Friend in Asia.”
Indeed, Japan stands as Washington’s paramount asset in the escalating competition with Beijing, and furnishing Japan with cutting-edge maritime capabilities ultimately enhances the US’ broader military stance in the Indo-Pacific region.
Second, AUKUS prioritizes hard power to a higher degree than the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) alliance and other mini-laterals involving Japan. Tokyo already participates in numerous mini-lateral arrangements alongside the US, such as the QUAD with Australia and India, the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral and the US-Philippines-Japan trilateral.
Notably, the proliferation of these formats with overlapping agendas poses a challenge for US policymakers seeking to establish a unified theme amid great power competition with China. However, unlike other mini-lateral formats, AUKUS’ strategic objective is crystal clear, emphasizing hard power and security containment in the Indo-Pacific region — an aspect that distinguishes it from the QUAD.
The QUAD has undergone a transformative journey from its original humanitarian mandate during the 2011 tsunami to become a pivotal vehicle for expanding the geopolitical boundaries of the Asia-Pacific into the Indo-Pacific, as envisioned by Abe. Despite the QUAD’s transformative role, it grapples with significant challenges, particularly in aligning with India on a comprehensive containment strategy against China. Integrating Tokyo into AUKUS transforms the US-Japanese alliance, as Jeffrey Hornung, a Japan expert at the Rand Corporation argues, into the “hub of a growing confederation of regional groupings” in the Indo-Pacific region.
The region faces a growing security threat, and AUKUS needs all hands on deck to maintain stability, prosperity and rule of law in this incredibly strategic theater.
Japan, with its evolving military posture, expanding defense capabilities and immensely valuable shipbuilding capacity, is a clear force multiplier for the alliance.
Concerns about loosening restrictions on access to highly sensitive military information are valid, but they cannot be allowed to overshadow the imperative of including Japan not only in Pillar II of the AUKUS alliance, but also within Pillar I.
Moreover, the institutional momentum for Japan’s inclusion is already significant: On April 10, during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington, the US and Japan announced that their militaries would cooperate with a joint command structure and that, together with Australia, they would develop a new air missile defense network.
The moment calls for a unified front.
Mohammed Soliman is a director at the Washington-based Middle East Institute, a member of McLarty Associates and a visiting fellow at Third Way.
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