US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (董軍) on April 16 engaged in their first dialogue since 2022. During the videoconference, they delved into various topics, including US-China defense and regional issues, as well as global security, such as Russia’s war against Ukraine and the threat North Korea poses to world peace.
Austin emphasized the criticality of upholding freedom of navigation, implicitly addressing China’s assertive stance in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Austin reassured the Chinese side of the US’ commitment to its “one China” policy. However, he also affirmed that US military ships and aircraft would persist in their patrols and training exercises in international waters. This stance indicated the US’ resolve not to yield its exercise of freedom of navigation to People’s Liberation Army coercion.
Previously, China had declined to meet due to US sanctions imposed on former Chinese minister of national defense Li Shangfu (李尚福). Beijing also canceled all military-to-military talks in response to then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on Aug. 2, 2022.
China has frequently utilized the granting of military dialogue as leverage, signaling its willingness to compromise on other matters. Regardless of whether compromise materializes, Beijing can maintain the moral high ground by showcasing its openness to discussions. Conversely, the US views these talks as an essential diplomatic tool to mitigate the risk of triggering a war. As a result, the US has advocated for and successfully arranged several high-level defense discussions, culminating in the latest dialogue between the two defense chiefs.
General Charles Brown, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in December last year engaged in discussions with General Liu Zhenli (劉振立), chief of staff of China’s Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission. A month later, the US-People’s Republic of China Defense Policy Coordination Talks took place.
Austin and Dong are slated to participate in the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore at the end of this month. This prestigious event draws defense chiefs from around the globe, offering opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussions. Key topics on this year’s Shangri-La agenda include maritime security, deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region, cybersecurity, defense cooperation and avenues for a diplomatic resolution in the conflict in Myanmar.
Most analysts view continuous and transparent dialogue as a more effective means of maintaining peace compared with severing relations. Apart from deterring conflict, discussions between the US and China provide opportunities to identify areas of common interest, such as addressing the conflict in Myanmar, combating terrorism and conducting anti-piracy operations. However, Beijing’s support for the Burmese junta, as well as some of ethnic armed groups opposing it, complicates matters. This dynamic makes it improbable for the US and China to reconcile their Myanmar policies sufficiently to reach a consensus.
The two nations’ counterterrorism approaches also greatly differ. Beijing’s backing of Iran, the primary state supporter of terrorist factions such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, stands in stark contrast to the US stance.
Regarding anti-piracy efforts, while China is open to collaboration against Somalian pirates, it has struck its own deals with the Houthis. These agreements ensure safe passage for Chinese vessels while allowing attacks on ships from other nations. Thus, even apparent shared interests lack true common ground.
Critics contend that entering into discussions with a rival military can inadvertently legitimize the actions of that government, even if they are perceived negatively. With each round of defense talks between the US and China, China’s online 50 Cent Army ramps up its efforts, portraying the US as submissive and eager for negotiations, while casting Beijing as powerful and generous for agreeing to them.
The day following the meeting with Austin, Dong was reported in the Global Times as stating: “The US should recognize China’s firm stance, respect China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea, and take practical actions to maintain regional peace and stability, and the stability of China-US military relations.”
This statement essentially reaffirms that the Chinese side remains steadfast, unwilling to compromise or yield. China seeks acceptance of its actions and territorial claims from the US and the international community, without opposition.
Austin and numerous other US officials’ continual reassurance to their Chinese counterparts regarding the US commitment to its “one China” policy is viewed by some as a form of appeasement. Another criticism is the lack of tangible outcomes from the talks. This is evident in the recurring topics of discussion with Beijing — China’s aggression toward Taiwan and the Philippines, its attempts to curtail freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, its ongoing support for Russia in Ukraine and its cyberattacks on the US.
Despite repeated discussions on these topics, China has made no commitments to align its behavior with the rules-based international order. There has been no observable change in its conduct.
On the contrary, China persists in its rapid modernization and expansion of its military, including augmenting its nuclear arsenal, which comprises at least 500 warheads. This intense modernization and expansion indicate China’s steadfastness, showing no inclination toward compromise.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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