As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy.
While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities.
Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing one Asian giant, China, against another, India, straining ties with the latter, which has long been a dependable neighbor.
This sorry tale of Maldivian foreign policy began unfolding after Muizzu’s electoral victory in last year’s elections, signaling a significant transition by his pro-China People’s National Congress party, and sparking concerns about a major and hurried shift toward China. The Maldives under Muizzu has shown a keen interest in building economic ties with China under the Belt and Road Initiative.
During a visit to China in January, Muizzu met with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), afterward signing a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership with China, as well as 20 agreements to assist with infrastructure in the Maldives. Beijing announced a US$130 million grant for the Maldives, while Xi promised to send more Chinese tourists to the tourism-dependent nation.
These visits suggest foreign relations in the Maldives is shifting away from its closest neighbor and primary source of aid and support — India. Historically non-aligned, the Maldives’ recent diplomatic trajectory is leaning toward China, influenced significantly by Male’s desperation to benefit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
These shifts have led to an increase in undue Chinese influence. A flurry of hurriedly inked agreements have also led to concerns about the Maldives falling for China’s “debt trap diplomacy.”
With a substantial budget deficit and looming Chinese debt repayments, the Maldives is already facing financial challenges. Official figures reveal a gaping US$550 million budget deficit this year alone, with the burden compounded by obligations exceeding a staggering US$1 billion in Chinese debt repayments looming in 2026.
Small powers such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives play significant roles in the complex web of geopolitical strategies in the Indian Ocean region. What is more, they are fully aware of their strategic relevance for major powers and overall maritime security dynamics.
As these countries navigate their development paths, they often look to larger regional powers for investment, infrastructure development and economic aid. China, with its expansive Belt and Road Initiative, has been at the forefront of such engagements, albeit due to its own strategic interests.
Sri Lanka’s experiences with Chinese investments offer critical lessons that are relevant to the Maldives as it deepens its own engagement with China.
China’s interest in the Indian Ocean forms part of a broader threefold strategy.
First, it aims to safeguard its maritime trade routes and ensure the safety of energy supply routes. This strategy involves protecting these routes and bolstering regional influence through the development of port infrastructure and logistics centers.
The second, more important and long-term strategy is to establish a permanent (military) presence in the Indian Ocean. China is mindful of its “Malacca dilemma.” While its efforts to overcome the challenge through Gwadar Port have delivered sub-optimal results, having forces stationed in the Indian Ocean would provide it with a “Third Arm” of sea access, in addition to the Malacca Strait and Gwadar.
That all major navies have a strong presence in the Indian Ocean has not gone unnoticed in Beijing.
However, the challenge for a revisionist power that is not inclined to work with traditionally powerful Indian Ocean navies — Australia, France, India, the UK and the US — is that the Indian Ocean’s vast expanse cannot be covered with just a handful of ports. The icing on the cake is that it helps China encircle India on the maritime fronts. Djibouti, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and now the Maldives — are all part of this threefold strategy.
Nevertheless, Sri Lanka’s experience with China, notably the Hambantota International Port project, illustrates the potential pitfalls of relying heavily on Chinese investment. Funded by Chinese loans, the port project failed to generate the expected revenue, leading Sri Lanka into unsustainable levels of debt. Consequently, Sri Lanka in 2017 leased the port to China for 99 years due to its inability to repay its loans, sparking concerns about sovereignty under undue Chinese influence.
Similarly, the Maldives, strategically positioned along crucial sea routes, is an attractive prospect for Chinese investment. As the Maldives manages its ties with China, it faces a critical decision, and must learn from Sri Lanka’s missteps, or run the risk of repeating the same mistakes as its neighbor.
The Maldives must tread cautiously, striking a delicate balance in its relations with China and India to avoid alienating a key regional partner while reaping the short-term benefits of Chinese investments. A calibrated approach is also needed in dealing with China. The Maldives must make a diplomatic course correction to avoid becoming a victim of self-inflicted damage.
Muizzu’s pursuit of risky foreign policy could lead to enduring consequences, particularly regarding Male’s deepening strategic dependence on China and likely entanglement in larger geopolitical dynamics.
China’s endeavors aim to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean region, potentially ensnaring other countries as it has done with Sri Lanka and numerous others.
It would be in the Maldives’ best interest to learn from recent instances where countries compromised their sovereignty due to over-reliance on China. Furthermore, given its limited maneuverability as a small country, it should not forsake its longstanding allies and development partners based on the personal preferences of certain leaders.
Neevia Kurup, an alumna of the Universiti Malaya, Malaysia, is an expert in Asia-Europe relations, EU-ASEAN dynamics, Malaysian foreign policy and Indo-Pacific politics.
Dr Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University in Thailand, and an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. His X handle is @rahulmishr_
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