Indonesia and Taiwan use their coastal geography to create their identities and policies. Indonesia’s strategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, its archipelagic status and inheritance of two Southeast Asian thalassocracies inspired the development of its Global Maritime Fulcrum in 2014, Maritime Policies in 2017 and Maritime Diplomacy White Paper in 2019.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s position at a junction between Northeast and Southeast Asia, facing the Pacific Ocean and surrounded by sea, has from the 2000s led to the development of an ocean state identity and policies.
In 2020, the Legislative Yuan passed the 2020 National Ocean Policy White Paper.
Social and cultural elements are crucial for Indonesia and Taiwan in building maritime identities because international law does not define these terms specifically. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea only defines archipelagic countries and coastal states. As a result, historical narrative and cultural heritage are crucial for forming a national identity centered on the sea.
Historical narratives of regional sea powers, such as the kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit, and the cultural heritage of the Orang Laut sea people, are important sources of Indonesian maritime identity.
Meanwhile, Taiwan derives marine culture from its indigenous communities.
Although the sea-related identities constructed by Taiwan and Indonesia are distinct, as maritime and ocean states, they both see the sea as a source of their identity and power.
They are motivated to adopt maritime policies out of an awareness of their nautical heritages and a desire to establish a strong maritime identity, recognizing that past neglect of the maritime domain has not served their national interests.
They construct a maritime vision based on a similar scenario and motivation. Indonesia aspires to be an advanced maritime country and leader through the Global Maritime Fulcrum. Meanwhile, Taiwan aims to be a sustainable marine nation.
Furthermore, Taiwan and Indonesia have comparable concerns about their maritime domains. Their marine policy documents focus on similar issues, such as maritime territorial security, safety and governance, marine environmental preservation, maritime economy and industry, maritime culture, and human resources.
They also take a similar approach to promoting open and rules-based relationships in the region. Indonesia and Taiwan constructively contribute to the Indo-Pacific region’s peace and prosperity.
A comparison of Indonesia and Taiwan’s sea-based identities and maritime policies reveals a significant potential for collaboration in marine concerns.
Since they have a similar understanding of the maritime sector and multiple associated programs covered by their maritime policies, they have a great chance to engage, collaborate and work together on maritime issues. At the very least, they could work together in three fields:
First, cooperation in the maritime industry. Indonesia is strategically located on important trade routes, whereas Taiwan has an advanced marine industry, with the world’s fourth-largest shipping firm and fourteenth-largest container port. They could collaborate to create maritime industries, port infrastructure and shipping technology through investment and trade.
Second, Indonesia and Taiwan could work together to establish secure and stable international maritime areas. As maritime countries, they face comparable challenges in combating transnational crime at sea, while promoting maritime safety.
Third, cooperation and collaboration in marine research and education. Jakarta and Taipei should prioritize educational and scientific partnerships in marine affairs.
The 2004 Memorandum of Understanding on Marine and Fisheries Cooperation between the two maritime states was a positive achievement, and since Taiwan introduced the New Southbound Policy in 2016, numerous Indonesian students have studied at Taiwanese universities.
Taiwan’s advanced technology and research in marine science and technology make it an excellent partner for Indonesia to strengthen its human resources in the fields of marine science and technology.
Taiwanese experts could engage with Indonesian researchers on larger marine science projects in Indonesia.
Moreover, studying and researching marine history and culture is critical for discovering social and cultural links between Indonesia and Taiwan, laying a solid foundation for increased maritime cooperation and collaboration.
In this regard, cooperation in education, research and innovation would help Indonesia and Taiwan connect their marine visions.
Hopefully, the new governments in both countries will seize this chance to strengthen their marine cooperation.
Tonny Dian Effendi is a doctoral candidate at National Sun Yat-sen University’s Institute for Political Science, and a doctoral student scholarship training awardee of Academia Sinica’s Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies.
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