India has been designated as a key priority country within Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy framework. Over the past decades, successive governments in Taipei have significantly expanded their outreach to India.
However, since 2020, India-Taiwan relations have made remarkable strides, reaching heights previously unimaginable. This marks a new and positive phase in bilateral relations, attributed largely to the unwavering dedication of key individuals such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tien Chung-kwang (田中光).
The importance of India to Taiwan cannot be overstated, particularly in light of President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) personal commitment to enhancing bilateral ties.
Indian Representative to Taiwan Manharsinh Laxmanbhai Yadav is also playing a pivotal role in revitalizing the relationship, injecting fresh energy and momentum into engagements.
While there have been significant constructive developments in India-Taiwan relations, fundamental issues remain. Despite Taiwan’s renewed focus on India, there are still challenges to overcome.
Before discussing India’s potential response to a potential contingency in Taiwan and the prospect of security cooperation, it is imperative to address often-overlooked aspects critical for meaningful progress in bilateral relations.
The primary issue is the re-establishment of direct connectivity between India and Taiwan. China Airlines, Taiwan’s state-owned carrier, operated the Delhi-Taipei route before the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite still holding the slot, it has yet to resume flights, citing the route’s lack of profitability. Indians predominantly opt for destinations such as Bali, Bangkok and Singapore for tourism, with limited awareness of Taiwan as a destination. Without the availability of direct flights, it is unlikely that this perception will change.
Second, facilitating easier visa applications for Indians is of utmost importance. Taiwanese visa policies for Indians are stringent and discriminatory, mirroring similar policies in many Western nations. These restrictions stem from concerns that citizens from the Global South might exploit easy access to move to the West.
Third, it is noteworthy that new lawmakers in Taiwan, particularly those from the Democratic Progressive Party, have shown less interest in establishing parliamentary exchanges with India compared with their enthusiasm for engaging with European counterparts.
This shift contrasts sharply with Tsai’s policies and priorities during her tenure, where she worked to diversify Taiwan’s external engagements, including fostering ties with India.
While continuity in this regard is expected during the administration of president-elect William Lai (賴清德) and vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), it is vital to ensure that the level of engagement with India is not compromised.
It is not in Taiwan’s best interest to disproportionately prioritize relations with the West over those with countries within the region.
Lobbying efforts with Indian ministers, strategic communities and civil society cannot be underestimated. It is imperative for the next set of legislators and ministers to bear this in mind, and prioritize maintaining and bolstering ties with India.
Gone are the days when India was not prioritized. In today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, engaging with India is not just important, but imperative for Taiwan. As Taiwan selects its next Cabinet, a steadfast focus on India is essential.
India plays a critical role as an effective Asian counterbalance to China. However, achieving this objective requires fulfilling the existing mandate of bilateral relations.
Recognizing economic, digital and people connectivity as key priorities becomes imperative, especially with new administrations to take office in both nations this year.
Action-oriented policies are a prerequisite to advance India-Taiwan relations effectively.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.
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