Mon, Apr 01, 2024 page8

• Guermantes Lailari On Taiwan: Countering China’s Gray Zone Warfare

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  Many analysts report on Chinese Communist gray zone antics in the region. It is time to discuss countering these actions, in terms of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) overall gray zone strategy, participants in their gray zone warfare (GZW), the varieties of CCP GZW, and finally some suggested countermeasures to the CCP’s GZW.

  The CCP’s gray zone strategy is to use all national means to achieve their objectives short of war — following Sun Tzu’s (孫子) edict of winning without fighting. In other words, the CCP’s gray zone actions are the equivalent of political warfare, which former US diplomat George F. Kennan defined as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”

  One of the main doctrines of communism is expansionism — the USSR, Russia and Communist China provide excellent case studies — recall the CCP’s occupation of Tibet, East Turkestan, Hong Kong, Inner Mongolia, parts of India, and illegal claims in the so-called South China Sea.

  

  The clearest description of this desire for world domination is Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s famous advice — “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.” The CCP is demonstrating this same penchant for aggression.

  Clearly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP’s paramilitary forces such as the Chinese Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and even Chinese fishing boats that are funded by the PLA are conducting GZW. Specifically, in the West Philippine Sea, the Chinese Coast Guard continues to severely harass replenishment ships to the Philippine Marines at Second Thomas Shoal while the PLA Navy lurks in the background ready to assist the Chinese Coast Guard if the Philippine Navy decides to enforce its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The CCP falsely claims 90 percent of the South China Sea even though the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concluded in 2016 that “there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”

  The PLA has consistently showed its bellicosity in the South China Sea with past aggression, by attacking and capturing Vietnamese islands in the South China Sea and killing at least 139 Vietnamese military (1974 Paracel and Spratly Islands battle — 75 killed, and in 1988 the PLA Navy killed at least 64) and by illegally drilling for oil and gas, fishing, extracting undersea rich mineral resources, constructing fake islands and military bases in the EEZ of multiple countries in the South China Sea. Some examples include Vietnam (CCP threats to attack Vietnam again in 2017 because of a planned joint venture between Spain and Vietnam for oil and gas exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ) and Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia: Illegal fishing and surveying of other countries’ EEZ in the South China Sea.

  Currently, the PLA and the CCP’s paramilitary forces are conducting increasingly disruptive gray zone actions in the South China Sea. The Sealight research group has documented their actions into the following categories: bow-crossing, blocking swarming, rafting, cable-cutting, ramming, water cannoning, going dark, spoofing, laser dazzling (blinding), over-the-horizon hiding and intrusive patrolling, and all these could be a pretext to escalate into a war. The CCP’s naval and aerial GZW actions in the South China Sea provide a training opportunity for a future blockade of Taiwan.

  The CCP’s naval and Chinese fishing boats are also conducting gray zone actions around Taiwan including recent events around Kinmen and Matsu islands using illegal fishing boats (no name, no registration, no AIS) and using these as pretext to exert illegal national sovereignty. Other examples include in late 2023 where Chinese-registered tugboats twice probed Taiwan’s eastern and southern coastlines, coming as close as three nautical miles, violating the twelve nautical mile territorial boundary.

  The PLA Navy and its auxiliary naval assets conduct similar hostile gray zone actions around Japan, especially near the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa. The 2010 case study where a Chinese fishing trawler, fishing in Senkaku waters, collided with a Japanese Coast Guard ship provides insight into CCP behavior. The Japanese detained the Chinese fishing trawler skipper. The ensuing Chinese rare earth embargo on Japan led the WTO to a rule against China for reducing supplies of rare earths to Japan.

  Non-nuclear-armed Japan has the unique position of being the victim of aggression by three nuclear armed totalitarian powers: China, Russia and North Korea. North Korean missiles flying over Japan receive only diplomatic complaints but no countermeasure to stop them.

  American assurances and the lack of counter-GZW actions cause skepticism with US allies and partners. The US alliance must think creatively about countering CCP, North Korean and Russian GZW actions. Doing the same thing over and over and thinking that this will cause the other side to change their behavior is the very definition of insanity.

  Just as the CCP conducts aggression on and under the ocean, the CCP’s PLA Air Force and Naval aircraft do the same in the air. The most infamous attack was the antics of a PLA Navy pilot who died while forcing the US Navy’s EP-3E reconnaissance platform to land on Hainan Island, China in 2001.

  PLA military aircraft continue to harass allied military aircraft operating in the South China Sea as well as the Taiwan Strait.

  China has many organizations conducting GZW in the non-physical domain such as the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, which conducts intelligence, space, cyber, media, psychological and legal warfare (Three Warfares). The Ministries of State Security, of Public Security, People’s Armed Police and other agencies conduct massive intelligence operations including United Front operations to disrupt and coopt governments, companies and individuals internally and externally. Clearly, in the intelligence warfare arena, the CCP is overwhelming the US and Taiwanese counterintelligence abilities. In 2017, Taiwan’s government estimated that over 5,000 spies were operating in Taiwan. Intelligence warfare is part of the CCP’s GZW.

  There are some possible counters to the CCP’s GZW strategies.

  The Philippine government is using transparency via media warfare to counter Chinese GZW. The CCP is one of the least transparent countries in the world and this tool has garnered worldwide sympathy and support for the Philippines against China. Some have recently argued that “radical transparency is democracy’s secret weapon to counter China.”

  Taiwan failed to use this tool in the 14 February 2024 incident in Kinmen where a Chinese speed boat sank while being chased by a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel. The government did not release any video from the incident and the government’s story kept on changing.

  Prior to former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PLA Air Force hardly ever crossed the median line between the PRC and Taiwan. But afterwards, this action became commonplace, creating a new normal. In other words, the PLA found “mush” and pushed. The Taiwanese and US governments made diplomatic protests, but to no avail.

  In 1955, General Benjamin O. Davis created the Taiwan Strait median line to promote peace by providing ample warning for each side to react to a possible attack and to prevent either side from conducting a surprise attack.

  The US president, Congress and the US military should have reacted directly against the PLA incursions crossing the median line and other closer approaches around Taiwan. For example, the US military could have sent large numbers of US military ships and aircraft through the Straits until the PLA stopped crossing the median line. The ROC military and other militaries could have joined US forces crossing the Straits and even the midline. In other words, the US and Taiwan did not take a stand and today Davis’ Line no longer exists.

  The US and NATO trained and armed Ukraine prior to 2022, causing a disaster for the initial Russian invasion. The US should be more active with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan, to counter CCP GZW.

  Although most analysts believe that China has the upper hand in commerce with other countries, China does have economic weaknesses. For example, food supplies are a critical weakness for China and they know it.

  Communist China tried to use economic warfare against Lithuania in 2021 because it opened a Taiwan Representative Office (instead of a “Taipei” Representative Office — China’s version of politically correct terminology). The CCP economic coercion failed since only one percent of Lithuania’s trade was with China and the European Union also struck back by passing legislation to mitigate such behavior in the future.

  Other types of economic gray zone warfare exist and should be explored within existing international agreements such as trade embargoes, boycotts, sanctions, tariff discrimination, the freezing of capital assets, the suspension of aid, the prohibition of investment and other capital flows and expropriation.

  The CCP wants to remove their main ideological threat — a Mandarin-speaking democratic country called Taiwan. Taiwan represents a country where the individual is the ruler and the government serves the people. This idea is clearly stated in Taiwan’s Constitution: “Sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens.”

  In China, sovereignty resides in the Party: the CCP is the ruler, and the people serve the party. This type of thinking is no different than how the masses were treated under the Chinese emperor or the serfs of Europe.

  Therefore, Taiwan represents the quintessential ideological threat to the CCP.

  Most governments appear to be silent in developing counter measures to China’s GZW. The first step is to understand China’s GZW strategy, doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

  China’s armed forces have been developing their TTPs for at least two decades. Furthermore, China’s government agencies have worked together to amplify their GZW actions through diplomatic warfare, economic warfare, and other types.

  If we don’t push back against China’s GZW, then we will be treated as Lenin’s mush. We need to be the “steel” to make the CCP withdraw.

  Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, missile defense, and strategy. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in 2022, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and National Defense University in 2023, and is a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in 2024.
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