Chinese villages are being built in the disputed zone between Bhutan and China. Last month, Chinese settlers, holding photographs of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), moved into their new homes on land that was not Xi’s to give. These residents are part of the Chinese government’s resettlement program, relocating Tibetan families into the territory China claims.
China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China Sea involve Vietnam (Paracel Islands, also known as Xisha Islands [西沙群島]), the Philippines (Scarborough Shoal, or Huangyan Island [黃岩島]), and parts of Spratly Islands [Nansha Islands, 南沙群島]), Malaysia (parts of Spratly Islands), Brunei (parts of Spratly Islands) and Taiwan. Last year, Beijing published a map claiming most of these territories as part of the People’s Republic of China.
The Bhutan dispute epitomizes a David versus Goliath scenario: with a population of only 777,486 and a standing military of 7,500 soldiers, it is incapable of defending itself from China. Despite its small size, the dispute holds significant importance due to its strategic location between India and China. Any alteration in Bhutan’s borders could directly affect the national security of India and Nepal.
In 2017, the Doklam plateau dispute erupted between India and China in the tri-junction area claimed by Bhutan, India and China. A platoon of Chinese border guards demolished Royal Bhutan Army bunkers. Subsequently, a Chinese road construction crew arrived, accompanied by more Chinese soldiers. India, Bhutan’s de facto security guarantor under the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, sent troops to obstruct the Chinese construction. After intermittent skirmishes, both sides agreed to withdraw forces.
In 2020, China asserted its claim to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, leading Thimphu to complain at the Chinese embassy in India. Last year, China built 150 new homes, doubling the size of a border village named Gyalaphug. The village includes a Chinese Communist Party Community Center with amenities. Chinese state media said that the village was established in 2007 with just two homes and no basic utilities.
By 2018, this and other border villages became models of Xi’s poverty alleviation program. The media report mentioned that by the end of 2021, 620 border villages had undergone similar transformations to alleviate poverty and enhance border security.
In October 2021, Thimphu and Beijing signed a three-step roadmap memorandum of understanding to expedite border negotiations, excluding the tri-junction area involving India.
However, China is now violating that agreement by settling into areas that have not yet been decided upon and developing infrastructure within the disputed zone, raising further concerns. This infrastructure could serve military purposes or bolster China’s claim on the territory. A stronger Chinese military presence near Bhutan’s borders could jeopardize India’s access to the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, connecting seven northeastern Indian states to the rest of the nation. The terms of the Treaty of Friendship prohibit either party from allowing a foreign country to occupy its territory in a manner threatening the other’s national security.
The dispute could lead to various outcomes. Bhutan might concede to Beijing’s claims on the disputed Jakarlung and Pasamlung territories, which are less strategically significant to India. However, any territory concession by Thimphu to China raises concerns about its territorial integrity.
Another possibility is Bhutan agreeing to a land swap with China in Doklam, jeopardizing India’s national security due to the proximity to the Siliguri Corridor. This would further strain the already complex relationship between New Delhi and Beijing.
The dispute adds to broader tensions in the Himalayas, where China also has a border dispute with Nepal. Nepalese sources claim China moved the boundary, encroaching 1,500m into Nepal near the Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts.
A stronger Chinese presence on Bhutan’s borders could potentially embolden Beijing in its border dispute with Nepal.
Thimphu has assured New Delhi that it would not make a decision without a three-way consultation. However, the Indian side worries that despite the absence of official diplomatic relations between China and Bhutan, Beijing might wield asymmetric negotiating power, using its regional economic and military dominance.
If Beijing successfully acquires Doklam without firing a shot, this could become its new expansion strategy. It would also undermine India’s role as the de facto security guarantor for Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, as well as for the exiled Tibetan community.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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