For 34 consecutive years, each Chinese foreign minister has started the new year with a state visit to Africa. In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) upgraded China’s ties with Africa to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”
While the US aims to counter China’s expanding influence on the continent, there are concerns that its efforts are too little, too late.
Conversely, some suggest that African nations might be attracted to the higher quality, transparency and financial terms offered by US aid and investment.
Beijing views US foreign policy objectives as forming an anti-China coalition, prompting efforts to bolster ties with developing countries in Africa and the broader Global South.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, this diplomatic approach included offering tens of thousands of scholarships to African students to study in China. Stadium diplomacy is another tool in Beijing’s strategy. Of the stadiums used at the Ivory Coast-hosted Africa Cup of Nations last month, three were built with Chinese funding, including the 60,000-seat Olympic Stadium of Epimbe in Abidjan. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) cited these stadiums as examples of “beneficial cooperation” between China and Africa, overlooking the fact that the road connecting Abidjan, the country’s largest city, to the stadium remains incomplete, resulting in travel times of up to an hour.
According to the Chinese Communist Party government tabloid the Global Times, China has constructed more than 100 stadiums across Africa as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beyond sports venues, the BRI finances projects including diplomatic buildings, military bases, schools and hospitals. These high-profile endeavors often stem from contracts linked to energy and resources, with anticipated returns flowing back to China.
Since Beijing hosted its first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, it has steadily increased its trade and investment with Africa, surpassing the US in 2009. China, Africa’s largest trading partner, aims to surpass the EU in trade volume by 2030, yet this has exacerbated Africa’s growing trade deficit. As a result of China’s increased investments, recipient nations struggle with interest payments.
Moreover, China’s investment practices disregard human rights and environmental concerns. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), China is expanding its mining operations despite humanitarian issues such as unfair labor practices, forced evictions and farmland destruction. Transparency is lacking in the deal, with the DRC’s state auditor, the Inspectorate General of Finances, reporting gross undervaluation, favoring China.
African Natural Resources Watch, a non-governmental organization based in the DRC, criticized the secretive negotiations, warning of potential financial burdens on the country’s treasury due to loan repayments.
In addition to trade and investment, China extends its influence in Africa through military diplomacy, offering education and training to African military and police officers. Graduates of these programs hold prominent political and defense positions across the continent, including presidencies.
Troops from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps are stationed at the China’s inaugural overseas military base in Djibouti. In 2020, an additional marine corps special operations force unit was incorporated into the African contingent.
China engages in counterpiracy operations, peacekeeping and joint training with African militaries. In 2022, Ugandan Special Forces collaborated with Chinese commandos to apprehend members of a Chinese criminal gang operating within Uganda.
In 2021, Xi unveiled the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at China’s Boao Forum, emphasizing its relevance, particularly in Africa.
Gateway House, an Indian think tank, calls the GSI, along with the BRI and the Global Initiative on Data Security, a strategic maneuver toward Chinese global dominance.
These official collaborations extend China’s authoritarian influence, as evidenced by Kenya’s decision to deport 44 Taiwanese to China in 2022, resulting in lengthy jail sentences.
Similarly, Egyptian authorities allowed Chinese intelligence services to interrogate Chinese students, mostly Muslims, in an Egyptian prison.
According to this year’s Global Diplomacy Index, China surpasses the US in Africa in terms of economic, diplomatic and military influence. While China has emerged as Africa’s preferred economic partner, the US remains the region’s primary security partner. Although Washington has a single official base in Djibouti, as China does, it maintains numerous camps and base-sharing arrangements. The US Africa Command’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa is in Djibouti. North Africa and the Middle East are overseen by the US Central Command, while Bahrain is home to the US Naval Forces Central Command and the US 5th fleet, as well as 9,000 personnel from the military and the US Department of Defense.
To strengthen its economic partnership, Washington is investing in the US$2.3 billion Lobito Corridor, linking the DRC, Zambia and Angola by rail. This initiative will not only boost the economies of these African nations, but also enhance diplomatic ties for the US.
Moreover, it positions the US ahead of China in the electric vehicle (EV) competition, as the metal ore transported along the route is crucial for EV batteries. Without this link, transporting copper by truck to ports in Angola can take up to a month, with the journey plagued by threats from corrupt officials and hijackers.
The rail project is anticipated to be a significant game changer, offering immense value to the local economy.
The Lobito Corridor project poses significant risks, expenses and challenges. While countering China’s influence, a few billion dollars might appear modest compared with BRI investments.
However, unlike the burdensome BRI loans, the GDP growth and return on investment are expected to be substantial. US investment also upholds higher standards in labor practices, environmental protection and transparency compared with Chinese models.
By prioritizing quality over quantity, African leaders can potentially slow China’s increasing influence and diversify their partnerships.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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