Small states with powerful, larger neighbors in international relations face a challenging reality.
Counting on bilateral trade for their domestic prosperity, they must grow economic ties while ensuring they do not develop a trade dependency that would undermine their independence.
To safeguard their security, they must decide whether to develop closer diplomatic ties with their larger neighbor, offering assurances and trust-building mechanisms, or to seek an external alliance with other nations in a coalition, protecting themselves and keeping threatening neighbors at bay.
For Taiwan, it is even more complex. Within its borders, a vocal minority identify with the history and culture of their larger neighbor.
Unlike smaller states in Europe that are part of NATO — which the US has committed to helping if its members are attacked — Taiwan has no such security.
Instead, the US has a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” neither committing to Taiwan’s defense, nor walking away.
Along with the US’ chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and wavering support for Ukraine, it is not surprising that many in Taiwan have “US skepticism.” However, this skepticism and the policies that flow from it — that Taiwan make accommodations for China and move further away from the US — tend not to be about the US or even hard-nosed geopolitical calculations.
For a certain segment of the Taiwanese population, this becomes tied up with questions of national identity, perturbed by the development of a societal consensus that Taiwan is separate from China.
With this, US skepticism and Taiwan’s foreign policy becomes less about national interest and more about national identity.
To prevent the nation from moving away from China, US skeptics say that Taiwan and China share the same culture and that “close neighbors are better than distant relatives,” implying that common cultural roots and geographical proximity should determine a nation’s foreign policy.
If this is the case, South Korea and Japan should also seek to accommodate China.
It goes without saying that basing foreign policy on identity is a recipe for a bad strategy.
As former British prime minister Henry John Temple said: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
In other words, it would be a folly to base a nation’s foreign policy on the idea of “common culture.”
It is normal for smaller powers that depend on an external security provider to be nervous about its commitment. US skepticism is not limited to Taiwan.
Just look at the debate in Australia about hitching its long-term security to the US with the signing of the Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, UK and US; or the apprehension in South Korea about the US’ resolve to use its extended nuclear deterrent should there be a North Korean nuclear attack.
These debates are filled with skepticism about the US’ long-term dependability.
When it comes to national strategy, it is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) who has made the decision for them: The alternative to the US is an accommodation of Xi’s China.
That is out of the question for those who want to maintain an independent foreign policy.
However, these nations do not have a sizeable minority that identifies with Chinese culture and views the nation’s China-related policies through the prism of identity.
US skepticism dresses itself up in the language of realism, but as with many controversies in the nation, it is more about national identity, China and an inability to come to terms with a changing Taiwan.
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
US President Donald Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have each given their thoughts on Russia’s war with Ukraine. There are a few proponents of US skepticism in Taiwan taking advantage of developments to write articles claiming that the US would arbitrarily abandon Ukraine. The reality is that when one understands Trump’s negotiating habits, one sees that he brings up all variables of a situation prior to discussion, using broad negotiations to take charge. As for his ultimate goals and the aces up his sleeve, he wants to keep things vague for
RSS