Certain China hawks caution that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) might consider invading Taiwan to secure his legacy and divert attention from the economy, which he has struggled to address.
However, he might also be hesitant to engage in a prolonged conflict that China would likely lose or that could harm his legacy more than benefit it.
Historically, China has faced several constraints in taking military action against Taiwan.
First, the US’ dominant military position in the region acted as a deterrent against aggression. Additionally, the extensive economic ties between Taiwan and China made the prospect of war undesirable and complicated. The fear of international backlash and the possibility of sanctions also contributed to the reluctance.
Moreover, Taiwan’s robust democracy and advancing military capabilities made it a formidable opponent.
Lastly, China’s internal issues diverted its attention inward.
However, in recent times, its economy has risen to become the second-largest globally, while its military ranks third, altering the strategic landscape.
In certain military domains, China might already have an edge over the US.
Furthermore, everyone has watched as Ukraine, a mid-sized European country that ranked 21st in firepower, has held out for two years with US and international support, against the world’s second most powerful military.
This raises the question: What were the deterrents that prevented China from invading Taiwan in the past and are they still effective today?
Taiwan was protected under the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which was terminated when the US recognized Beijing in 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act was implemented in 1979 and although the US Navy was no longer stationed in Taiwan, they continued to patrol the Taiwan Strait.
At that time, the difference in firepower between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the US Navy was so heavily skewed in favor of the US that a conflict would have been suicidal for China.
Taiwan’s faster economic development and its support from the US also provided it with a superior air force capable of defending the nation.
The PLA Air Force is now dramatically more powerful than Taiwan’s, but still does not surpass the overall power of US forces in the region. The US Air Force recognizes, after running computer simulations, that it must improve its capabilities to counter the PLA and minimize the loss of equipment and lives. They also need more anti-ship planes to counter the PLA Navy.
Taiwan also has air defense missile systems to repel the PLA. Its air defense systems, while effective, could be improved, recent assessments showed. To this end, Taiwan has begun mass production of its own indigenous air defense systems.
Xi has prioritized the development of the PLA Navy and now has the largest fleet in the world.
However, the US Navy remains the world’s most powerful and could be deployed from numerous overseas bases, whereas China is limited to two dedicated overseas bases, one in Djibouti and one in Cambodia. Therefore, the naval deterrent remains in place.
Another deterrent, a testament to Taiwan’s development, is the nation’s so-called “silicon shield.” Its microchips are so valuable and crucial to China’s technological advancement and defense capabilities that Beijing would hesitate to interrupt their production by invading Taiwan, proverbially killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.
On the other hand, Chinese chip imports last year slid 10.8 percent in volume and 15.4 percent in value compared with 2022. This diminishing demand for semiconductors in China is partly due to worsening China-Taiwan ties, as well as a general economic slowdown.
Additionally, the US chip export ban, meant to impede China’s economic development and the modernization of the PLA, further exacerbates the situation. While well-intentioned, it is also encouraging China to find alternative sources of chips and accelerate its own domestic production capacity. Proof of China’s ability to find alternative providers is that Chinese imports of chipmaking equipment rose 14 percent year-on-year.
In the long run, the chip shield might become ineffective, as China would not be concerned about losing chips from Taiwan.
Throughout the 2010s, another deterrent was the promise of increased trade and investment from the West. In previous decades, the West and China believed that time was on their side.
The West was confident that as China developed economically, it would start to liberalize and open up or possibly even transition to a democracy. It was also thought that Beijing would recognize the benefits of peaceful coexistence with Taiwan, Europe, the US and its allies, and would not risk losing them for the sake of pride in “reunifying” China.
On the other hand, Beijing believed that time favored it, as each year brought economic growth and technological advancement, enabling modernization and bolstering the PLA against the US military. This also meant preparing the country for the hardships of potential conflict. Chinese leaders aimed for economic, energy, food and technological independence to withstand the challenges of a prolonged war. As the Xi era began, each passing year brought China closer to achieving these goals.
There might also have been hope in Beijing that the longer it allowed the “Taiwan experiment” to continue, the more likely it was that Taiwanese would “realize the error of their ways” and opt to “reunite” with China.
The early 2000s posed a particular test, as hardliners from the pre-World War II era were passing away rapidly. Beijing closely monitored Taiwan’s elections to gauge whether the younger generation of “soft children,” raised in bushibans and never experiencing hardship, would still vote for independence, potentially risking conflict.
Now that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has won the past three elections and has held office for most of the lifespan of the youngest voters, it is clear that with the passage of time, Taiwanese are unlikely to change their minds and join China.
China’s military advancements, coupled with Taiwan’s steadfast desire to remain separate, mean that time is no longer the primary factor in China’s decision-making process. Some speculate that Xi is waiting to improve the economy before initiating any military action.
However, many economists believe it would be impossible for Xi to rescue the economy without addressing underlying structural issues such as public debt, a looming real estate crisis, a growing demographic crisis and declining exports and foreign direct investment.
If Xi acknowledges his inability to solve these problems, he might see no better time than the present to act. Nonetheless, the military deterrents remain intact, including the US nuclear arsenal, which consists of 5,550 warheads, significantly outnumbering China’s 350.
In conclusion, many historical deterrents persist, although some have been weakened by China’s progress. However, the existing deterrents are still potent enough that a Taiwan invasion would likely end in defeat for China, and regardless of the outcome, it would severely damage China’s economy.
Therefore, the question of whether China will invade now is less about objective deterrence and more about the rational analysis versus Xi’s personal ambitions.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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