Since last month’s presidential and legislative elections concluded with the victory of Vice President William Lai (賴清德), there has been a considerable increase in Chinese People’s Liberation Army military activity around the nation. Lai is not Beijing’s preferred victor. However, his election is looking to be a sober affair, with him aiming to maintain the “status quo” in cross-strait relations.
Despite a more measured approach, China has responded forcefully through repeated intrusions into the nation’s air defense identification zone.
As tensions mount across the region, there is a need for the nation to widen its strategic horizon beyond great power politics.
One way in which Taiwan could strengthen its security position is by building stronger ties with Southeast Asian countries.
Arguably, China’s position of strength in the region derives from its strong support from Southeast Asia. The region’s adherence to the “one China” policy favors Beijing’s diplomatic claims.
In terms of security, China has held joint military exercises with a number of Southeast Asian states, and coupled with naval base cooperation with Cambodia, has a growing security foothold in the region.
Historically speaking, Southeast Asian states have been reluctant to involve themselves over the question of Taiwan.
To counteract this development, Taiwan needs a better understanding of the security interests of Southeast Asian states and the factors dictating their reticence. Though varied and needing specialized approaches, there are general trends that could be adopted.
The Philippines is one such example. Taiwan needs to understand its security beyond great power politics, and this is also true for Southeast Asian states.
Manila’s actions, though taken in consideration of Washington’s concerns, are not extensions of US interests. Beijing’s narrative of the Philippines being a US proxy over Taiwan fails to consider Washington’s nominal influence over the Philippines’ politics.
Taiwan needs to develop an appreciation for this level of complexity — which is applicable to every capital in the region.
This should assist in the realization that Taiwan’s security does not only rely on the US-China dynamic and the inclusion of Japan.
The prevailing discussion on Taiwanese security is entangled with great power politics, summed up as keeping the Chinese at bay, the US interested and the Japanese engaged. This strategy fails to consider smaller states in Taiwan’s security.
Archipelagic Southeast Asia not only straddles major global shipping routes, but also allows for the transit and host of US naval assets in the region. This is true for Singapore and, more importantly, the growing number of US assets on Philippine bases near Taiwan. Three of these bases are located in the north of the main island of Luzon, across the Bashi Strait.
Geographical proximity gives these bases strategic significance should the US attempt to give any form of military assistance to the nation. If conflict arose in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines’ cooperation would be pivotal as a base to either supply arms or direct involvement.
However, the use of the bases would be restricted to humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Any changes to the use of these bases would be at Manila’s discretion. Their use in any form of a Taiwan contingency is not certain.
Manila, like most Southeast Asian governments, prefers to downplay disputes through multilateral institutions, technical working groups or starting with non-sensitive issues, appearing to work through disagreements while circumventing great power politics. The nation’s security engagement with Southeast Asia needs to develop through non-sensitive issues.
Lai is expected to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) New Southbound Policy (NSP) initiative aimed at bolstering the nation’s engagement with Southeast Asia. The NSP relies on building people-to-people connections augmenting established economic ties.
2022 marked the first time the nation’s investment in Southeast Asia overtook those going to China. However, there is an absence of maritime cooperation, as illegal fishing and industrial pollution disputes have hampered dialogue.
The NSP needs teeth — it needs to look beyond people-to-people connections and economic investment. Changes to the NSP should reflect an appreciation for the strategic position of the Southeast Asian states, in particular, Vietnam and the Philippines. These two nations bare the brunt of Chinese expansionism and “gray zone” harassment.
One way of doing this is through incentivizing a looser interpretation of the “one China” policy. The Philippines has one of the most stringent interpretations of the “one China” policy in Beijing’s favor — a holdover from times of better relations with China, which has failed to evolve with the times.
This is hampered by a Philippine executive order barring official interaction with the Taiwanese government, which greatly hampers any form of negotiation. However, executive orders could be repealed or reinterpreted.
The second is that the nation’s diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia should focus on daily operational challenges of a non-military nature. This corresponds to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and information sharing on maritime awareness.
Though Taiwan has the same territorial dispute over the South China Sea, it has a less aggressive position, presenting a more amenable opportunity to develop coast guard relations. Taiwan already has a fishing agreement with the Philippines that could function as a template for agreements with other Southeast Asian states.
Effective marine domain awareness involves the utilization of data flows from shore-based radar networks, patrols and space-based sensors. These are costly hardware for most Southeast Asian states with limited capacity to effectively monitor their exclusive economic zones.
While there is an acknowledgment of the need for order at sea in the region, there is little consensus on how to proceed. Concerns over sovereignty and border security frustrate calls for cooperation in areas of safety and ecosystem management.
This is an area where Taiwan could greatly contribute to improved relations in the region.
The parameters of Taiwan’s confidence building in maritime Southeast Asia have not been fully explored. While there has been a tendency to focus on economic measures, there has been little effort in more robust efforts such as fishing agreements, establishment of sub-regional task forces, or information sharing.
The provisioning of information would help nations in the region improve their maritime domain awareness. Delimitation of fishing rights and information sharing with coast guards would be beneficial for both sides.
Uniquely for the Philippines, as the only Southeast Asian signatory to the UN’s Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Refugee Convention, it has an international responsibility to provide assistance should there be a need to evacuate Taiwanese nationals. This is not widely known to the general public, beyond government agencies and academics.
Should the situation necessitate triggering this responsibility, it is unclear how Filipino citizens would react. Building reserves of goodwill amongst the populace might be prudent for the Taiwanese government, should there be a need for the Philippines to take in Taiwanese refugees.
Experience has shown that aggressive reactions from China have been motivated by US action, such as former US speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022. However, a similar reaction could be expected from the development of stronger ties with other states in the region.
China’s reaction is to be expected, but should not be allowed to dictate how circumstances develop.
The Philippines, like much of Southeast Asia, is not without influence and agency, and understands the possible costs and advantages of cooperation with Taiwan. If done sensitively and in a coordinated manner, deeper cooperation with Taiwan is achievable and beneficial.
Marvin Hamor Bernardo and Aswin Jia-Song Lin are doctoral candidates at National Chenghi University’s International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies.
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
US President Donald Trump’s second administration has gotten off to a fast start with a blizzard of initiatives focused on domestic commitments made during his campaign. His tariff-based approach to re-ordering global trade in a manner more favorable to the United States appears to be in its infancy, but the significant scale and scope are undeniable. That said, while China looms largest on the list of national security challenges, to date we have heard little from the administration, bar the 10 percent tariffs directed at China, on specific priorities vis-a-vis China. The Congressional hearings for President Trump’s cabinet have, so far,
RSS