With most Americans believing that the US is in decline, former US president Donald Trump claims he will “Make America great again.” However, Trump’s premise is simply wrong, and it is his proposed remedies that pose the biggest threat to the US.
Americans have a long history of worrying about decline. Shortly after the founding of the Massachusetts Bay colony in the 17th century, some Puritans lamented the loss of an earlier virtue. In the 18th century, the founding fathers studied Roman history when considering how to sustain a new US republic. In the 19th century, Charles Dickens observed that if Americans are to be believed, their country “always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise.” On a 1979 magazine cover about national decline, the Statue of Liberty has a tear rolling down her cheek.
However, while Americans have long been drawn to what I call the “golden glow of the past,” the US has never had the power many imagine it did. Even with preponderant resources, the US has often failed to get what it wants. Those who think that today’s world is more complex and tumultuous than in the past should remember a year like 1956, when the US was unable to prevent Soviet repression of a revolt in Hungary; and when our allies the UK, France and Israel invaded the Suez. To paraphrase the comedian Will Rogers, “Hegemony ain’t what it used to be and never was.”
Illustration: Yusha
Periods of “declinism” tell us more about popular psychology than about geopolitics. Nonetheless, the idea of decline clearly touches a raw nerve in US politics, making it reliable fodder for partisan politics. Sometimes, anxiety about decline leads to protectionist policies that do more harm than good. Sometimes, periods of hubris lead to overreach, such as the Iraq War. There is no virtue in either understatement or overstatement of US power.
When it comes to geopolitics, it is important to distinguish between absolute and relative decline. In a relative sense, the US has been in decline since the end of World War II. Never again would it account for half the world economy and hold a monopoly on nuclear weapons (which the Soviet Union acquired in 1949). The war had strengthened the US economy and weakened everyone else’s. However, as the rest of the world recovered, the US’ share of global GDP fell to one-third by 1970 (roughly its share on the eve of WWII).
Then-US president Richard Nixon saw that as a sign of decline and took the dollar off the gold standard. However, the greenback remains preeminent 50 years later, and the US share of global GDP is still about one-quarter. Nor did “decline” prevent it from winning the Cold War.
Nowadays, China’s rise is often cited as evidence of US decline. Looking strictly at US-China power relations, there had indeed been a shift in China’s favor, which could be portrayed as US decline, in a relative sense. However, in absolute terms, the US is still more powerful and is likely to remain so. China is an impressive peer competitor, but it has significant weaknesses. When it comes to the overall balance of power, the US has at least six long-term advantages.
One is geography. The US is surrounded by two oceans and two friendly neighbors, while China shares a border with 14 countries and is engaged in territorial disputes with several, including India.
A second is relative energy independence, whereas China depends on imports.
Third, the US derives power from its large transnational financial institutions and the international role of the dollar. A credible reserve currency must be freely convertible and rooted in deep capital markets and the rule of law — all of which China lacks.
Fourth, the US has a relative demographic advantage as the only major developed country that is projected to hold its place (third) in the global population ranking. Seven of the world’s 15 largest economies are to face a shrinking workforce over the next decade; but the US workforce is expected to increase, while China’s peaked in 2014.
Fifth, the US has long been at the forefront of key technologies (bio, nano, information). China is investing heavily in research and development — it now scores well in terms of patents — but by its own metrics, its research universities still rank behind US institutions.
Sixth, international polls show the US outranking China in the soft power of attraction.
All told, the US holds a strong hand in the 21st-century great-power competition. However, if Americans succumb to hysteria about China’s rise, or to complacency about its “peak,” the US could play its cards poorly.
Discarding high-value cards — including strong alliances and influence in international institutions — would be a serious mistake. Far from making the US great again, it could greatly weaken it.
Americans have more to fear from the rise of populist nationalism at home than they do from the rise of China. Populist policies, such as refusing to support Ukraine or withdrawing from NATO, would do great damage to US soft power. If Trump wins the presidency in November, this year could be a turning point for the US’ power. Finally, the sense of decline might be justified.
Even if its external power remains dominant, a country could lose its internal virtue and attractiveness to others. The Roman Empire lasted long after it lost its republican form of government. As Benjamin Franklin remarked about the form of US government created by the founders: “A republic if you can keep it.” To the extent that the US’ democracy is becoming more polarized and fragile, it is that development that could cause the US’ decline.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., an emeritus professor at Harvard Kennedy School and a former US assistant secretary of defense, is the author of the forthcoming memoir A Life in the American Century.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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