The incoming 11th Legislative Yuan is to elect its legislative speaker and deputy speaker when it opens on Thursday. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which won 52 seats out of the total 113, has nominated new legislator-at-large Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) for speaker and KMT Legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), who was re-elected, for deputy speaker. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with 51 seats, has reached an internal consensus that incumbent speaker, DPP Legislator You Si-kun (游錫?), and Deputy Speaker Tsai Chi-chang (蔡其昌) should continue in their posts. Since neither the KMT nor the DPP holds more than half of the seats, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), with its eight seats, could play a decisive role in deciding who the next speaker and deputy speaker would be.
As well as the routine duty of chairing legislative proceedings and mediating between governing and opposition parties, the speaker’s job also includes leading the ruling and opposition parties’ conduct of parliamentary diplomacy. As Taiwan’s international space is tightly squeezed by China, the executive branch of the government finds it difficult to interact with the governments of other countries.
The legislature, which represents a democracy and a diversity of opinions, has less of an official nature, making it easier for it and its members to make friends with other countries. To put it simply, parliamentary diplomacy is an important way for Taiwan to develop its foreign relations, so whoever leads the Legislative Yuan should be highly competent in this respect.
The outgoing 10th Legislative Yuan was affected by the impact of COVID-19 for three years out of its four-year term. Although the pandemic impeded exchanges with other countries, the legislature still made some impressive achievements. During this period, 303 delegations from 80 countries showed their support for Taiwan by visiting the Legislative Yuan. You also visited several countries, including the US, Japan and several European states, and in some cases was received with a high degree of protocol.
Moreover, You achieved some historical firsts in the field of parliamentary democracy. For example, Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil was the first incumbent speaker of a country that has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan to deliver a speech in the Legislative Yuan. Czech Chamber of Deputies Speaker Marketa Pekarova Adamova and Lithuanian Parliament Speaker Viktorija Cmilyte-Nielsen followed Vystryl’s example by addressing the Legislative Yuan when they visited Taiwan.
You also became the first Taiwanese speaker to give a speech in the Czech Senate. Although some of the countries he visited have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan, in some cases he was given a reception equivalent to countries that do have diplomatic relations, such as police escorts, airport landing receptions and the display of our national flag.
These hard-won achievements are an affirmation by the international community of Taiwan’s performance over the past few years. Some countries, constrained by their diplomatic relations with China, find it hard to openly interact with Taiwan’s officialdom. When that happens, the two countries’ parliaments could build a bridge of friendship. In the case of Taiwan’s warming relations with the Czech Republic and Lithuania, the two countries’ executive and legislative branches have played a key role. Without one of these two engines, there would not be enough diplomatic momentum. If it were not for the ice-breaking visit by Vystrcil, it would have been hard for Taiwan and the Czech Republic to take further steps forward.
When You became legislative speaker four years ago, he announced that he would work toward “deepening diplomatic alliances.” Indeed, You has actively led cross-party legislators on numerous trips abroad to bolster the nation’s foreign relations, as well as received one foreign guest after another in Taiwan. Thanks to his efforts, last year Taiwan and the Czech Republic started direct flights, while the legislature established a new department of international affairs that is responsible for promoting international exchanges and cooperation.
Even as Taiwan has just held its presidential and legislative elections, other countries have already organized delegations to come and visit in the hope of strengthening relations. Several other democratic nations are to hold general elections this year, and, in the spirit of bilateral friendship, Taiwan could send parliamentary delegations to those countries and congratulate them on their election results. In such circumstances, the legislative speaker has plenty of scope for playing a diplomatic role.
However, it could be a problem if the next speaker does not think along these lines, or is only wont to call the future administration of president-elect William Lai (賴清德) “pro-Taiwan independence” while following the path of the so-called “1992 consensus.” We cannot help worrying that if such people were elected legislative speaker and deputy speaker, Taiwan’s parliamentary democracy could backslide. The “1992 consensus” in effect locks Taiwan into a “one China” framework, and puts cross-strait relations ahead of foreign relations. If such people are put in charge of the Legislative Yuan, they are very likely to make concessions to China’s demands, and hardly likely to visit countries that have diplomatic relations with China in the hope of developing Taiwan’s relations with them.
This is why You reminded everyone to think about what the newly elected speaker would do if they get a phone call from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). What would happen if the legislature is led by someone such as Han, who visited the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region — a department through which the CCP implements its “one country, two systems” policy?
What if the new speaker is eager to establish personal connections with China? If that happens, our parliamentary diplomacy could be snuffed out. Furthermore, such a speaker might be critical of the incoming administration engaging in diplomacy with other countries, in the name of oversight, but actually with the intention of impeding the government’s efforts.
Taiwan needs to head in an outward direction. It cannot be locked into China again. If the twin engines of the executive and legislative branches of government go in opposite directions, how would that be interpreted by the international community and friendly countries?
The Organic Act of the Legislative Yuan (立法院組織法) stipulates that the legislative speaker and deputy speaker cannot hold party positions and must exercise their powers and functions in accordance with the principles of fairness and neutrality so as to maintain order in the Legislative Yuan and handle its proceedings. Whoever serves as speaker should transcend ruling and opposition parties and factions.
However, the opposition party’s nominee is absurdly calling for the opposition parties to unite to teach the DPP a lesson. To narrow the role of parliamentary leadership down to partisan self-interest is like a prolongation of the recent general election. The governing and opposition parties might indeed compete with one another as well as cooperate, and the opposition parties have a responsibility to oversee the ruling party, but this should consist of give and take on matters such as budgets, bills and the approval of official appointments. The legislative speaker is supposed to transcend partisan rivalries, not to teach a specific party a lesson. More importantly, he or she should lead the legislators in parliamentary diplomacy so as to give it greater momentum.
TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), whose party holds a crucial number of votes in the legislature, has said that he would follow the line set by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in foreign relations. The parliamentary diplomacy the nation has seen in the past few years has been an implementation of Tsai’s diplomatic path. The question of who occupies the position of legislative speaker would have a decisive influence on Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy and the nation’s overall interests.
When the legislature votes for its next speaker on Thursday, the public would then find out whether Ko’s promise to follow Tsai’s line in foreign relations was a heartfelt statement or whether he would once again go back on his word.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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