Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), the democratic government-in-exile, on Jan. 2 issued its official position on China, pledging to “safeguard Chinese economic investments and other socioeconomic enterprises within Myanmar.” The document also stated that “the ‘one China principle’ will be upheld and supported in a sustained manner.”
Conflict in Myanmar has persisted for more than 70 years, during which the nation has been subjected to successive repressive military regimes, except for a brief period of democracy from 2015 until a military coup in February 2021. Following the coup, the intensity of the fighting has increased, with the emergence of new ethnic resistance armies and existing ones forming alliances. These groups are now executing coordinated strikes against the military. There is a glimmer of hope for the first time that the military might finally fall, and China is a significant stakeholder in the outcome of the war.
During the past decades, Myanmar has faced severe sanctions, leaving China as one of its major trade and investment partners, supporting the military junta. Throughout these years, China made no effort to improve the human rights situation or the quality of democracy in Myanmar. Even during the years when the nation was nominally led by the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD), China remained at the top of the list in terms of trade and investment, but did nothing to encourage or support the NLD.
Beijing prioritizes stability, but shows no interest in supporting human rights and democracy. Instead, its continued engagement with the democratic Burmese government was one of begrudging convenience.
Consequently, after the coup in 2021, there was no condemnation from the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) did not urge the military to hold general elections; instead, China continued to trade and invest.
Ethnic resistance armies currently control somewhere between 50 and 70 percent of Myanmar’s territory. Soldiers complain that the primary advantage still held by the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) is air superiority, utilizing attack helicopters and fighter jets provided by Russia and China. If China were to withdraw its support from the junta, or if it were to throw its support behind the ethnic resistance armies, the war could end. However, it does not seem that Beijing is ready to do so, even though Xi did call for ceasefire talks, suggesting that Beijing is losing faith in the junta’s ability to win the war.
The NUG’s official position on China might have been its attempt to sway China to come to its aid in the conflict. A former resistance soldier now serving as head of a refugee camp, 72-year-old Sai Leng, said that it was crucial for the NUG to reassure China about its commitment to maintaining trade and investment ties.
Sai Leng’s hope is that if the NUG can convince China that allowing the democratic government to return to power poses no threat to its interests, there is a chance that China might intervene or withdraw its support. In such a scenario, China could let the war unfold naturally and then resume its trade and investments with whichever side emerges victorious.
That the NUG was willing to give up Taiwan as a bargaining chip is a bit disappointing, but the economic and geopolitical realities of Myanmar are unmistakable. Myanmar and China share a border that is 2,185km long. Additionally, China is the world’s largest importer of gas, which flows through Myanmar. China is also a large buyer of Myanmar’s other exports, including wood, natural resources, rare earth minerals and forest products. So Myanmar is economically dependent on China.
On the other hand, one would think that people who have struggled for 70 years for democracy and freedom would understand and support Taiwan’s recognition. There have been repeated protests against Chinese projects in Myanmar, but the reality is that the outcome of the war depends on China, as does Myanmar’s economic future. At the same time, Xi has yet to meet with the NUG. So, the government-in-exile is kowtowing to a regime that refuses to engage with it and is hated by much of the population. And for the slight chance that China might be sympathetic toward the NUG, it has given up its support for Taiwan.
As the possibility of Taiwan securing new diplomatic allies diminishes, Beijing is intensifying its strong rhetoric regarding Taiwan. During the Chinese Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on Dec. 28 last year, Xi said: “We have worked to both pursue development and safeguard security, and effectively upheld China’s sovereignty, security and development interests with a firm will and an indomitable fighting spirit.”
The reference to “China’s sovereignty” typically encompasses Taiwan, and the mention of “fighting spirit” is somewhat ominous, confirming Xi’s readiness to employ force to bring Taiwan under Chinese control.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
Why is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) not a “happy camper” these days regarding Taiwan? Taiwanese have not become more “CCP friendly” in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of spies and graft by the United Front Work Department, intimidation conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police/Coast Guard, and endless subversive political warfare measures, including cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation. The percentage of Taiwanese that prefer the status quo or prefer moving towards independence continues to rise — 76 percent as of December last year. According to National Chengchi University (NCCU) polling, the Taiwanese
US President Donald Trump is systematically dismantling the network of multilateral institutions, organizations and agreements that have helped prevent a third world war for more than 70 years. Yet many governments are twisting themselves into knots trying to downplay his actions, insisting that things are not as they seem and that even if they are, confronting the menace in the White House simply is not an option. Disagreement must be carefully disguised to avoid provoking his wrath. For the British political establishment, the convenient excuse is the need to preserve the UK’s “special relationship” with the US. Following their White House
It would be absurd to claim to see a silver lining behind every US President Donald Trump cloud. Those clouds are too many, too dark and too dangerous. All the same, viewed from a domestic political perspective, there is a clear emerging UK upside to Trump’s efforts at crashing the post-Cold War order. It might even get a boost from Thursday’s Washington visit by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In July last year, when Starmer became prime minister, the Labour Party was rigidly on the defensive about Europe. Brexit was seen as an electorally unstable issue for a party whose priority
After the coup in Burma in 2021, the country’s decades-long armed conflict escalated into a full-scale war. On one side was the Burmese army; large, well-equipped, and funded by China, supported with weapons, including airplanes and helicopters from China and Russia. On the other side were the pro-democracy forces, composed of countless small ethnic resistance armies. The military junta cut off electricity, phone and cell service, and the Internet in most of the country, leaving resistance forces isolated from the outside world and making it difficult for the various armies to coordinate with one another. Despite being severely outnumbered and
RSS