Two noteworthy events occurred within a month of each other: Taiwan’s elections on Jan. 13 and US President Joe Biden’s signing of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2024 on Dec. 22 last year. This article discusses how the US plans to help enhance Taiwan’s defense in 2024 by discussing the 2023 and 2024 NDAAs and their significance to Taiwan’s defense.
The 2023 NDAA did a lot for Taiwan; it initiated large-scale US military training of Taiwan’s military in Taiwan and in the US. Between five and six hundred Taiwanese Army personnel now train on a rotating basis with the Michigan National Guard, and several hundred US military personnel (from all services and specialties) train Taiwan’s military in Taiwan. This level of training of Taiwan’s military has not occurred since the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty period (1955–1979). The 2023 NDAA also invited Taiwan to participate in the 2024 Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) occurring this coming summer.
The 2023 NDAA included the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) which Congress designed to provide a comprehensive strategy that the US and Taiwan would pursue to enhance Taiwan’s national defense and security. In accordance with the TERA, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) “shall establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity building program for the military forces of Taiwan.”
More specifically, the TERA directs the DOD to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan:
(1) to accelerate the modernization of capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces—
(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities;
(B) to blockade Taiwan; or
(C) to secure a lodgment on any islands administered by Taiwan and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and
(2) to prevent the PRC from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan’s civilian and defense leadership.
The 2024 NDAA uses the 2023 NDAA’s TERA as the foundation to continue and enhance training and capabilities. The 2024 NDAA has the following six key sections that are focused on Taiwan and they are briefly described below along with other references.
Sec. 1306 Limitation on delivery of Harpoon missiles and other defense Articles:
The new law directs the DOD and DOS to provide Congress every six months a detailed status update on the anti-ship Harpoon missile deliveries and other defense articles and services to Taiwan. Furthermore, the two departments will have to report on any defense case that has been delayed by more than three months and what they are doing to accelerate the delivery of those items. Harpoon missiles can be launched from air, land, and sea. Taiwan’s new submarines will also be able to launch Harpoon missiles underwater.
Sec. 1307 Sense of Congress on Taiwan defense relations:
Congress notes that “the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the PRC toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan.”
According to the Taiwan Relations Act, the US will provide Taiwan the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system.” The new NDAA states the US “should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities” by supporting the acquisition of defense articles and services “with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy” and by “ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services.”
The US should continue to conduct “practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities” and continue exchanges “enhancing cooperation on defense planning; improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and improving the reserve force of Taiwan.”
Sec. 1308 Oversight of Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA):
Congress directed the DOD to provide an annual report on the status of “actions taken to establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan” and provide “a description of actions taken to establish a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan, and the multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan.” Congress also tasked the DOD to provide an annual update on the regional contingency stockpile (which was established for Taiwan in the 2023 NDAA for an annual investment of US$100 million per year from 2023 until 2032).
Sec. 1309 Training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for military forces of Taiwan:
Congress directed DOD to provide an annual TERA update to include any shortfalls.
Sec. 1518 Military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan:
By June 2024, DOD will work with DOS and in coordination with the Commanders of the US Cyber Command and the Indo-Pacific Command, to work with Taiwan officials and “the military forces of Taiwan on defensive military cybersecurity activities.” These activities include:
1) defending military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
3) leverage US commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and
4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.
DOD will brief Congress in June 2024 on the implementation of this section to include defensive military cybersecurity activities, identifying any challenges and resources that are needed and an overview of efforts undertaken.
Sec. 7407 Independent study on economic impact of military invasion of Taiwan by PRC:
Congress directed US intelligence agencies to complete a comprehensive study by September 2024 “on the global economic impact of a military invasion of Taiwan by the PRC or certain other aggressive or coercive actions taken by the PRC with respect to Taiwan.” The study shall include the following economic impact areas: supply chains, trade flows, financial markets, sovereign debt and gross domestic product, unemployment, and other key economic indicators. The assessment will also include similar impact areas that fall “short of an invasion, including as a result of a blockade of Taiwan.” Finally, the report will provide “economic policy options, to include sanctions and supply chain restrictions, designed to cause escalating impacts on the economy of the PRC during a pre-conflict phase.” Congress directs that the report will be unclassified but may include a classified annex.
In other sections of the 2024 NDAA, Congress directed US Intelligence to analyze the PRC’s efforts to increase its influence in Middle Eastern countries against Taiwan, and the PRC’s economic or other forms of coercion against Pacific Islands countries that diplomatically recognize Taiwan.
Biden has stated at least four times he would send the US military to defend Taiwan. His recent statement following Taiwan’s elections, “We do not support independence,” echoes the CCP political warfare narrative that Taiwan is not a de facto independent country (it is).
Biden has not called president-elect William Lai (賴清德) or offered congratulations. Perhaps the presence of the PRC’s senior intelligence officer and PRC dissident hunter, Liu Jianchao (劉建超), provided a reminder from Xi Jinping (習近平) to curb his enthusiasm about Taiwan.
Interestingly, former US president Trump called President Tsai (蔡英文) after she won the 2016 election, and his phone call was the first conversation between a US president and a Taiwan president-elect since 1979.
As was seen during the DPP’s former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) lame duck administration 2000-2008, the legislature delayed or cancelled many defense-related purchases and stalled Taiwan’s military’s advancement while the PRC began their dramatic military buildup starting from US$22.24 billion in 2000 to US$78.84 billion in 2008, a 354 percent increase in eight years. During the same timeframe according to US Congressional Research Service reports, the KMT legislatures flatlined Taiwan’s defense spending and cancelled or delayed US weapon purchases. Will we see a similar performance in Taiwan’s new legislature? Let us hope that the new legislature does not regress into the infantile fisticuffs of the 2000–2008 period.
The US Congress is Taiwan’s strongest defense advocate. President Biden is a reluctant participant. In a reverse fashion, VP soon-to-be-president Lai and his administration appear to be the strongest advocate for Taiwan’s national defense, and Taiwan’s legislature could become the battleground over efforts to enhance Taiwan’s defense and deterrence against the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression. For the sake of Taiwan, let us hope that the past (2000–2008) is not a prelude to the future.
Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare and missile defense. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in Taipei last year and is a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University.
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