Work with TPP to avoid Han
The result of the legislative election left the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) six seats short of the 57 seats needed to hold a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Hopefully, Vice President William Lai (賴清德), the president-elect, would summon up the goodwill to invite Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) to talk about the election of the next legislative speaker and deputy speaker.
It would be better for the DPP to make do with the position of deputy speaker and concede the speaker’s chair to TPP legislator-elect Vivian Huang (黃珊珊) than, heaven forbid, let the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) China-friendly legislator-at-large-in-waiting Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) become speaker.
The KMT has at times jokingly called Huang “[President] Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) girl.” During the 2016 legislative elections, Tsai, in her capacity as chairperson of the DPP, recommended that the voters in Taipei’s Nangang-Neihu (南港-內湖) constituency vote for Huang, who was at that time standing as the People First Party’s candidate, but unfortunately Huang was not elected. Admiral Huang Shu-kuang (黃曙光) — the officer in charge of the indigenous submarine-building project in Taiwan — is her elder brother. Since the confirmation of the election results on Saturday, the KMT has been angrily accusing Vivian Huang of being the main culprit behind the failure to agree on a joint presidential election ticket between the KMT and the TPP.
Supporters of the DPP and its pan-green allies need to recognize the political reality and face this bitter historic lesson. The DPP must find ways to cooperate with the TPP’s Ko and Vivian Huang on important issues. Politics is a product of compromise and definitely not a zero-sum game.
Chiu Jih-ming
Taipei
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