As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to wreak havoc both regionally and globally, the Ukrainian people and their allies demonstrate remarkable determination and courage. Yet nearly two years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, it is increasingly clear that the international community could and must do much more to help.
While the G7 countries and other governments around the world have been extraordinarily generous in supporting the Ukrainian war effort, there are signs of growing fatigue in some circles — a development Russia appears to have anticipated. With the US and the EU failing to commit more than US$100 billion in aid to Ukraine in December, the idea of seizing Russian assets frozen by Western countries has re-emerged as a potential solution.
Although seizing these assets would boost Ukrainian morale and finances, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are wary. As the New York Times recently reported, top US officials fear that setting such a precedent would deter other countries from depositing their funds at the New York Federal Reserve or holding them in US dollars.
However, the concern that other governments might become wary of keeping their funds in the US for fear of future seizures overlooks some key points. Seizing Russia’s frozen assets would not affect other countries’ assets or change the incentives of governments that are not planning a major war.
Moreover, by not seizing these funds, Western countries are signaling that governments waging brutal wars of aggression could violate international law and simultaneously benefit from it to escape the consequences of their actions. Instead, G7 leaders should send a clear message: No country can have it both ways. By deterring other bad actors from violating international law, such seizures could act as a peace-building measure.
The supposed negative effect of seizing Russian assets on other countries’ willingness to deposit funds in the US and Europe, were it real, would have become apparent when these funds were frozen in early 2022. It is worth mentioning that there has been no capital flight from the US or Europe. This is partly because there are few safe alternatives to the established financial system. Assuming that governments do become wary of keeping their assets in the US, Europe or Japan, where else would they hold them? Even if they set aside concerns such as capital controls, would they feel more secure holding their money in, say, Chinese institutions?
Moreover, while European and Japanese institutions might benefit if other potential “rogue” countries decided not to keep deposits in the US, the financial impact would be negligible. Many economists argue that such capital inflows are a cost rather than a benefit. Since they lead to currency appreciation, the argument goes, they make it harder to export goods and compete with imports, thereby destroying jobs.
To be sure, some financiers might face losses. However, most of the funds held in the US are simply reserves deposited at the Fed, which do not directly benefit Wall Street. The same applies to Euroclear, the Belgian financial institution where the bulk of Russian assets are held.
Another related argument against asset seizure is that it could only be carried out once, because once it is done, no country would leave its reserves or other assets in the US or the EU.
However, even if true, the argument is not persuasive: A tool that cannot be used is essentially worthless, and there has never been a more appropriate time to use it than now.
Ultimately, Russia must be held accountable. While Russia cannot fully compensate Ukraine for the devastation it has wrought, it should, at a minimum, pay for the physical damage and cover the costs of reconstruction. When an individual commits a tort — an act that harms another person — they are obligated to provide compensation. Often, individuals’ assets are seized to ensure that they fulfill this obligation. The same principle applies to countries. Although asset seizures are often complex undertakings, Russia’s case could prove to be the exception, given that the assets to be seized have already been frozen.
Legal experts might argue that offering Kyiv loans and using the frozen assets as collateral is a better approach, since it would force Russia to choose between directly compensating Ukraine and forfeiting these funds, but such technicalities are best left to lawyers.
The reality is that Ukraine needs the money now, the money is under Western control, and not using it to help Ukraine win this war and rebuild would be unconscionable. It is unreasonable to expect taxpayers and donors in Europe, the US and Asia to bear the costs of Ukraine’s reconstruction when Russia itself could make a significant, albeit involuntary contribution.
However, the specific use of the confiscated funds is a secondary concern. While 90 percent of the US security assistance allocated to Ukraine is spent in the US, the seized Russian assets could be used to support Ukrainian forces on the ground and finance the massive recovery effort.
It should go without saying that seizing Russia’s frozen assets would not absolve the West of the responsibility to provide Ukraine with military aid; without victory, there would be no reconstruction. Nevertheless, that rebuilding Ukraine could end up costing US$1 trillion — more than three times the assets’ value — might mollify those who are still reluctant to use them to fund the reconstruction effort.
Of course, no amount of money could ever undo the immense damage that Russia’s war of aggression has inflicted on Ukraine’s economy and its people. However, the frozen Russian assets could be viewed as a down payment on the reparations that the Kremlin should eventually be compelled to pay.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is a professor at Columbia University and the winner of the 2018 Sydney Peace Prize. Andrew Kosenko is an assistant professor of economics at the School of Management at Marist College.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The return of US president-elect Donald Trump to the White House has injected a new wave of anxiety across the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan, an island whose very survival depends on the delicate and strategic support from the US, Trump’s election victory raises a cascade of questions and fears about what lies ahead. His approach to international relations — grounded in transactional and unpredictable policies — poses unique risks to Taiwan’s stability, economic prosperity and geopolitical standing. Trump’s first term left a complicated legacy in the region. On the one hand, his administration ramped up arms sales to Taiwan and sanctioned
The Taiwanese have proven to be resilient in the face of disasters and they have resisted continuing attempts to subordinate Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nonetheless, the Taiwanese can and should do more to become even more resilient and to be better prepared for resistance should the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) try to annex Taiwan. President William Lai (賴清德) argues that the Taiwanese should determine their own fate. This position continues the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) tradition of opposing the CCP’s annexation of Taiwan. Lai challenges the CCP’s narrative by stating that Taiwan is not subordinate to the
US president-elect Donald Trump is to return to the White House in January, but his second term would surely be different from the first. His Cabinet would not include former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo and former US national security adviser John Bolton, both outspoken supporters of Taiwan. Trump is expected to implement a transactionalist approach to Taiwan, including measures such as demanding that Taiwan pay a high “protection fee” or requiring that Taiwan’s military spending amount to at least 10 percent of its GDP. However, if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invades Taiwan, it is doubtful that Trump would dispatch
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) has been dubbed Taiwan’s “sacred mountain.” In the past few years, it has invested in the construction of fabs in the US, Japan and Europe, and has long been a world-leading super enterprise — a source of pride for Taiwanese. However, many erroneous news reports, some part of cognitive warfare campaigns, have appeared online, intentionally spreading the false idea that TSMC is not really a Taiwanese company. It is true that TSMC depositary receipts can be purchased on the US securities market, and the proportion of foreign investment in the company is high. However, this reflects the