When the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) vice presidential candidate, Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), spoke at National United University in Miaoli County on Dec. 19, a student asked him how anyone could negotiate with China about the so-called “1992 consensus” when there was no consensus.
Jaw said that the “consensus” is a matter of each side — The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan — saying what it wants, and you can think of it as an “open sesame.”
He said there is no need to worry about what the “consensus” really is, because when upon shouting “open sesame,” the door would open.
Since the Democratic Progressive Party got into government, it has insisted on asking Beijing whether the “consensus” means the ROC, which is what has caused a stalemate between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, he said.
In the fable Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves, “open sesame” is a magic spell used to open the door of a cave full of hidden treasure.
Ali Baba is a woodcutter. One day, when he is out gathering wood, he discovers a cave full of treasure hidden there by a band of thieves. Ali Baba overhears the chief of the robbers shouting “open sesame,” upon which a hidden door swings open, and it swings shut again when he shouts “close sesame.”
Ali Baba waits until the thieves leave, whereupon he opens the cave door by shouting “open sesame.” Having gained access to the cave, he carries away enough gold and jewels to make him rich.
By chance, his brother Kassim finds out what happened and goes on his own to the cave where the treasure is hidden, but in his excitement he forgets the password, gets locked inside the cave, and is found and killed by the thieves.
Judging by Jaw’s analogy, the KMT wants to repeat former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trick of getting China to open its doors by shouting “open sesame.” What it does not realize is that the robber chief has long since changed his predecessor’s system. The old conditions of saying “open sesame” to open up the door were clearly not enough to tell whether the person saying it was “Ali Baba” or one of the “thieves,” so the “open sesame” password has been changed.
If the KMT tries to use the “open sesame” of 1992, it would not open the door of China’s cave.
Even if the KMT gets hold of the new password, it would find the cave full of tumbling real-estate prices, soaring unemployment, the risk of a financial crisis and problems left over from three years of COVID-19 lockdowns.
What would anyone who enters the cave see? A vault full of treasure or a pile of junk?
All Taiwanese should be cautious about setting foot inside.
Moreover, the thieves are not as gullible as the KMT seems to think. They keep making changes. If the KMT makes the slightest mistake, it might get shut inside the cave and killed by the thieves like the unfortunate Kassim.
Jaw’s analogy linking “open sesame” and the “1992 consensus” reveals how, for him and his “blue fighters,” the “consensus” is not really a political expression of “one China,” but merely a password to get into China and do business there.
Li Ta-yu is a freelancer who lives in Hsinchu City.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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