The recent call by some American scholars to “assure” China that Washington will continue to “contain” democratic Taiwan as part of deterring Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aggression against Taipei amounts to putting the shoe on the wrong foot; there should be far more emphasis on assuring Taiwan and demanding that the CCP prove it can live in peace with Taiwan and all other democracies.
In this debate prominent experts on US-China policy have sought to affirm the idea that “deterring China” from attacking Taiwan must include “assuring China” by containing democratic Taiwan’s quest for greater “democratic space” in addition to repeated vows to refuse recognition of its de jure “independence.”
This argument to “contain” Taiwan is well formulated in Oriana Skylar Mastro’s October 16, 2023 New York Times op-ed “This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan.”
Mastro states that “Reassuring China would require Mr. [President] Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China … moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and … discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative [US Congress] legislation.”
A November 30, 2023 Foreign Affairs article, “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence,” by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen, who fear military deterrence will not work, offers a more expansive list of assurances that should be provided by Taipei and Washington.
They are unsatisfied with the record of moderation in relations with Beijing set by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), and the willingness to continue this stance by DPP presidential candidate Vice President William Lai (賴清德), should he become president, who should go further to assure Beijing.
They say, “because his party’s 1991 charter still calls for the creation of a ‘Republic of Taiwan’ and a new constitution, doubts persist in Beijing about his willingness to hold to this position as president. If he wins the election, Lai should consider revisiting a proposal made by DPP legislators in 2014 to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter, a nonbinding and reversible step that would give any rhetorical commitment to the status quo more weight and credibility.”
Furthermore they state, “US officials should also work to ensure that Taiwan does not upset the status quo… If a future government of Taiwan, or key political figures, appear to be promoting such a change in the status quo, US officials should voice concerns in private, in public, or both. In addition, transits of the United States by high Taiwan government officials, “should not be occasions for large-scale, public, politically charged events”… US officials, including members of Congress, should refrain from making statements that are inconsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act…
“…Resolutions calling for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state or provide an unconditional defense commitment ironically weaken deterrence by suggesting Washington intends to restore the alliance with Taipei that it abrogated in 1979… Congress should not send to Taiwan the president of the Senate (who is also the vice president of the United States), the Senate president pro tempore, or the Speaker of the House.”
In essence, these scholars seek an abrupt reimposition of the Faustian US management-interference regime for Taiwan of the 1980s to the Obama Administration, the height of which was President Bill Clinton’s July 8,1998 recitation of the “Three No’s,” and to walk back the political gains Taiwan made during the Trump Administration, all to assure Beijing.
But they do not acknowledge that the ability of Washington to “contain” Taiwan was just as dependent on US strategic-military superiority over China, as it was required to “deter” CCP aggression toward Taiwan, as such US power provided crucial “assurance” to Taipei as it was denied the benefits of political recognition and military alliances.
The CCP has made clear since 1949 that its objective has been to take Taiwan and destroy its non-Communist government — the real essence of its “Peaceful Unification” policies always combined with the negative assurance “to not forgo the use of force.”
But with Taiwan’s ongoing evolution toward a mature democracy, CCP demands that Taiwanese surrender their freedom to a repellent dictatorship have no appeal in Taiwan, necessitating the CCP’s increasing reliance on military coercion up to and including a brutal invasion, to be followed by mass Taiwan refugee flows and political concentration camps.
Assuring, or more aptly, appeasing China over Taiwan’s political status in a period in which Beijing is rapidly gaining military superiority, will no more deter CCP aggression or its greater hegemonic objectives, than assuring Hitler in 1938 he could take the Sudetenland deterred his dragging Europe and America into World War Two.
After two and a half decades of modernization and buildup, since 2017 the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been exercising two generations of force reform and weapons rearmament around Taiwan to prepare for full blockade, or a blockade and then full invasion operations, which could entail multiple waves of 100,000 troops.
Even if Washington fully “assures” China that it will limit its political support and contain Taiwan’s legitimate political aspirations, it is increasingly not credible that the US could defeat, much less deter, the CCP from starting a bloody war over Taiwan — much as it could not deter Vladimir Putin from waging his brutal war over Ukraine, which could still spread to Poland and the Baltics.
In addition, China has abetted Iran’s ability to arm and lead its proxy Hamas to start it savage October 7 war against Israel, which could be made much worse if China-abetted North Korean tactical nuclear weapons are given to Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah (or even Venezuela), creating multiple wars that will further drain US military resources.
As former US president Eisenhower successfully deterred a late 1950s threat by Mao Zedong (毛澤東) to invade Taiwan by deploying US tactical nuclear armed cruise missiles and artillery shells, and then US forces, to Taiwan, so today Washington could also deter CCP aggression by deploying tactical nuclear artillery shells.
These are the shortest range, very low yield nuclear weapons that, while non-threatening to Chinese territory, would utterly destroy PLA invasion forces. But there is a catch: the US does not have tactical nuclear artillery shells, and there is no apparent desire within the Biden Administration to revive this capability.
It follows logically that it would be politically easier to deploy such weapons to Taiwan if the US were to give formal political recognition to Taiwan and to revive the US Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty which existed from 1955 to 1979.
Washington and its allies in Tokyo, Manila, Seoul, and Canberra have little time to create a new level of deterrence based on strength or the assurance to the CCP that its blockade or invasion of Taiwan will fail.
This should start with a private and then public listing of the CCP actions that will trigger US and allied formal recognition of Taiwan and then the immediate deployment of decisive force to Taiwan to defeat CCP aggression.
This should include a date for the CCP to halt its daily PLA coercive exercises around Taiwan, and its “grey zone” military coercion against Japan and the Philippines.
Instead of “containing” Taiwan the US and its allies should be increasing their support of Taiwan, explaining to Chinese how they could benefit from Taiwan’s example of peaceful transition from political authoritarianism to greater pluralism and social justice.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
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