We should all rejoice to see Israeli hostages being released following the barbaric attacks by Hamas nearly two months ago. Yet under the short pause in fighting, the terrorists are exchanging kidnapped Israelis — in agonizingly slow fashion — to buy time to rearm, refresh and reset their forces. There is not a shred of humanitarian impulse here. Hamas cynically measures the price of human lives and then doles them out 10 at a time for another day of military advantage.
Although the Israeli government has understandably agreed to extend the pause to gain more hostage releases, it needs to be clear-eyed from a military perspective about the costs. What are the ramifications for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)?
We have seen this type of humanitarian and diplomatic pause in warfare before. I experienced it firsthand as NATO’s military commander during the six-month air campaign over Libya in 2011. Our mission, authorized under a UN Security Council resolution, was to use air assets (no boots on the ground) to degrade Muammar Qaddafi’s ability to kill his own people.
Our bombing campaign was relentless and highly effective. Yet working closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross, we used a series of tactical pauses to enable the transport of humanitarian supplies. Each time we did so, government forces would refit to continue their fight.
Further back, during the long, painful course of the US war in Vietnam, there were moments when Washington slowed its bombing operations to facilitate diplomatic discussions in Paris. The principal air campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, was used on and off throughout negotiations in the 1960s. During those pauses, North Vietnam took advantage.
With US bombers off the table, Hanoi was able to move troops, heavy weapons, small arms and ammunition, and to transport general logistics (food, fuel and communications gear) to forces who were otherwise cut off. The clever use of the tactical pauses in the mid-to-late 1960s permitted North Vietnam to put units in place for the ultimate conquest of the south and the brutal fall of Saigon in 1975.
Hamas would do much the same thing. Like Hanoi, the terrorists are playing to a sense of war fatigue in the US and Europe. They are going to use the pause to sharpen their information-warfare campaign and strengthen arguments for an extensive cease-fire that restores the status quo bellum, which is unacceptable to Israel.
Hamas would also be able to shift its forces around using its 482.8km tunnel system. Its on-the-ground “leadership” — actually lower-level commanders remaining in Gaza after their superiors decamped for friendlier environments in Qatar and elsewhere — would be able to reach safer destinations in the south of the Gaza Strip.
Pauses also allow the unhindered movement of ammunition and the bomb-making materials that would be used to build improvised explosive devices. These booby traps would hinder IDF troops when they move to consolidate their positions, try to find hostages and begin to wipe out the tunnel complexes through flooding or targeted explosives. Knowing that some number of hostages would still be in enemy hands would slow the IDF, but ultimately not stop these operations; yet the longer the cease-fires continue, the more time Hamas would have to prepare.
Finally, like the North Vietnamese, Hamas officials would use the pauses to resupply their troops before they allow civilians to be fed and cared for, and they would encourage Gazans to “return to their homes” in the north so they could again serve as human shields.
The term “ceasefire” understandably generates enthusiasm among people casually following events. If it allows innocent hostages to go free, that is rightly viewed as a positive by the international community.
Yet delays always favor weaker defenders in a military conflict. While Israel might benefit to some degree in the propaganda war globally (which it is losing badly), in a pure combat sense these pauses are far more valuable to Hamas.
So while the Israelis should welcome their citizens back to safety, they must remain clear-eyed about the cost to their overall campaign — and have a well-developed plan to recover the initiative when the fighting resumes.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO and dean emeritus of Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Stavridis is also vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings, Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump’s second administration has gotten off to a fast start with a blizzard of initiatives focused on domestic commitments made during his campaign. His tariff-based approach to re-ordering global trade in a manner more favorable to the United States appears to be in its infancy, but the significant scale and scope are undeniable. That said, while China looms largest on the list of national security challenges, to date we have heard little from the administration, bar the 10 percent tariffs directed at China, on specific priorities vis-a-vis China. The Congressional hearings for President Trump’s cabinet have, so far,
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
RSS