The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) last week unveiled its legislator-at-large nominees for the Jan. 13 elections, with Kuma Academy cofounder Puma Shen (沈伯洋) at the top of the list. Coincidentally, in a recent talk show, China Television Co (CTV) compared the Kuma Academy to the Islamist militant movement Hamas.
The major role of the Kuma Academy is not to launch a war or invade other countries, but to safeguard Taiwan and prepare its people for battle. To compare it to Hamas, a terrorist organization that has launched merciless attacks on Israelis, is not only unfair, but a serious abuse of freedom of speech. The show only served as China’s mouthpiece in spreading its propaganda.
Perhaps this kind of conflict arises out Taiwan’s lack of a national security strategy, one which would clearly outline the state’s allies, enemies and values. With such a document, the military would know what they are fighting for.
In the US, every new administration publishes its own National Security Strategy report, such as former US president Barack Obama’s “pivot to East Asia,” and US President Joe Biden’s statement of China remaining the largest threat to global order. With a document setting the tone, both government and opposition unite and rally behind the consensus.
If Taiwan were to put its national security strategy to paper, what would it say? If the document were to list China as the largest threat to Taiwan, it could spark a backlash, with critics condemning it for opting for division and enmity over dialogue and friendship.
The Chinese threat remains the elephant in the room, mutually felt yet shielded from open discussion. Despite the two sides of the Taiwan Strait having had their own governments for more than 70 years, there is still a percentage of people, especially those who retreated to Taiwan from China with the KMT and their offspring, that are still shackled to ideas of “unification” and “returning to the motherland.” With such mixed identities and complications, made worse by polarization, it is no wonder that Taiwan cannot come up with its own national security strategy.
Not wanting to face the inconvenient truth of China being the biggest enemy, this mentality has given pro-China politicians much to work on, such as advocating the idea that arming oneself to the teeth is a “provocation.”
There are periodic cases of retired generals receiving bribes to surrender to China and overthrow the DPP government, or officials being invited to attend lavish parties to help promote “peaceful unification” and “one China, two systems.” People might be surprised why such personnel, who should be the most patriotic, are the most susceptible to treason and bribery.
This issue could be traced back to the time of former president Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) rule, which promoted the five basic values: national ideology, national leader, country, duty and honor. As a party-controlled state, and the party leader as the head of state, military personnel were taught to worship and place their loyalties to the leader, not the nation. Taiwan has since become a democratic society, but some military personnel have yet to excise these demons from their mentality.
Without defining the enemy or having a clear idea of what they are defending, military personnel are easily led astray with bribes or other seductions.
In view of next year’s presidential election, it is high time that different parties come to a consensus on China and turn it into Taiwan’s version of a national security strategy. The Russian invasion triggered Ukrainians into uniting behind the same cause. Taiwan should not leave that question to a time when war breaks out, only to belatedly realize the invaluable importance of freedom and democracy.
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