China’s paper sanctions
In the current political arena, economic sanctions and trade embargoes have become a common way for governments to show their political stance or apply pressure on other nations.
However, Beijing’s actions usually do not match its words when it comes to sanctions, and its hypocritical behavior soon becomes a joke when the principle is applied to real life, such as when China imposed bans on Australian lobsters and Japanese beef.
When China announced that it would suspend imports of Japanese wagyu due to concerns over mad cow disease, it should have dealt a huge blow to Japan’s agriculture sector.
Although Cambodia’s population is predominantly Buddhist, and refrain from killing or consuming beef, trade data show that over the years, it has not only been importing high-class Japanese wagyu, but the number continues to climb. In 2021, Japan’s wagyu exports to Cambodia reached a record high. Presumably, wagyu has found its way into the Chinese market using Cambodia as a “transit station.”
A few years later, Japan’s wagyu exports to Cambodia plummeted. It seems the cat was out of the bag and the Chinese government had learned about the “entrepot trade” business. While the truth might be more complicated, there is no denying that “Cambodia-grown” wagyu is still a massive hit on dinner tables, showing just how hypocritical Chinese officials are, despite the policy they themselves set in place.
Wagyu is not the only “blacklisted” item. As relations between Canberra and Beijing have been in free fall for the past few years, China imposed a near-total import ban on Australian lobsters in 2020, which was part of a broader politically charged “shadow trade war.” Nonetheless, the Australian lobster industry — worth about US$500 million a year — found its way into the gray market, particularly through Kinmen and Matsu.
Even though the Chinese government had banned Australian lobsters, private smuggling was in full swing to satisfy Chinese demand. Whenever the Lunar New Year arrives, these “contraband” goods sell out like hot cakes. This is classic Chinese hypocrisy where politics and the economy are not in lockstep with each other.
Economic sanctions and trade embargoes can help make political statements, but the economic effectiveness of these measures are often questionable when put into practice. The shift and adjustment of trade direction, as well as consumer’s behavior, have made these policies less harsh than they promise to be.
In August, a wave of online harassment and vitriol directed at Japan following the release of treated radioactive wastewater from the destroyed Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant sent tensions between Tokyo and Beijing soaring, triggering a wave of Chinese boycotts of Japanese products. Even though Beijing did not set rules restricting imports of these goods, the Chinese public still avoided Japanese imports under the “boycott” banner.
From the examples of beef and lobsters, Japanese seafood has probably made its way to Chinese dinner tables. After all, economic profits are far more alluring than the pursuit of political ideology.
Chueh Li
Taipei
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