Former Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s (李克強) sudden passing last week at the age of 68 dropped a bombshell on China. Many consider his death to be a rare oppertunity to air pent-up discontent with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and the direction in which he has taken the country, while tributes have flooded the country’s tightly controlled Internet.
While Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) was in the US, he refrained from touching upon Li’s passing, and held off on confirming Xi’s attendance at the APEC forum.
With Taiwan entering the final stages of campaigning for January’s elections and talks of a “blue-white alliance” between the candidates of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) under way, as well as Chinese authorities searching the offices of Hon Hai Precision Industry — apparently as a warning to company founder Terry Gou (郭台銘), who is running as an independent — and interfering in the democratic process in other ways, it remains to be seen how Xi intends to snuff out potential social movements triggered by the public’s reaction to Li’s death and take precautionary measures to prevent social gatherings that could lead to another Tiananmen Square Massacre.
US-China ties are at a tipping point. As the two do not see eye to eye on the Israel-Hamas war — with China condemning the violence against civilians in Gaza, but not denouncing Hamas by name — the US has been focusing on patching up the relationship while avoiding the subject of the conflict. Perhaps this is why US President Joe Biden has refrained from asking China to declare its position on the conflict, but has been concerned about whether Xi would participate in the APEC forum.
After Biden met with Wang, the White House released a statement saying: “President Biden expressed his condolences on the passing of former premier Li Keqiang.”
However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs mysteriously removed any mention of Li, leaving only “Biden sends his regards to Xi.”
At such a critical moment, the ministry’s official statement was carefully crafted to toe the line of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The omission of Li is enough to show that Chinese authorities are going out of their way to downplay his passing, especially by keeping China’s people in the dark about the reaction in Western countries, to prevent further “incidents.”
With Xi securing a third five-year term as president, he still sees US-China relations as one of his top priorities, as decoupling from the US works against China. Consequently, it has to keep its options open by entertaining the US with the possibility of Xi attending the APEC forum. Otherwise, a US that sees no hope of turning the tide could ratchet up sanctions. Only by keeping the US’ hopes up would there be space for negotiation, which falls in line with Chinese interests.
Nonetheless, Li’s death might have reminded Washington of Xi’s authoritarian and ideologically driven regime, and could sabotage the relationship, which is why China is on tenterhooks over his passing.
Li’s sudden death has triggered different responses in Taiwan’s political camps. As China has not released any details regarding his death, except a “doctors did their best” statement, it has had a hard time convincing Taiwanese that his death was not suspicious, increasing skepticism and speculation.
With former Chinese minister of foreign affairs Qin Gang (秦剛) and former Chinese minister of national defense Li Shangfu (李尚福) having been removed, people have ample reason to believe that Xi is “cleaning house,” with those who are lucky stepping down and those less fortunate losing their lives.
Is the CCP backing the KMT-TPP alliance — including with the probe of Hon Hai’s tax situation? Would it retaliate if the alliance does not come to fruition? Or would it stick to its mudslinging against the Democratic Progressive Party?
The danger that a potential KMT-TPP union poses, especially if the CCP is behind it, must be kept in mind.
Moreover, the political upheaval in China might lead to Beijing incorrectly assessing the international order or initiating armed conflict to divert the attention of ordinary Chinese and distract from grief over Li.
China has censored references to his death and praise of him on social media, while universities have banned mourning activities.
However, people are placing flowers in his honor and skirting the Internet censors, including with snide comments about Xi, indicating the level of discontent.
It remains to be seen how much pressure Li’s death might bring upon Chinese society. What Taiwanese need to bear in mind is that they alone have the obligation to safeguard their homeland and not place their hopes on outside assistance. They certainly should not believe the lies spawned by Chinese election interference efforts.
As the relationships between Taiwan, the US and China become more intertwined, people should not underestimate the tremendous impact that Li’s death could have upon the global community.
Chiu Chih-wei is a Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Rita Wang
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