Since former US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August last year triggered China’s drills in six ocean zones around Taiwan, the probability of a military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait has escalated substantially.
From China’s perspective, the Pelosi incident clearly marked the US’ stance of treating Taiwan as a pawn in the hegemonic competition between itself and China. As such, China had to respond forcefully by sending a sufficiently strong warning shot to Taiwan and the US, to prevent a recurrence.
China’s most ideal step-by-step trajectory for Taiwan in the immediate future would be for it to recognize the so-called “1992 consensus,” reopen cross-strait communication channels and personnel exchanges, and start political negotiations about a schedule for peaceful unification. China dictates the following provisos: Without that first step, there would be no second and third steps; cross-strait relations cannot remain in the second step forever; and there are no preimposed restrictions on Taiwan’s post-unification political system.
Let us use this trajectory map to describe and compare the China strategies of the four candidates in next year’s presidential election.
The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate, Vice President William Lai (賴清德), adheres to President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) China policy, which does not recognize the “1992 consensus,” because the DPP believes that consenting to the “one China” principle is harmful to Taiwan’s national security interests and that negotiating with Beijing is unlikely to lead to any tangible benefits.
Therefore, in the face of China’s threat to unify by force, the only viable way to preserve Taiwan’s democratic way of life is not through negotiation, but through deterrence by strengthening the nation’s defensive might and gaining access to US military aid.
Other than conflicting with the party’s Taiwan independence platform, why is the DPP so firmly opposed to the “one China” principle? The reasoning is that once Taiwan concedes that it is part of China, if China invades Taiwan, the US and its allies would have fewer excuses and less motivation to come to the rescue.
However, given today’s geopolitical reality, if China does invade Taiwan, the considerations that the US might factor into its decision of whether to intervene militarily would be the losses to the world economy if Taiwan is destroyed, and the damage to the US’ credibility to its allies if it does not step up.
As for whether Taiwan consents to the “one China” principle, it is largely irrelevant for all practical purposes.
Taiwan People’s Party presidential candidate and Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) does not recognize the “1992 consensus,” either. Instead, he says “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one family,” in an attempt to persuade China to allow Taiwan to bypass the first step and move directly to the second.
However, there is so far no sign that China is willing to accept anything that is more ambiguous than the “1992 consensus” and still conveys the “one China” principle. If his attempt failed, Ko would likely be willing to reluctantly accept the “1992 consensus” just to lower the risk of a cross-strait war.
The Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), recognizes the “1992 consensus,” so both sides of the Taiwan Strait could immediately move to the second step. However, the majority of Taiwanese still have strong reservations about holding political negotiations with China.
Hou has always chosen to steer close to public opinion, so he is likely to remain indefinitely in the second step while waiting for public opinion to change. If that happens, China might resort to soft and hard tactics to force Hou to move to the third step.
Hon Hai Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) not only recognizes the “1992 consensus,” but has also proposed to engage in political negotiations with the objective of reaching a cross-strait peace agreement with China. Therefore, from day one, his administration would be able to initiate the third step.
However, rushing into step three carries several risks. First of all, if the public’s support for political negotiations with China is not sufficiently strong, such a move might cause a recurrence of 2014’s Sunflower movement. Second, the mere act of negotiating with China might trigger suspicion and backlash from the US, which would have to be managed in a nuanced way to avoid any collateral fallouts.
It is reasonable to assume that these four candidates all share the same ultimate goal of protecting Taiwan’s democratic way of life. Their strategic differences mainly lie in when to give up negotiating with China and resort to military measures. Lai chooses to use military force without even considering the first step, Ko and Hou could start with the second step, or even the third step if push comes to shove, while Gou would take the third step from the get-go.
For Ko, Hou and Gou, if negotiations with China end because they fail to produce an agreement on Taiwan’s post-unification political system and its guarantee mechanism, they would have no choice but to rise and engage China militarily as to defend Taiwan’s democratic way of life.
Strategically these three candidates would negotiate with China for as long as there is a chance of peace, but tactically they would still do what is necessary to prepare for war.
The DPP’s cross-strait strategy relies on military deterrence to hold off China’s invasion for as long as possible. This strategy might work if China evolves into a democracy or the deterrence scheme is able to forever dissuade Beijing from invading.
The KMT’s cross-strait strategy assumes it is possible to strike a deal with China that guarantees Taiwan’s current way of life for centuries. In light of the painful lessons of Hong Kong, it is not at all clear how such a deal, especially its guarantee mechanism, is even feasible or could be successfully structured.
The above two strategies both carry a risk, and the associated degrees of risk evolve with the short-term dynamics of the geopolitical landscape, and withlong-term economic trends.
As a show of their commitment to Taiwan’s democracy, it behooves each of the four presidential candidates to perform an accurate risk assessment of their own China strategy, and then to clearly explain the assessment results to the electorate, so that voters can make the most informed decision when casting their ballots in next year’s presidential election.
Chiueh Tzi-cker is a joint appointment professor in the Institute of Information Security at National Tsing Hua University.
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump’s second administration has gotten off to a fast start with a blizzard of initiatives focused on domestic commitments made during his campaign. His tariff-based approach to re-ordering global trade in a manner more favorable to the United States appears to be in its infancy, but the significant scale and scope are undeniable. That said, while China looms largest on the list of national security challenges, to date we have heard little from the administration, bar the 10 percent tariffs directed at China, on specific priorities vis-a-vis China. The Congressional hearings for President Trump’s cabinet have, so far,
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
US President Donald Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have each given their thoughts on Russia’s war with Ukraine. There are a few proponents of US skepticism in Taiwan taking advantage of developments to write articles claiming that the US would arbitrarily abandon Ukraine. The reality is that when one understands Trump’s negotiating habits, one sees that he brings up all variables of a situation prior to discussion, using broad negotiations to take charge. As for his ultimate goals and the aces up his sleeve, he wants to keep things vague for
RSS