The recent deaths of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and several of his top lieutenants in an airplane crash north of Moscow would likely have far-reaching implications for Africa, where the private military company has established a significant presence in recent years. After all, if Russian President Vladimir Putin is responsible for Prigozhin’s death, African leaders who have tied their political fortunes to Wagner must wonder how credible Prigozhin’s promises to them now are.
The military ties between the Kremlin, Wagner and African governments have always been shrouded in uncertainty, but the death of Prigozhin and Wagner cofounder Dmitry Utkin, presumably orchestrated by Putin as punishment for Prigozhin’s short-lived June rebellion, has increased the risks faced by African leaders who have relied on Wagner’s mercenary army to strengthen their power.
Sudanese warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, is a case in point. Hemedti, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, spent years cultivating a relationship with Prigozhin, but with Prigozhin dead and Wagner’s future uncertain, the supply of weapons to RSF would likely stop, potentially shifting the balance of power between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces. This shift comes at a precarious time for Hemedti, whose bid to lead the country seems shaky.
Partnering with Wagner, always a risky proposition, is now fraught with even greater peril. With coups erupting from Niger to Gabon, African governments or rebel groups considering an alliance with Wagner cannot count on business as usual. Without Prigozhin’s access to Kremlin resources, Wagner is almost certain to wane.
Prigozhin, who was purportedly in Africa days before his death, was the driving force behind Wagner’s African activities. His unique character, rapport with African leaders and control of commercial channels were crucial to his paramilitaries’ growing clout. Finding a successor who can deliver the same results would be a daunting — perhaps impossible — challenge, potentially impeding Wagner’s operations across Africa.
To the extent that Wagner’s troops believe that Putin ordered their leader’s assassination, he would be unwise to expect their continued allegiance, particularly from units far from the Kremlin’s reach. If Wagner comes under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which appears to be Putin’s goal, its transformation from a private militia into a state actor would likely limit its operational flexibility and tactics.
Moreover, maintaining the discipline, merit-based hierarchy and mission-driven reward system that Prigozhin instituted could prove challenging. While Prigozhin was known to share the spoils of ventures with his men, such largesse is not typically associated with the ministry.
Then there is the critical issue of operational autonomy. Prigozhin trusted his men, delegating decision-making power to them on-the-ground operations, a practice the Kremlin has traditionally frowned upon. Already wary of Wagner’s independence, the ministry is unlikely to adopt a decentralized model, which has been a key factor in the group’s ruthless effectiveness in Africa.
Many commanders have been with Prigozhin since Wagner’s inception. For example, the group’s top commander in Mali, Ivan Maslov, operates almost like an independent CEO, exemplifying Wagner’s operational approach. It remains to be seen whether the ministry can secure the loyalty of experienced officers, otherwise, Wagner might lose its competitive edge.
Given the deep distrust between Wagner and the Russian military establishment, many mercenaries might quit altogether. Some might join other non-state militias, private military companies or criminal organizations, while others might directly serve African leaders with whom they have built relationships, as some have already done in the Central African Republic. Such shifts could further destabilize some of the world’s most fragile countries, heightening the risk of regional turmoil.
The imminent classification of Wagner as a terrorist group by the US and the UK, together with Putin’s divide-and-rule strategy, could also cause the group to splinter. The mercenary company Redut, headed by Prigozhin’s archnemesis, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, would likely vie for control over some of Wagner’s operations in Africa.
However, Redut lacks the necessary cultural understanding, established relationships, and on-the-ground experience. Even if Shoigu manages to take over some or all of Wagner’s positions, Redut might struggle to retain them.
African leaders who have relied on Wagner and similar mercenary groups — and those contemplating such partnerships — must use this moment to reassess their strategy. Aligning with groups like Wagner, characterized by internal strife, egregious human-rights records and uncertain futures, is perilous.
To counter private militias like Wagner, Western countries must do more to fill security vacuums.
While military measures are necessary to combat the Muslim insurgencies ravaging the Sahel, lasting peace can only be achieved by promoting human development and strengthening community resilience. Championing economic and social progress would be key to driving out Wagner and its ilk.
Prigozhin’s death provides Western countries with a unique opportunity to forge stronger security ties with African governments. As Wagner’s influence wanes, Africa and the West must capitalize on this chance to build a future of security and sustainable peace.
Jaynisha Patel is a policy analyst at the Tony Blair Institute.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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