It is hard to think of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a strongman whose bizarre ideas on economics have brought his country close to catastrophe, as a pragmatist, but that is how to understand his foreign policy swings, and why he is stuck in a loveless triangle with Russia and NATO. On Monday, Erdogan went to see Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, with much of his government in tow.
He stated the obvious on his way in: “Everyone,” he said, was watching whether they could revive the grain deal that allowed Ukraine to export 33 million tonnes of wheat and other cereals by sea in a year of war, stabilizing global food prices and vastly boosting Turkey’s status on the world stage. That agreement was brokered by Erdogan in summer last year and ended by Putin on July 17. It showed no signs of life on Monday after their 90-minute meeting. Instead, the two men pushed forward with a separate and deeply cynical plan to salvage Putin’s image in the Global South, under which Qatar buys 1 million tonnes of Russian grain for processing in Turkey and distribution to select African states.
Erdogan’s visit to Sochi was not just about grain. It was an attempt at damage control because, after using Putin to help get re-elected earlier this year, the Turkish leader has been making nice with the Kremlin’s arch enemies in the US and Europe. Seen from Moscow, that is betrayal.
Until he won his vote on May 28, Erdogan had used Turkey’s veto as a member of the NATO to keep Sweden from joining the bloc, accusing it of harboring Kurdish “terrorists.” That could hardly have been more welcome in the Kremlin, or more irritating to Turkey’s NATO allies. Amid a stream of anti-Western rhetoric, Erdogan accused his political opponents of taking orders from Washington.
Putin returned the favor, letting Erdogan announce Russia’s agreement of a two-month extension of the Ukrainian grain deal, on the eve of Turkey’s first-round vote. Erdogan’s main rival for the Turkish presidency accused Russia of election interference, including a deep-fake smear campaign.
However, with the election behind him, Erdogan has swung hard toward the West, not only green-lighting Sweden’s NATO bid, but also hinting he would do the same for Ukraine, which is not unlike showing a red rag to a bull. Having killed the grain deal in July, Russia then drove home its displeasure, sending troops to board a Turkish cargo vessel and broadcasting footage of the crew as they were forced to kneel at gunpoint.
It is not useful to understand any of this as Erdogan throwing his lot back in with the West. His goal is to establish Turkey as a regional power in an emerging multipolar world, able to compete at the same table as the US, the EU, China, India, and Russia, among a growing list. That means punching way above Turkey’s weight and playing stronger powers against each other. By and large, Erdogan has pulled that off, if at enormous cost to Turkey’s democracy.
However, by the time he was re-elected a few months ago, his balancing act looked in danger of collapse as the realities of Turkey’s dependence on Western markets hit home. By December last year, the value of the lira had more than halved and inflation was running at 65 percent because Erdogan insisted the central bank cut interest rates in the face of rising prices. As foreign creditors fled, he relied on shell games and loans from wealthy Gulf nations to plug the hole. It was not enough.
Erdogan now knows his economic experiment of cutting interest rates to tame inflation failed, and that Turks are lining up to trade their diminished currency for US dollars, not Russian rubles or Chinese yuan, said Huseyin Bagci, a Russia specialist who heads Ankara’s Foreign Policy Institute.
“Turkey needs the West because the money is still in the West,” he said.
So too are the F-16 upgrade kits and jets that Turkey needs to strengthen its aging air force, until it can build state of the art combat aircraft of its own. However much Erdogan might bait NATO, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proved the alliance’s value for Turkish security, just as Turkey’s geography and control of access to the Black Sea have underscored its importance to the alliance.
Still, if Turkey needs NATO, US F-16s, European markets and an end to the war in Ukraine that does not turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, Erdogan also needs Russian trade (up more than 80 percent last year as Turkey stood aside from joining Western sanctions), cheap Russian gas, Russian tourism (up nearly 150 percent this year), as well as Putin himself, a fellow strongman and combatant against US dominance and European liberal values. For Erdogan, divorce from either side of this unhappy triangle would be brutal.
Marc Champion covers global politics. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal. He is based in London. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry gives it a strategic advantage, but that advantage would be threatened as the US seeks to end Taiwan’s monopoly in the industry and as China grows more assertive, analysts said at a security dialogue last week. While the semiconductor industry is Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” its dominance has been seen by some in the US as “a monopoly,” South Korea’s Sungkyunkwan University academic Kwon Seok-joon said at an event held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In addition, Taiwan lacks sufficient energy sources and is vulnerable to natural disasters and geopolitical threats from China, he said.
After reading the article by Hideki Nagayama [English version on same page] published in the Liberty Times (sister newspaper of the Taipei Times) on Wednesday, I decided to write this article in hopes of ever so slightly easing my depression. In August, I visited the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, Japan, to attend a seminar. While there, I had the chance to look at the museum’s collections. I felt extreme annoyance at seeing that the museum had classified Taiwanese indigenous peoples as part of China’s ethnic minorities. I kept thinking about how I could make this known, but after returning
What value does the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) hold in Taiwan? One might say that it is to defend — or at the very least, maintain — truly “blue” qualities. To be truly “blue” — without impurities, rejecting any “red” influence — is to uphold the ideology consistent with that on which the Republic of China (ROC) was established. The KMT would likely not object to this notion. However, if the current generation of KMT political elites do not understand what it means to be “blue” — or even light blue — their knowledge and bravery are far too lacking
Taipei’s population is estimated to drop below 2.5 million by the end of this month — the only city among the nation’s six special municipalities that has more people moving out than moving in this year. A city that is classified as a special municipality can have three deputy mayors if it has a population of more than 2.5 million people, Article 55 of the Local Government Act (地方制度法) states. To counter the capital’s shrinking population, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) held a cross-departmental population policy committee meeting on Wednesday last week to discuss possible solutions. According to Taipei City Government data, Taipei’s