There are many nuggets of information about the UK’s position on Taiwan and China in the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report titled Tilting Horizons: The Integrated Review and the Indo-Pacific, which was published on Wednesday last week while British Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs James Cleverly was in Beijing.
The quote from the report pounced upon by Taiwanese media, highlighting the report saying that Taiwan “is already independent under the name the Republic of China [ROC],” is certainly important and warranted an immediate response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The report does not represent London’s official policy, but the committee is still an influential body that maintains oversight and shapes official policy.
Regardless of whether recognition of the ROC’s independent status is part of the UK’s official policy, it is now in print in an official British Foreign Affairs Committee report. This has a ratcheting effect. That is, the situation has been moved to a position from which it can no longer retreat — it is “locked in” as part of the debate.
This is the kind of thing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fears most.
The report says very little that would surprise anyone familiar with Taiwan’s predicament vis-a-vis the CCP’s aggression. It is refreshing to read the sections describing a narrative that contradicts the one the CCP has been trying to persuade the international community of concerning its claim that Taiwan is a part of China.
The report says that “the People’s Republic of China has never controlled Taiwan, and indeed historically the CCP has rejected the idea of ownership,” and that “although Chinese officials claim that Taiwan has been part of China for 1,800 years, it was only when the Manchu Empire took control of China and Taiwan that China ruled there ... just as the British Empire took control of India and Sri Lanka at the same time, it did not make Sri Lanka part of India.”
And so the ratchet turns and locks into place as the report clarifies the basis on which to reject the CCP’s narrative.
Section 151 is also interesting because it opens the door for more freedom for high-level talks. It says it was agreed “25 years earlier that there is no reason why a Cabinet member could not visit Taiwan,” and yet the British government has still avoided sending high-level officials to Taiwan. It asks why this has been the case.
This is evidence of the ratcheting effect that visits to Taiwan by US and Japanese officials have had. The visits tested and lessened fears of the CCP’s reaction.
When the British government notices this and wonders why it has not followed suit, it could embolden other governments to challenge Beijing.
In Section 153, the report says that President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) is to launch a bilateral trade deal with the UK, but that Beijing objects to such arrangements unless China is consulted and agrees.
To circumvent this, the report said that nations should sign bilateral agreements with Taiwan en masse to dissipate the focus of Beijing’s ire.
The ratchet turns again.
Section 155 says that the UK should leverage its influence as a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership to support Taiwan’s membership, removing more barriers to signing deals with Taiwan.
These examples show how the Tsai administration’s policy to challenge Beijing’s narrative and promote engagement with the international community incrementally, to positions that cannot be reversed, is the correct way forward.
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