When Hon Hai Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) announced that he would run in January’s presidential election, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Vice Chairman Sean Lien (連勝文) said that KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) had sent him to have a chat with Gou three weeks earlier. Lien said Gou had told him that the only offer he would accept from the KMT would be if he were to replace New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜) as its presidential candidate.
As Gou did not offer any room to maneuver, there was nothing more to talk about, Lien said.
Who or what is to blame for Gou’s total disdain for Hou? As the saying goes, a tree can bear to lose its branches as long as its trunk is firm, but over the past three months Hou’s “trunk” has been looking increasingly wobbly.
Hou was easily elected mayor of New Taipei City in the local government elections in 2018 and last year. As mayor, he has been efficient and popular. By avoiding controversial issues and ideologies, and not having any major failures in municipal governance, he has maintained a steady lead in public opinion polls.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered a major upset in last year’s local government elections, leading most people to expect the same in next year’s presidential and legislative elections. This made Hou’s outlook look very bright. His only worry was that his change in direction after only just starting his second term as mayor would likely be a weak spot that his opponents could use against him.
In contrast, Taiwan People’s Party Chairman and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) has already served his two allowable terms as Taipei mayor, while Vice President William Lai (賴清德), the DPP’s presidential candidate, would have served his term by the time he can take up the position of president.
Some members of the pan-blue political camp who do not like Hou would surely have wanted to use this issue against him, but Hou’s popularity forced them to remain silent and wait for further developments.
Hou’s first steps were too passive. He waited to be “enlisted” as the KMT’s presidential candidate to avoid accusations of abandoning his job as mayor. This worked out thanks to the strange primary selection method Chu used, which culminated in Hou being “enlisted” as the KMT’s nominee on May 17.
However, some of those who should have lined up in support of Hou have failed to do so. Gou initially promised to support Hou, but then had second thoughts, whereupon he launched a quasi-candidacy that broke the KMT’s game rules.
Over the past three months, Hou’s opinion poll ratings have taken a beating. He has found himself competing with Ko, both alternating between second and third place in the polls. This made it hard for Hou to be the sole prospective candidate within the KMT, not to mention the pan-blue camp.
Among the “deep blue” fans of former Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), the party’s other factions, its corrupt “black gold” elements and local KMT politicians, are people who, because of longstanding grudges or out of concern for their own political careers, have overtly or covertly aligned themselves with the very wealthy Gou.
The KMT and Hou do not have enough sticks and carrots to get these people back in line, so the situation is becoming irretrievable.
As a result, the run-up to next year’s presidential election has unexpectedly seen Hou’s reputation for “getting things done” fall flat with hardly a push. Hou’s self-confidence has been shaken, and he is no longer as resilient in the face of whatever stones might be aimed at him.
However, the main cause of Hou’s setbacks lies with Hou himself. Over the past few years, he has prioritized “getting things done,” while keeping his distance from the “deep blues,” “Han fans,” “black gold” elements and local factions.
He also kept his distance from the so-called “1992 consensus,” a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000. It refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Strait acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
This pragmatic approach led to Hou remaining very popular. His support base included plenty of Taiwan-centric and centrist voters. This caused some “deep blues” to suspect that Hou could become a second version of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), while centrist and Taiwan-centric voters hoped Hou’s local-oriented spirit might result in a “Taiwanese KMT” or “Taiwan Nationalist Party.”
Unfortunately, Hou and his team do not seem to have correctly analyzed their own support structure. After facing unprecedented setbacks since May 17, they rushed to embrace the “deep blues” — who were never among Hou’s main supporters — and abandoned the centrist and Taiwan-centric voters.
This unwise choice amounts to Hou pushing into Gou’s territory to vie for a piece of “non-mainstream public opinion,” which is not a decisive force in general elections. This has made Gou look down on Hou and, emboldened by his own financial clout, fight harder in the confidence that he can bend Hou to his will or even take his place.
Hou’s increasingly poor showing in opinion polls has thrown him off. His speeches on university campuses have gone way off track. Although he is seemingly full of confidence, he is losing touch with what the public want.
Proclaiming his opposition to Taiwanese independence, he has accused the DPP of “denigrating” the so-called “1992 consensus” as being the same as “one country, two systems.”
He has also accused the DPP of thoroughly destabilizing cross-strait relations and pushing the Taiwan Strait to the brink of war.
He has promoted extending the life of Taiwan’s three working nuclear power plants and restarting construction on the fourth. He seems to have forgotten that three of the four, including two of the three working ones, are in New Taipei City, and more New Taipei City residents voted “no” than “yes” in the December 2021 referendum on restarting construction of the fourth nuclear plant.
He has also voiced support for Kinmen County holding a referendum on building a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen in China’s Fujian Province.
With all these pronouncements, Hou has painted a new and barely recognizable image of himself. In March, he said that corruption should not be tolerated in any political party. That statement conveyed the image of a tough former police officer who is determined to change Taiwan’s politics and reinforce law and order.
Now, as all kinds of motley characters gather around Gou, Hou seems to be scared of offending the “tumor of democracy.” In 2020, Hou kept his distance from the “Han fans,” which turned out to be a wise decision, but recently he has embraced Han.
Now that Hsinchu Mayor Ann Kao (高虹安) of the TPP has been charged with corruption, Hou has blindly followed Chu, Ko and Gou in accusing the DPP of using the case to attack its opponents. Hou has disregarded the fact that it was the KMT’s Hsinchu mayoral candidate, Lin Keng-jen (林耕仁), who originally raised suspicions about Kao’s alleged corrupt practices while competing against her in last year’s local government elections.
Hou has not resigned or even taken leave of absence from his post as mayor to pursue his presidential campaign, so is Hou the presidential nominee not negating the standpoints of Hou the mayor?
Hou faces his greatest challenge since he first became involved in politics, and there is no end in sight.
In the past, he kept clear of ideological and controversial issues, while working at his own pace to “get things done” for the public. Oblivious to any pressure from the Chinese Communist Party, the “deep blues,” KMT factions and corrupt elements, he stuck firmly to a “moderate KMT” position.
Due to Gou’s disruptive interventions, he has gradually fallen into the grasp of the “deep blues,” but while “deep blue” voters have not yet lined up behind him, disappointed centrist and Taiwan-centric voters have been drifting away from him. Hou is losing supporters from both sides.
His logic of “getting things done” has veered toward the line of former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and become unconvincing for most people. This is a deep-seated issue that Hou must attend to.
With just four months left until the election, Hou must regain the popularity he had before being “enlisted” to stand for president if he wants to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
Maybe he can succeed if he stops worrying about those around him and returns to his down-to-earth nature.
Being himself could be the best strategy to revive his flagging fortunes.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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