Since the 1970s, Taiwan’s diplomatic presence has continued to diminish because of direct competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With 1971 marking the Republic of China’s ejection from the UN General Assembly and Security Council, efforts by Taipei to counteract its shrinking diplomatic space have been hampered by significant economic and military disparity. With ever-heightening tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing diplomatic support for Taiwan has become even more imperative.
Through diplomatic initiatives, such as the New Southbound Policy and “steadfast diplomacy,” Taiwan has made efforts to bolster its diplomatic alliances, and unofficial relations with Southeast Asian states and others. These efforts have yielded mixed results. Despite the latest loss of Honduras in March, Taiwan has seen increased support from unofficial diplomatic allies, such as those in Europe.
This has contributed to Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy seeing an increase in efforts focused on unofficial diplomacy directed at non-diplomatic allies. This has been attributed to domestic apathy in maintaining traditional diplomatic allies partly fueled by a view of diminished returns regarding the actual value of Taiwan’s remaining formal diplomatic ties.
Taipei’s efforts might be best served by focusing not only on unofficial diplomatic avenues, but more unconventional diplomatic relations. With Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex marriage in 2019 and its reputation as a bastion of equal rights, Taipei should explore the possibility of leveraging LGBTQ rights promotion as a means to carve out a diplomatic niche for itself.
As the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to legalize same-sex marriage, LGBTQ advocacy is an issue where Taiwan has first-mover advantage and therefore commands regional acknowledgment, if not respect in certain sections of society. Taiwan could significantly benefit from creating its own unorthodox means of engaging with other states on an issue that is difficult for Beijing to gain sympathy.
This coincides with an increasing number of Asian states passing legislation that recognizes and protects LGBTQ citizens, such as Japan’s Equality Act and Nepal’s recognition of same-sex marriage.
Taiwan might find fertile ground in LGBTQ issues as a means of growing its diplomatic space in Asia. There should be a concerted effort to frame Taiwan’s LGBTQ credentials as a soft-power asset to attract like-minded or sympathetic groups within target countries. Taiwan could present itself as a model for the acceptance of LGBTQ individuals within a wider society in Asia.
With the advancement of LGBTQ rights in Taiwanese society and legislation, Taiwan has credibility to present itself in a positive light as a free and open democratic society.
There was immediate jubilation in the East Asia region from LGBTQ activist and community members following the legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan, both at the announcement of the Judicial Yuan ruling in 2017 and the eventual passage of the legislation in 2019. Some saw it as a spark of hope and an indication that the region was moving toward equal rights.
Yet more importantly, Taiwan could claim “moral leadership” as the first in Asia legalize same-sex marriage — the nation became a powerful example.
The New Southbound Policy launched in 2016 focused on building relations with Southeast Asian states, Australia, New Zealand and South Asia. The policy centers on pursuing international engagements through people-to-people development such as providing opportunities in terms of social connectivity and civic engagement. LGBTQ diplomacy fits well within this framework, as it connects on very personal issues of identity.
Continuing to emphasize people-to-people engagement, the use of LGBTQ diplomacy could further reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic engagement with not only Southeast Asia, but also to South Asia and other regions.
The advantage of engaging in LGBTQ diplomacy is that credible competition from Beijing is lacking. The PRC under Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has systematically reduced the public participation of LGBTQ organizations within China and has curtailed international missions on LGBTQ issues.
These developments that restrict the visibility of LGBTQ individuals delegitimize any efforts by the PRC to engage in this issue. The lack of acceptance in China removes the possibility of international participation — credibility is built at home before it can be exported.
That being said, the presidential elections in January next year are to determine whether LGBTQ advocacy becomes a staple of Taiwan’s diplomatic mission.
A study looking at LGBTQ rights and international diplomacy found that “LGBTQ rights often remain at the whims of domestic politics and can be endangered even following positive gains.” This variability in support exists even in countries that have had established LGBTQ rights promotion as part of their diplomatic missions, with the main factor being anti-LGBTQ factions that affect domestic politics.
To re-emphasize, such an opportunity should not be lost, as efforts by Taiwan in supporting the LGBTQ community could foster political allies in target countries that could advocate for Taiwan’s interest in a wider range of issues.
Equally important is that Taiwan’s openness to LGBTQ issues untethers Taiwan from China.
Marvin Hamor Bernardo is a doctoral student in Asia-Pacific studies at National Chengchi University researching Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asian states.
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