Everyone who cares about elections in Taiwan is wondering whether Hon Hai Group Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) would declare his candidacy in the presidential election scheduled for Jan. 13 next year. Gou, who is not a member of any political party, seems to be playing games with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) on the one hand and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) on the other, and everyone knows what he wants from them — to let him serve at least one term as president.
Gou wants to run for president, but the question is who, if either, of New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), the KMT’s candidate, or the TPP’s nominee, former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), would be willing to give way to him.
There are two reasons that neither Hou nor Ko would be willing to let someone else take the helm. The first is that they have gone through the process of being nominated by their respective parties, which gives them procedural legitimacy. The second is that they are both ahead of Gou in public opinion polls.
Why would someone in a higher position give way to someone lower down? This is the principle of fair competition.
Having failed to strike a deal with either rival, Gou has been waging a kind of amphibious assault by touring Taiwan to set up beachheads and accumulate a supply of bargaining chips.
It is an interesting metaphor, but what he is really doing is undermining his rivals. After all, Gou started out in the KMT’s “deep blue” camp and has close connections within it.
Furthermore, the KMT has long-term links with local factions and has a well-organized network in local areas. Last year, the KMT won control of 14 counties, cities and municipalities, while KMT councilors were elected as speakers of 16 councils, while 14 were elected as deputy speakers.
The support or opposition of these grassroots “vote captains” is the key to whether Gou can open another “bottom up” path to challenge the orthodox candidate nominated by the KMT’s Central Committee.
This would explain why Gou has been touring KMT-governed regions, deploying his forces as he goes, with the aim of having a greater impact on KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) and the rest of the party’s central leadership.
Gou has indeed demonstrated his “strength” relative to KMT headquarters.
The KMT’s assets have been completely liquidated since 2016. Consequently, the power to allocate resources has long since changed hands. The party is now propped up more by local factions than the political elite in Taipei.
As the wealthy Gou tours the country, the power shift is highlighted in the places he visits. Examples include Changhua County Council Speaker Hsieh Dien-lin’s (謝典林) voluntary withdrawal from the KMT and Pingtung County Council Speaker Chou Dian-lun’s (周典論) open mobilization for Gou, not to mention former Miaoli County commissioner Hsu Yao-chang’s (徐耀昌) so-called “slip of the tongue” about “bringing down the KMT.”
These incidents raise the question: Is it the KMT that needs the local factions or the local factions that need the KMT?
Gou’s actions rang alarm bells. This can be seen from the fact that Chu and other KMT officials have been raising the issue of party discipline, while Hou has begun returning to a defensive position and Ko has vowed to run for president all the way.
However, it also shows that while a fourth candidate might increase tensions, it is not enough to make higher-rated contenders give way to a newcomer.
As former legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) said: “Terry Gou has not yet made it clear whether he will run or not. There is still room for ambiguity.”
Wang hit the nail on the head. Gou will be sidelined if he does not play for real. If he goes on faking it, he can only do so until Sept. 17, which is the deadline for applying to collect signatures for the presidential election, or, at the outside, until Nov. 24, which is the deadline for registering as a candidate.
If he misses those deadlines, he would have to leave the stage.
What will Gou’s next step be? Only he can answer that question, but it is clear what consequences would follow from the options he has.
If Gou is not ready to start collecting signatures, his political fireworks would end next month, when calm would be restored.
If he is determined to collect signatures and reaches the threshold by Nov. 2, and if the Central Election Commission pronounces the signatures as valid by Nov. 14, then, before officially registering as a candidate on Nov. 24, Gou would be in a position to negotiate conditions with the other candidates.
Only then would the KMT and the TPP start talking in earnest about his proposal for a “grand alliance of mainstream opinion.”
If Gou keeps going until the Nov. 24 deadline, he can either not submit his candidacy, or join the KMT or the TPP.
The three options have different probabilities that will change as the campaigns evolve, but making the election a four-horse race would be irrational.
If the TPP is set on supplanting the KMT, there would be little chance of those two parties joining forces. In that case, the dream of the opposition forces forming a single ticket would remain no more than that — a dream.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times, the Taipei Times’ sister paper.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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