The public wants to know whether Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) plans to withdraw from next year’s presidential election.
On Aug. 11, Ko declared that he would remain the TPP presidential candidate until the end of the race. A few days earlier, reports said Ko maintained that he would not be anyone’s deputy.
His attitude and stance have been settled. This strategy has confined the influence of Hon Hai Technology Group founder Terry Gou (郭台銘), overpowered Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Hou You-yi (侯友宜) and lifted TPP morale.
It is common knowledge that Gou wants to collaborate with Ko, as he had once suggested that Ko should be his deputy.
Knowing that he could not take advantage of the KMT, Gou turned to Ko. The two met in Kinmen and seemed to have made some kind of commitment. Gou also delivered flowers to Ko’s concert, “harassing” him from time to time, and painted a picture of two politicians bonding together. That way, Gou could pressure Ko, and Ko would be confined.
Now, Ko has made it clear: Not only would he refuse to be somebody’s deputy, he even said that he would stay the course. These comments were clearly directed at Gou, as their potential voters overlap. At a time when Gou is still trying to encroach on Ko’s voter base, Ko fought back and shattered his plans.
Gou can no longer exploit Ko’s popularity, nor can he return to the KMT for negotiations because Hou has become the KMT’s one and only candidate. In short, Gou is running out of options.
Ko’s second objective is to overpower Hou. Recent public opinion polls show that he remains in second place in opinion polls, after Vice President William Lai (賴清德) and ahead of Hou.
Obviously, Ko wants to have as many bargaining chips as possible in negotiations with the KMT. He also wants to intimidate Hou by demonstrating his resolve. Ko wants Hou to consider joining his ticket as vice presidential candidate once the KMT realizes it cannot turn the tide.
The structure of the presidential election is clear. Lai’s support has never surpassed 40 percent, while about 60 percent of Taiwanese want to get rid of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The key is to bring together the non-green camps.
If Ko’s strategy works, Gou would lose his status and become marginalized. He might as well just leave the election. As for Hou, it looks like he cannot catch up with Ko or be on a par with Lai.
Before long, the public might encourage Ko and Hou to pair up. At this point, the KMT and Hou would have to make their decision. If the blue camps keep thinking of the TPP as unimportant, non-green supporters might even stop backing the KMT’s legislative candidates.
Ko’s declaration has also cheered the TPP. After all, one of his goals is to win party votes and increase the TPP’s seats in the Legislative Yuan. As long as Ko remains in the race, the TPP could win up to 10 seats.
Although the TPP’s performance in single constituencies has not been good, a TPP legislative candidate nominated by Ko could defeat KMT. In other words, the blue camps have been restricted by Ko’s strategic moves.
It is only natural that Ko keeps boosting TPP morale and consolidating his leadership. This can only do him good.
Niu Tse-hsun is a professor in Chinese Culture University’s advertising department.
Translated by Emma Liu
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