Taiwan People’s Party Chairman and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) recently said that a Japanese lawmaker had told him that Taiwan should give up all hope of being able to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Hiroshige Seko, secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the House of Councillors in the Japanese Diet, has since clarified that he never said this to Ko, saying that the LDP’s stance has always been to welcome Taiwan to join the CPTPP and keep working on it.
Ko had thrown Taiwan-friendly Seko under the bus by spouting nonsense. He equivocated, saying that a Japanese politician would tactfully say something is “difficult” without stating outright that it is impossible. Instead, Ko presumed to add the word “impossible” himself. To reduce his own embarrassment, Ko asked the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to say clearly when Taiwan could join the CPTPP.
If the governing party is so incompetent that it is unable to secure Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP, opposition parties would have the opportunity to demonstrate their own competence, proving they are ready to rule the country. They could offer a complete plan for joining the CPTPP to attract voters.
Ko could only resort to criticizing the DPP and spreading defeatism. As a presidential candidate, he should ask himself, if he were to win the presidential election, how could he ensure Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP?
Only two and a half years after applying, having secured the agreement of 11 members, the UK formally joined the CPTPP last month, the first new member since the bloc’s creation in 2018.
In September last year, China and Taiwan applied for CPTPP membership. A signatory is approved by a consensus of all members, so even if primary countries such as Japan and Australia support Taiwan’s accession, Beijing would be a barrier if it pressures any one of the members to oppose Taiwan’s membership, and this is why Seko said to Ko that “any political problems must be solved.”
Ko exaggerated Seko’s remarks by saying: “Taiwan should give up hope.”
Taiwan could receive more international sympathy, and the accession could build a consensus and unite Taiwanese. National leaders, concentrating on a vision, would not limit themselves from any interference.
Taiwan meets the CPTPP’s high requirements with its global trade network, yet has not joined the bloc, as Beijing hinders its accession.
Ko does not investigate who pulls the strings, but blames the victims instead, using political trickery by reversing causation.
Given US-China tensions, what defines the possibility of Taiwan’s diplomacy is being rewritten. The US House of Representatives passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, clearly stating that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not refer to Taiwan. When Taiwan wanted to join the UN as Taiwan, not as the Republic of China, many thought it was impossible and not worth the effort, but now, as the wall built by Beijing is gradually starting to show cracks, people can believe the impossible can be made possible.
Chen Yung-chang is a company manager.
Translated by Polly Chiu
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