Large numbers of Chinese warships and warplanes are conducting military activities around Taiwan this summer as part of a long-running intimidation campaign. With the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) venturing ever closer to Taiwanese territory, the risks associated with hostile incursions are growing. Taiwan’s fighter pilots and ship captains are being put to the test like never before. Less visible, but no less important, are the soldiers and marines who stand watch on Taiwan’s outer islands just off the coast of China.
What role do forward deployed forces play in Taiwan’s defense strategy? Why are these remote island outposts worth defending? It starts with the three “Gs.”
Visit any highly secure facility and you will see the three “Gs” in action: guns, guards, and gates. This trio is foundational to the physical protection plan of sensitive sites worldwide, places such as intelligence hubs and military command bunkers.
Here’s how it works. First, imposing walls or fences are built to surround the area in question. Next, traffic is channeled through fortified gates. Finally, guards with guns check credentials and filter out those who might pose a danger to the people and classified equipment inside. Often you will only see a few guards on duty at each gate. Could they be overrun by a large and determined group of bad guys? Of course. Does it follow, then, that the area is not actually secure? Of course not. Perimeter guards are backstopped by larger units who will flood onto the scene the moment an alarm is triggered. The three “Gs” system is popular because it works.
Taiwan’s national defense layout follows the same basic principle. The outer islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongyin are located approximately 190km (100 nautical miles) west of the shores of Taiwan. Each island cluster is like a heavy gate and observation post, monitoring the shipping lanes into and out of southeastern China’s natural harbors, bays, and ports — the very places where PLA troops would need to assemble and load aboard ships before an assault on Taiwan.
Taken as a whole, the offshore islands represent a critical defensive perimeter, giving Taiwan warning time, tactical flexibility, and strategic depth. But like any first line of defense, it is far from impregnable. In the supreme emergency, the elite soldiers and marines stationed on these rocks are expected to fight independently, without resupply. Their mission is to defend themselves and hold out for as long as possible — while doing as much damage to the enemy as possible — thereby buying time for Taiwan to prepare for a coming invasion.
A few of the island citadels have significant firepower, including long-range air defense missiles, anti-ship missiles, and land attack missiles. Perhaps most notable is the Ray-Ting 2000 (Thunderbolt 2000), a wheeled multiple-launch rocket system, which can fire simultaneous volleys of guided munitions and shotgun-like projectiles filled with tens of thousands of ball bearings.
If necessary, batteries of missiles and rocket artillery could shred PLA staging areas around Xiamen and Fuzhou — the closest Chinese launch pads for an amphibious attack on Taiwan. The Taiwanese military hides its big guns inside warrens of deep tunnels and hardened bunkers, so they can still fight under intense bombardment.
Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, author of the book Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, observes that Taiwan’s outlying islands have an outsized influence on the thinking of Chinese war planners. Yoshihara points out that “the PLA considers its armies’ offshore operations the seedlings of Chinese naval doctrine.” Indeed, Chinese military textbooks such as Informatized Joint Operations and Taiwan Strait Military Geography portray Taiwan’s outer perimeter as a dagger pointed at the throat of their invasion plans. According to them, as long as the Taiwanese hold these islands, they could launch devastating surprise attacks on any fleets the PLA assembled, sinking valuable amphibious ships and drowning storm troops before they even had a chance to get underway.
Because Taiwan’s outer islands are so close to the People’s Republic of China physically and economically (and sometimes also politically), it’s easy to see them as a liability. Since the 1990s, they have been demined and demilitarized. Once home to over one hundred thousand troops, the local garrisons have been reduced to a total of less than 5,000 defenders, approximately two percent of Taiwan’s active-duty military.
Today the PLA could launch an overwhelming wave of attacks and seize most of the outer islands with little notice. Xi Jinping (習近平) and his generals in Beijing may be in the process of considering the feasibility of just such an operation. In September 2022, Taiwanese troops shot down a Chinese drone hovering over a military base in the Kinmen islands. Earlier this year, two submarine cables across the Taiwan Strait were cut by PRC vessels in mysterious circumstances, causing a temporary internet blackout on Matsu. PLA units are reportedly expanding their coastal bases directly across from Kinmen and Matsu and conducting frequent amphibious drills. Such activity could be interpreted as a precursor to conflict and warning sign.
If Taiwan’s outer islands have become tempting targets, they don’t have to stay that way. Taiwan could deploy more crack troops to augment its island garrisons and arm them with thousands of smart mines, loitering munitions, and lethal drones. General Mick Ryan, author of the new novel White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan, offers readers an excellent mental map for envisioning how human-machine teaming approaches and futuristic defense networks might work in practice.
It is the considered opinion of many senior military commanders and intelligence chiefs that there might exist the possibility of a Taiwan invasion by 2027. Some say much sooner. By bolstering its frontline islands, perhaps Taipei could help convince Beijing to change course and preserve the long peace that has richly benefitted peoples on both sides of the Strait.
Ian Easton is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute and the author of The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia.
Two weeks ago, Malaysian actress Michelle Yeoh (楊紫瓊) raised hackles in Taiwan by posting to her 2.6 million Instagram followers that she was visiting “Taipei, China.” Yeoh’s post continues a long-standing trend of Chinese propaganda that spreads disinformation about Taiwan’s political status and geography, aimed at deceiving the world into supporting its illegitimate claims to Taiwan, which is not and has never been part of China. Taiwan must respond to this blatant act of cognitive warfare. Failure to respond merely cedes ground to China to continue its efforts to conquer Taiwan in the global consciousness to justify an invasion. Taiwan’s government
“If you do not work in semiconductors, you are nothing in this country.” That is what an 18-year-old told me after my speech at the Kaohsiung International Youth Forum. It was a heartbreaking comment — one that highlights how Taiwan ignores the potential of the creative industry and the soft power that it generates. We all know what an Asian nation can achieve in that field. Japan led the way decades ago. South Korea followed with the enormous success of “hallyu” — also known as the Korean wave, referring to the global rise and spread of South Korean culture. Now Thailand
This month’s news that Taiwan ranks as Asia’s happiest place according to this year’s World Happiness Report deserves both celebration and reflection. Moving up from 31st to 27th globally and surpassing Singapore as Asia’s happiness leader is gratifying, but the true significance lies deeper than these statistics. As a society at the crossroads of Eastern tradition and Western influence, Taiwan embodies a distinctive approach to happiness worth examining more closely. The report highlights Taiwan’s exceptional habit of sharing meals — 10.1 shared meals out of 14 weekly opportunities, ranking eighth globally. This practice is not merely about food, but represents something more
In an article published on this page on Tuesday, Kaohsiung-based journalist Julien Oeuillet wrote that “legions of people worldwide would care if a disaster occurred in South Korea or Japan, but the same people would not bat an eyelid if Taiwan disappeared.” That is quite a statement. We are constantly reading about the importance of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC), hailed in Taiwan as the nation’s “silicon shield” protecting it from hostile foreign forces such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and so crucial to the global supply chain for semiconductors that its loss would cost the global economy US$1
RSS