On Monday last week, Hon Hai Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) wrote an op-ed titled “Taiwan abandoning the one-China framework aggravates the risk of war,” published by the Washington Post. In it he emphasized “the one China framework” and “extensive business dealings and personal experience with China” to prevent Taiwan from speeding towards a political and economic precipice.
On Sunday last week, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) presidential candidate, also reiterated the importance of avoiding war and pursuing peace at the party’s national congress. Although Hou did not specify how he would deal with cross-strait relations, he had pledged to “the Constitution of the Republic of China under the framework of the so-called 1992 consensus.”
To some extent, what Gou and Hou want is that the pan-blue camp upholds the political legacy former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) fought long and hard to build during his presidency and after stepping down. Apparently, this way of thinking assumes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still “buys” that story.
It is puzzling whether the so-called “1992 consensus” still provides Taiwan any room to politically maneuver with the CCP if the KMT returns to power under a totally different geopolitical environment than in the past.
As New York University professor emeritus Jerome Cohen and Academia Sinica law research professor Chen Yu-jie (陳玉潔) wrote, “the ‘1992 Consensus’ would not be deemed to be legally binding under international law; nor was it even a genuine consensus.”
Neither Taipei or Beijing should be legally bound by the consensus, as it has no legal effect and is not analogous to an international agreement.
Assuming that the pan-blue camp insists on the so-called “1992 consensus” as a way to resume cross-straits talks, some argue that neither the political reality at the present nor maintaining Ma’s legacy would be in Taiwan’s interest to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength going forward.
It is equally perplexing whether Gou’s personal ties with China can actually preserve Taiwan’s freedom and democracy in one way or another.
With Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) tightening his hold on power and coming across complex challenges at home and abroad, the CCP regime has been unstable over the past years. The recent disappearance of former Chinese minister of foreign affairs Qin Gang (秦剛) is a case in point.
Intriguingly, Gou has been proud of the ties he personally built with former US president Donald Trump, among other US high-level officials. One might say that as unpredictable as Trump is, Gou has upped the ante despite having pledged to support Hou if he wins the party nomination. Gou’s flip-flop has drawn flak inside the party and cast more doubt upon his credibility.
One of the things Gou’s supporters loved about him is that he speaks whatever is in his mind and does not have a politician’s filter. Gou’s charisma is built upon that basis, as well as his long-years of successful business experience that has translated into his reputation as the well-respected philanthropist he has been over the years.
Yet it seems that the foundation is shaking, while hardly widening under the dynamics of the three-way presidential dilemma. Whether Gou runs independently or not could hardly move the needle and benefit the KMT.
If the Democratic Progressive Party manages to split the pan-blue camp and secure the presidency, does it not mean that Gou chose to have nothing to gain but everything to lose, thus contributing to being caught between two fires eventually?
Huang Yu-zhe is a student at National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Law and Interdisciplinary Studies.
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