Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin might have played his assigned role by reportedly meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on June 29. Notwithstanding the contrived show of unity, it would not have been lost on Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) that Prigozhin’s highly public mutiny last month has profoundly weakened the Russian leadership. With Ukraine waging a counteroffensive and Russia’s battlefield losses mounting, Xi’s “no limits” partnership with Putin is quickly morphing into a military liability for China.
Of course, China insists that the Wagner Group’s abortive putsch did not threaten its own cooperation with the Kremlin. Just hours after Prigozhin halted his march on Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement dismissing the revolt as an internal matter. Inside China, news of Prigozhin’s uprising has been sparse, because censors have sanitized Chinese social media of any hint that Putin might have been taken down a peg. State media have duly reiterated the regime’s support for Russia, portrayed the Western reaction as overblown, and declared Putin’s position to be secure.
That Xi would maintain this facade is understandable, given how often he has waxed rhapsodic about China’s ties with Russia and his personal relationship with Putin. The two men have met about 40 times over the past decade, repeatedly avowing a shared worldview. Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine shortly after Xi had announced their “no limits” partnership, and handshake photos during Xi’s visit to Moscow in March — three days after the International Criminal Court indicted Putin for war crimes and issued a warrant for his arrest — conveyed that their bond remained strong.
In the multipolar world that China touts, Russia remains key to constraining the US and its allies. The “comprehensive strategic partnership” that Xi and Putin announced in March encompasses everything from cooperation on “de-dollarization” to pursuing parallel policies in Iran, Syria and Africa — where China’s investments and rising profile complement Russia’s growing military and political presence. Notwithstanding the consequences of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Xi has emphasized that China’s strategy regarding Russia “will not be changed by any turn of events … no matter how the international landscape may change.”
Xi also is ever mindful of maintaining stability at home. The last thing China’s economy — already facing intensifying headwinds — needs is rocky relations with Russia. Faltering industrial output, weak consumer demand, and flagging exports are hampering China’s post-COVID-19 recovery. Although Russia accounts for only 3 percent of China’s total trade, bilateral trade grew 30 percent last year, and has already grown another 41 percent as of May. China is buying Russian oil and gas at a deep discount, and its exports are helping Russia sustain the war and keep its economy afloat.
Moreover, Xi is deeply invested in Sino-Russian military cooperation. On his watch, defense relations accelerated following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern Ukraine, despite the sanctions that followed. While bilateral defense cooperation might have plateaued since 2020, China is still benefiting from access to Russian advanced weapons, military exchanges, joint exercises, and high-tech air, naval, and early-warning systems.
However, as important as such tangible returns might be, China cannot ignore the growing intangible liabilities associated with its ties to Russia. After 16 months of battlefield failures, the Russian armed forces have lost 50 percent of their combat effectiveness, Britain’s military commander estimates, with the US putting the number of Russian casualties at more than 100,000 just since December.
It is safe to assume that China’s own generals are stunned and disappointed by these results. The last war that China fought was almost half a century ago, against Vietnam. Any hope that it had of drawing fresh insights from a winning Russian playbook in Ukraine have now been dashed.
The factors behind Putin’s failures should trouble Xi personally. Consider Russia’s competing chains of command and constant reshuffling of generals in Ukraine. China’s military brass would be wondering what to expect in any East Asian conflict that calls for joint operations with Russia.
Even without the Kremlin’s incompetence and confusion, the US government-funded Center for Naval Analyses concludes that Russia and China have a long way to go in creating an effective military partnership. As matters stand, “[t]he episodic establishment of joint operation centers and the occasional use of each other’s military facilities remain the only cases of advanced military cooperation.”
Even more important for Xi, Russia’s muddled decision-making is not confined to the battlefield. As the Carnegie Endowment’s Mikhail Komin suggests, the military’s tepid response to Prigozhin’s putsch raises basic questions about its loyalties. Xi is already familiar with this problem. As part of his sweeping anti-corruption campaign in the 2010s, he oversaw a highly publicized purge of the Chinese military to root out competitors and critics. One wonders what was going through his mind as the Wagner Group marched on Moscow while Russia’s armed forces did nothing.
China doubtless has its own view about Prigozhin and the specific Russian military leaders whom he sought to challenge — namely Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov — but these are only a few of the many players in the Kremlin’s internecine struggle for position and privilege.
Others include Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s respective predecessors, Anatoly Serdyukov and Nikolai Makarov. A decade ago, Komin reminds us, they led a reform program to revamp the military, ultimately discharging 80 percent of the Russian Army’s colonels and 70 percent of its majors. That house cleaning opened the doors for new officers who are not beholden to today’s incumbents. These players are stationed across Russia’s 11 time zones and up and down its chain of command, and where their loyalties ultimately lie is anyone’s guess.
Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the questionable integrity of Russia’s chain of command would fundamentally change Xi’s strategic calculus or global designs. The Russian security services have reportedly detained at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others following Prigozhin’s revolt can only be troubling for Beijing, but it would appear that Xi cannot do without even a weakened and humiliated Putin.
Kent Harrington, a former senior CIA analyst, served as national intelligence officer for East Asia, chief of station in Asia, and the CIA’s director of public affairs.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
US President Donald Trump’s second administration has gotten off to a fast start with a blizzard of initiatives focused on domestic commitments made during his campaign. His tariff-based approach to re-ordering global trade in a manner more favorable to the United States appears to be in its infancy, but the significant scale and scope are undeniable. That said, while China looms largest on the list of national security challenges, to date we have heard little from the administration, bar the 10 percent tariffs directed at China, on specific priorities vis-a-vis China. The Congressional hearings for President Trump’s cabinet have, so far,
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
RSS