The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is set to modify its J-20 stealth fighters by re-equipping them with WS-15 turbofan engines, with the aim of gradually replacing the WS-10 series and Russian-made AL-31 turbofan engines, and has completed its first test flight of the modified fighter. What role would the J-20, which is touted as a fifth-generation fighter and the mainstay of the PLAAF’s air operations, play in the PLAAF’s future combat system?
China has maintained a high level of confidentiality regarding the specific details of the WS-15 engine. Using afterburners, the engine generates approximately 36,000 pounds of thrust, and the ultimate goal is to reach a thrust rating of 40,000 pounds.
However, this is only the minimum standard for US fifth-generation fighters, so it is still too early for China to think it can surpass the US’ advanced engine manufacturing technology.
The WS-15 engine has approximately 4,000 pounds greater thrust than the existing WS-10, providing a significant boost in performance for the PLAAF’s current aircraft.
However, the J-20’s thrust is still inferior to the US’ two fifth-generation fighter jets — the F-22 and F-35.
Nonetheless, for the US, the J-20 is already one of the biggest threats in air combat. US Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kenneth Wilsbach said that as long as the modernization of US air power continues to advance rapidly, the US is not worried about the J-20’s continually improving performance. The US Air Force and US Navy are striving to develop their respective next-generation air dominance initiatives with the aim of obtaining sixth-generation stealth fighters to serve as the next-generation mainstay of air combat.
China has always made good use of external propaganda directed at the international community. It has always tried to create an impression that exerts psychological pressure on its adversaries. Although China has made progress in the production of stealth aircraft and advanced crewed and uncrewed aircraft, its research and development strength in modern high-performance engines still lags behind the engineering technology of its Western peers. This can be seen from recent setbacks in the operation of China’s Comac C919 passenger airliner. With regard to improvements to the Xian Y-20 Kunpeng military transport aircraft, although it has successfully integrated the new Chinese-made high-bypass WS-20 engine, it is still uncertain whether this technology can be applied to other types of aircraft.
The newly modified J-20 fighter jet equipped with a pair of WS-15 engines is a long-awaited step forward for China’s air force and for its aviation industry.
However, while outside observers focus on the efficiency ratio of engines and the extent to which they can be manufactured domestically, Taiwan’s national defense research needs to pay more attention to identifying the battlefield role of China’s J-20 fighters. As China has completed the architecture of its third-generation Beidou navigation satellite system, Taiwan must, before it obtains the full next-generation version of the data link provided by the US, first and foremost get full access to real-time battlefield and defense zone images shared with the US. This way it can prevent China’s new-generation airpower vehicles from carrying out strategic raids on Taiwan. At this moment, this is the most urgent task.
Chang Yan-ting is a retired air force lieutenant general and an honorary emeritus professor at National Tsing Hua University.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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