Following the decision by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an address in March to “de-risk, not decouple” from China, other Western democracies have taken the same approach to reduce import dependence on China.
Fresh on the heels of the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China and the US have ramped up their tech battle. The Netherlands and Japan have joined the US in limiting China’s access to advanced semiconductor machinery, while the European Council will reduce critical dependencies, and de-risk and diversify supply chains where necessary.
In response, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that it will impose export controls on gallium and germanium, used in semiconductors and electric vehicles, from Aug. 1.
As China accounts for 80 percent of global gallium and germanium production, its export controls have increased geopolitical tensions amid the race to develop advanced computing technology.
Former Chinese deputy minister of commerce Wei Jianguo (魏建國) stepped up the threat by saying that the export controls on chipmaking materials were “just the start” and that the country has more sanctions-related tools.
Beijing’s retaliation with economic coercion and market dependence have proven that the “de-risking” strategy and the pursuit of supply chain diversification was a timely solution.
Its decisive blow to pull the rug from under the West’s feet will do doubt leave it reeling, but it would also bolster resolve to diversify supply chains, which is what happened as a result of an incident on Sept. 7, 2010, when a Chinese trawler collided with Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Diaoyutais (釣魚台, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan). Tokyo arrested the Chinese captain of the trawler, prompting Beijing to protest and suspend exports of rare earth minerals to Japan. The export restrictions ended, but Japan in 2012 developed an electric motor that does not use rare earth minerals. It reduced dependence on imports of the minerals from China from 86 percent in 2009 to 55 percent in 2015, while Toyota developed a new magnet for electric motors that reduces use of rare earth elements by up to 50 percent.
The Japanese government has always backed the policy, regardless of which party is in office.
The EU is drafting raw materials legislation to bolster all stages of its supply chain and diversify imports to reduce strategic dependencies on China. Concerned about Beijing using its economic influence as leverage, the EU and Japan have signed a memorandum to improve cooperation on semiconductors, focusing on the establishment of an early warning system to share information promptly and avoid supply chain disruptions.
This is especially critical as the EU imports 27 percent of its gallium and 17 percent of its germanium from China, and the West relies heavily on China for critical raw materials and distillation. The EU might also have realized that cutting imports of fuel from Russia and accelerating investment in renewable energy have increased dependence on China, as Beijing controls 80 to 90 percent of the products needed for a green transition.
The US has underscored that it will engage with allies and partners to address supply chain issues, meaning that reducing dependence on China will become a shared consensus.
Washington might soon take a leaf out of Japan’s book.
Chang Meng-jen is chairman of Fu Jen Catholic University’s Department of Italian Language and Culture, and coordinator of the university’s diplomacy and international affairs program.
Translated by Rita Wang
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
The US Department of State has removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” in its updated Taiwan-US relations fact sheet, which instead iterates that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” This shows a tougher stance rejecting China’s false claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since switching formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, the US government has continually indicated that it “does not support Taiwan independence.” The phrase was removed in 2022
US President Donald Trump, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have each given their thoughts on Russia’s war with Ukraine. There are a few proponents of US skepticism in Taiwan taking advantage of developments to write articles claiming that the US would arbitrarily abandon Ukraine. The reality is that when one understands Trump’s negotiating habits, one sees that he brings up all variables of a situation prior to discussion, using broad negotiations to take charge. As for his ultimate goals and the aces up his sleeve, he wants to keep things vague for